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Deference Mistakes 
Jonathan S. Masur† & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette†† 
This Article begins with what should seem a relatively straightforward prop-
osition: it is impossible to fully understand a case’s holding without understanding 
its “deference regime”—the standard of review or burden of proof that governs the 
case. If a court holds in the context of a habeas petition that a constitutional right 
was not “clearly established,” that does not necessarily mean that the court would 
hold that the right does not exist were it writing on a blank slate. If a court refuses 
to invalidate a granted patent, which is presumed valid and can be held invalid 
only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence, that does not mean that the 
court believes the patent should have been granted in the first place. And if an ap-
pellate court holds that a trial court’s ruling was not “plain error,” that does not 
necessarily mean that the appellate court believes the trial court reached the correct 
result or would have affirmed the ruling if the review were more searching. 
Yet in case after case, we find that judges (and their clerks) confuse one defer-
ence regime for another or ignore deference entirely. In so doing, they make what 
we term “deference mistakes.” Courts in standard criminal cases regularly rely on 
habeas precedents holding that a federal right was not clearly established to con-
clude that the right does not exist. The Federal Circuit and the Patent and Trade-
mark Office regularly rely on precedents involving granted patents (which are pre-
sumed valid) to justify granting new patents (which are not entitled to that 
presumption). And courts of appeals regularly rely on plain error precedents to jus-
tify holdings in cases in which the standard of review is less deferential. 
Although the problem of deference mistakes cuts across legal doctrines, it has 
been neither identified nor described in prior scholarship. Our Article presents a 
multitude of examples of deference mistakes in practice and explains why they are 
likely to occur. Deference mistakes may seem relatively innocuous, particularly if 
they are confined to individual cases. But that appearance is misleading. We de-
velop a theoretical model of how deference mistakes, coupled with particular 
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asymmetries in adjudication, can generate systematic shifts in legal doctrine. Def-
erence mistakes may have contributed to the current patent crisis by adding to the 
proliferation of bad patents. They may also be partly responsible for retrenchment 
in the law of constitutional criminal procedure rights or the pro-employer shift in 
employment discrimination law. After analyzing deference mistakes’ potential to 
affect the long-term evolution of the law, we discuss possible solutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A district court relies on Eighth Circuit precedent to con-
clude that a claimed federal right does not exist—but the Eighth 
Circuit court had held only that the right was not “clearly estab-
lished” for purposes of habeas corpus.1 The US Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) relies on Federal Circuit precedent in 
granting a patent application—but the Federal Circuit had held 
only that the challenger to a granted patent had not presented 
“clear and convincing” evidence to overcome the presumption of 
patent validity.2 A district court relies on Seventh Circuit prece-
dent in granting an employer’s summary judgment motion in an 
employment discrimination case—but the Seventh Circuit had 
held only that a finding of no discriminatory intent was not 
“clearly erroneous.”3 
In each of these examples, the second decisionmaker made a 
“deference mistake”: it relied on precedent without fully account-
ing for the legal and factual deference regime under which that 
precedent was decided, thereby stripping the holding from its 
legal context.4 (We use “deference” broadly to refer to anything 
 
 1 Newton v Kemna, 352 F3d 776, 785 (8th Cir 2004). In that case, the Eighth Cir-
cuit concluded that, although “the Supreme Court has recognized in other circumstances 
that constitutional rights can trump evidentiary privileges,” “[g]iven the restrictive na-
ture of habeas review,” it was not the Eighth Circuit’s “province to speculate as to 
whether the Supreme Court, if faced with the issue, would find that Missouri’s physi-
cian-patient privilege must give way to a defendant’s desire to use psychiatric records in 
cross-examination.” Id at 781–82. A later district court mischaracterized Newton in re-
jecting a party’s request for a witness’s medical records, stating that Newton “held that 
the trial court’s denial of the criminal defendant’s access to the witness’s medical records 
did not violate the confrontation clause under the Sixth Amendment.” Jackson v 
Wiersema Charter Service, Inc, 2009 WL 1531815, *1 (ED Mo). 
 2 This example is drawn from Ex parte Albritton, 2009 WL 671577, *16 (BPAI), 
which reversed an obviousness rejection in a “close case” based on Arkie Lures, Inc v 
Gene Larew Tackle, Inc, 119 F3d 953 (Fed Cir 1997). 
 3 Oxman v WLS-TV, 12 F3d 652, 656, 661 (7th Cir 1993). In that case, the Seventh 
Circuit stated that, while “it [would be] reasonable to infer that [the] statements [of a 
television station’s news director] reflected [the] opinions [of the station’s general man-
ager, who had exclusive authority to fire employees], . . . such an inference is not man-
dated,” and that the district court’s decision to exclude the news director’s statements 
was “not clearly erroneous.” Id at 660. In granting summary judgment for the employer 
in another employment discrimination case, a later district court interpreted Oxman to 
suggest that the intentions of someone without firing authority “are irrelevant” and “not 
evidence of discrimination.” Respondi v Merrill Lynch & Co, 1998 WL 355447, *4  
(ND Ill). 
 4 To be clear, the latter decisions are not “wrong” in the sense of contravening 
precedent; rather, the mistake is that the second decisionmaker—the one relying on the 
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that causes a decisionmaker to consider an issue differently 
from how it would in the first instance, including different 
standards of review, standards of evidence, or legal presump-
tions.) Just because an evidentiary holding is not an abuse of 
discretion does not mean that a contrary holding is not allowed. 
Just because a determination of negligence is not clearly errone-
ous does not mean that courts should find negligence in every 
similar factual scenario. When a mistake of this type causes a 
decisionmaker to decide a case differently than it would have 
but for the error, the mistake has effectively produced a change 
in the law. 
Nonetheless, these types of mistakes might seem minor. Af-
ter all, courts make small errors of many types on a regular  
basis. What are a few more here and there? And, in many in-
stances, deference mistakes will have no net effect on doctrinal 
development: some district judges might mistakenly rely on 
precedent to exclude evidence that they otherwise would (within 
their discretion) allow, while others might mistakenly rely on 
other precedent to allow evidence that they otherwise would  
exclude. 
But when some asymmetry in the legal system results in a 
skewed distribution of deference mistakes, their overall effect is 
not so innocuous. Each time a deference mistake leads a court to 
exclude evidence erroneously, the law governing the admission 
of evidence narrows slightly. Conversely, each time a deference 
mistake leads to the erroneous admission of evidence, the law 
governing the admission of evidence expands. If one type of def-
erence mistake comes to predominate over the other, the result 
will be a systematic shift in the doctrine. For example, imagine 
that litigants appealed evidentiary rulings admitting evidence 
much more frequently than rulings excluding evidence.5 Appel-
late courts would have many more opportunities to consider ad-
missions of evidence, and the appellate case law would be 
skewed toward deferential affirmances of those admissions. 
Subsequent courts would thus have many more opportunities to 
make deference mistakes with respect to admissions of evidence 
 
precedent—failed to correctly account for the deference regime under which the original 
case (the precedent) was decided. 
 5 This might occur in the context of forensic evidence because criminal appeals are 
almost always made by defendants, who are more likely to complain about the admission 
of incriminating evidence. See Part II.B.2. 
02 MASUR_ART_PSA (CKB) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2015 10:15 AM 
2015] Deference Mistakes 647 
 
than with respect to exclusions. The long-term result would be 
legal bias in the direction of admitting more and more evidence. 
This Article thus joins a broader literature on extralegal de-
terminants of doctrinal pathways. Other scholars have shown 
that legal doctrine can evolve due to factors other than norma-
tive rightness or judicial interpretive methods, including the 
choice of enforcement mechanism, the identity of the parties 
bringing suit, or structural factors related to the courts.6 To this 
literature, our Article contributes the idea of long-term doctrinal 
evolution via mistake. This doctrinal evolution is problematic 
even if the mistakes are made by decisionmakers who rule dif-
ferently from how they otherwise would for strategic, reversal-
averse reasons. 
Of course, for this mechanism to result in a shift in doctrine, 
the court granting deference must defer on some issue that will 
matter in future cases. In theory, appellate courts defer only on 
case-specific factual determinations, while reviewing legal ques-
tions without deference. In practice, however, factual decisions 
often infect legal decisions, and courts have recognized the diffi-
culty of separating legal and factual determinations by declaring 
some issues to be “mixed questions of law and fact,”7 which are 
sometimes reviewed deferentially.8 
Furthermore, there are a few areas in which legal questions 
are reviewed under different standards in different situations. 
These doctrinal areas can be especially fertile grounds for defer-
ence mistakes. For example, patent invalidity must be estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence in the infringement  
 
 6 See generally, for example, David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s 
Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 Colum L Rev 1913 (2014) (describing 
this literature and presenting a new theory of how the choice of private versus public 
enforcement can systematically shift doctrine); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come 
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L & Society Rev 95 (1974) 
(discussing the dynamics of litigation in the presence of repeat players); Bert I. Huang, 
Lightened Scrutiny, 124 Harv L Rev 1109 (2011) (showing that, when the Second and 
Ninth Circuits were overwhelmed with immigration appeals, they began to overrule dis-
trict courts less often than other circuits in nonimmigration civil appeals). See also gen-
erally Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 Yale L J 470 (2011) (suggesting that patent 
law has evolved in pro-patent directions because of asymmetries in the conditions under 
which parties may appeal adverse decisions); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, What Are the 
Sources of Patent Inflation? An Analysis of Federal Circuit Patentability Rulings, 121 
Yale L J Online 347 (2011) (hypothesizing that misunderstandings of deference regimes 
may have contributed to patent law’s pro-patent evolution). 
 7 Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, 9C Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil Procedure § 2589 at 473 (West 3d ed 2008). 
 8 See id at § 2589 at 484–85. 
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context, but only by a preponderance of the evidence when valid-
ity is challenged before the PTO.9 Just because there is not clear 
and convincing evidence that a patent is invalid does not mean 
that it should not be held invalid under a lower standard. It is 
often a mistake for the PTO to rely on precedent from infringe-
ment cases when deciding to grant patents.10 Similarly, in the 
habeas and qualified immunity contexts, courts consider wheth-
er federal rights are clearly established rather than whether 
these rights exist at all.11 It is a mistake to rely on precedent 
holding that a right is not “clearly established” in order to con-
clude that it is “clearly not established.” We find numerous mis-
takes of this type.12 
We make two principal contributions in this Article. First, 
we explain, categorize, and document deference mistakes across 
a wide swath of legal fields. We discuss numerous cases in which 
a court cites precedent for a proposition that the precedent does 
not support given the deference regime under which the prece-
dent was originally decided. Though we cannot be certain, it 
seems likely that, in many of these cases, the deference mistake 
was dispositive. Second, we build and analyze a theoretical 
model of deference mistakes in judicial decisionmaking. Using 
this model, we demonstrate that, under the right conditions, 
deference mistakes can propagate across time and lead to long-
term doctrinal evolution. Asymmetries in the types of cases that 
come before courts, or the contexts in which these cases arise, or 
even the types of decisionmakers involved, can lead to asymme-
tries in the number and type of deference mistakes that courts 
or other decisionmakers commit. Over time, like water dripping 
 
 9 See Microsoft Corp v i4i LP, 131 S Ct 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that the stand-
ard of proof to establish patent invalidity in an infringement case is clear and convincing 
evidence); In re Baxter International, Inc, 678 F3d 1357, 1364 (Fed Cir 2012):  
[A] challenger that attacks the validity of patent claims in civil litigation has a 
statutory burden to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. . . . In 
contrast, in PTO reexaminations the standard of proof—a preponderance of the 
evidence—is substantially lower than in a civil case and there is no presump-
tion of validity in reexamination proceedings. 
(quotation marks omitted). We will at times use “validity” to refer to the patentability of 
patent applications for ease of explication, even though this term is technically reserved 
for granted patents. 
 10 One of us has suggested that this mechanism may have been partially responsi-
ble for the expansion of the boundaries of patentability that has occurred since the crea-
tion of the Federal Circuit. See Ouellette, 121 Yale L J Online at 368–71 (cited in note 6). 
 11 See Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362, 402–03 (2000) (habeas); Harlow v Fitzgerald, 
457 US 800, 818 (1982) (qualified immunity). 
 12 See Part II. 
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on a rock, these asymmetries can carve new doctrinal channels 
and steer the law in directions it might not otherwise have taken. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we explain 
why we expect deference mistakes to occur. First, we review the 
various deference regimes (again, using our broad definition of 
“deference”) and describe a number of situations in which appel-
late decisionmakers grant deference on issues that will matter 
in future cases. Second, we review the literature and cases on 
the extent to which deference regimes actually affect outcomes, 
and we conclude that deference likely does matter to at least 
some extent. Finally, we discuss factors that might cause courts 
to make deference mistakes—using “mistake” to refer to the 
kinds of legal errors discussed above. 
Part II then presents numerous examples of actual defer-
ence mistakes. For instance, we show that courts have errone-
ously relied on precedents holding that a given right was not 
clearly established (in the context of a petition for habeas relief) 
in concluding that a right does not exist. Analogously, the PTO 
and the Federal Circuit have relied on precedents from patent 
infringement suits—in which patents and trademarks carry a 
presumption of validity—to justify granting new patents or reg-
istering new trademarks (which are not entitled to that pre-
sumption). We also provide examples of criminal cases in which 
a precedent involving plain error review—which applies because 
the appealing party failed to object at trial—is used to decide a 
later case subject to a lower standard of deference. 
In Part III, we present a theoretical model of how deference 
mistakes can lead to systematic doctrinal shifts. This model is 
simplest when the deference is not to a lower decisionmaker but 
rather is a legal presumption, such that similar cases are some-
times decided under different legal standards (as in patent and 
habeas cases). But we also show that, when an appellate deci-
sionmaker defers to a lower decisionmaker, a skewed distribu-
tion of precedents can arise when only one type of party appeals 
(or appeals more often), when the deference is one-sided, or 
when the lower decisionmaker is likely to be biased relative to 
the appellate decisionmaker. We then explain how a skewed dis-
tribution of precedents, coupled with the cumulative effect of 
seemingly innocuous deference mistakes, can lead to systematic 
doctrinal shifts. 
To be clear, we do not claim that deference mistakes are 
solely responsible for doctrinal shifts in the areas of law that we 
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describe in Part II—the areas in which we have documented re-
peated instances of deference mistakes. Rather, the mechanism 
we describe can work in tandem with, or even supplement, shifts 
based on changing judicial philosophies and other factors. We do 
not even claim to have proven here that our mechanism has 
caused systematic doctrinal shifts. Part II demonstrates that all 
the elements necessary for the mechanism that we lay out in 
Part III—including actual examples of deference mistakes—are 
present in a variety of doctrinal areas. The extent to which def-
erence mistakes are driving doctrinal shifts in these or other  
areas is thus ripe for empirical study. 
Part IV then explores potential solutions to the problem of 
deference mistakes. We consider whether appellate deci-
sionmakers should be required to address deference more explic-
itly, for instance by noting that they might have reached a dif-
ferent conclusion had they been deciding the case on a clean 
slate. In the qualified immunity context, courts are encouraged 
(and were, for a time, required) to decide whether a constitu-
tional right was violated before deciding whether that right was 
clearly established.13 So far as we can tell, this has led to fewer 
formal deference errors than in the habeas context. But the 
qualified immunity regime is not necessarily healthier for the 
development of constitutional doctrine—it might simply cause 
courts to overstate the case against a particular right in order to 
avoid cognitive dissonance and minimize the probability of re-
versal. In any case, because the problem occurs only when some 
actor in the system makes a mistake, simply publicizing the 
problem is likely to help. Unless decisionmakers become more 
comfortable admitting ambiguities, the best hope for avoiding 
deference mistakes may lie with increased awareness on the 
part of decisionmakers, advocates, and commentators, which 
will enable these various actors to recognize and announce such 
mistakes when they occur. 
I.  DEFINING DEFERENCE MISTAKES 
One of the virtues of a system in which judges issue written 
opinions is clarity regarding what the judge has actually decid-
ed. In the written opinion, the judge will typically explain both 
 
 13 See Camreta v Greene, 131 S Ct 2020, 2031–32 (2011). See also Saucier v Katz, 533 
US 194, 201 (2001) (noting that the “initial inquiry” for a court ruling on qualified immuni-
ty must be whether a constitutional right was violated), revd, Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 
223 (2009). 
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the decision she has reached and the legal standard under which 
she made the decision—including such basic elements as the 
burden of proof. Of course, this system does not always function 
smoothly. Sometimes a judge is not clear about what she has de-
cided or the standard she has applied. Other times a judge is 
clear, but subsequent courts and litigants misinterpret what she 
has written. It is difficult to imagine a subsequent court mistak-
ing which party actually won an earlier case, but occasionally a 
court will err in interpreting the burden of proof or standard of 
review that a previous judge applied. 
A mistake regarding the appropriate burden of proof in a 
prior case may not, at first glance, appear particularly im-
portant. It might seem like a highly technical legal mistake, of 
interest only to legal sticklers (or pedants). But this impression 
is misleading. Misunderstanding the operative burden of proof 
in an earlier case is often equivalent to misunderstanding the 
legal decision on the merits. For example, if a court holds that a 
right is not clearly established in the habeas or qualified im-
munity contexts, and that court is subsequently misunderstood 
to have held that a right is clearly not established, the mistake 
creates a precedent (at least in the opinion of the misinterpret-
ing court) that may be precisely the opposite of what the first 
court would actually have decided had the issue been presented 
to it outside the prevailing deference regime. This type of mis-
understanding is a deference mistake. 
In this Article, we focus on unintentional deference mis-
takes. We note, however, that deference mistakes can be either 
honest and inadvertent errors or willful and strategic deci-
sions—or somewhere on the continuum between. Outside ob-
servers typically cannot discern where a decisionmaker’s moti-
vation falls along this spectrum. In many ways, the motivation 
behind a deference mistake is unimportant: both unintentional 
and intentional deference mistakes lead to similar doctrinal 
shifts for normatively problematic reasons. The most important 
distinction is that strategic mistakes may call for different solu-
tions. We focus here on unintentional errors because our impres-
sion is that few judges intentionally insert errors into their opin-
ions in the hope that the mistakes will slip past their colleagues. 
Judges may be more likely to err in favor of their preferred  
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normative outcomes due to unconscious motivated reasoning,14 
but we suspect that few mistakes are consciously intended. 
For deference mistakes to matter for future cases, three key 
elements must be present. First, courts must sometimes grant 
deference (in our broad sense of the term) on issues that will 
matter in future cases. Second, legal-deference regimes must ac-
tually affect outcomes in at least some cases. And third, courts, 
agencies, or other legal decisionmakers must sometimes make 
deference mistakes: they must rely on precedent without fully 
accounting for the legal and factual deference regime under 
which that precedent was decided. In this Part, we argue that 
these three elements are present in the US legal system. 
A. What Is Deference? 
Judicial deference can be a “slippery concept to define pre-
cisely.”15 In this Article, we use “deference” in its broadest sense 
to include any situation in which a second decisionmaker is in-
fluenced by the judgment of some initial decisionmaker rather 
than examining an issue entirely de novo.16 In our model, these 
decisionmakers might be courts, agencies, or other government 
actors that resolve individual cases.17 
Deference might be granted through a variety of mecha-
nisms. Federal courts often review decisions of lower courts and 
 
 14 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some 
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv L Rev 1 (2011) (arguing that judges’ deci-
sions are influenced by cultural cognition, predisposing them to fit their judgments to 
their group commitments). 
 15 Jonathan M. Justl, Disastrously Misunderstood: Judicial Deference in the  
Japanese-American Cases, 119 Yale L J 270, 285 (2009). See also Henry P. Monaghan, 
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum L Rev 1, 4–5 (1983) (noting that defer-
ence is “not a well-defined concept but rather an umbrella that has been used to cover a 
variety of judicial approaches”). 
 16 We thus adopt a broader definition than that of Professor Paul Horwitz, who was 
hesitant about using “deference” to describe “a thumb on the scales but not a complete 
surrender of judgment,” or situations in which “some independent controlling authority 
dictates to [the second decisionmaker] that it defer to [the first decisionmaker].” Paul 
Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 Notre Dame L Rev 1061, 1073, 1076 (2008). We 
also adopt a broader definition than commentators who have focused on deference to 
facts. See, for example, Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Re-
view, and the Bill of Rights, 84 Iowa L Rev 941, 958 (1999). 
 17 For example, Professor Daniel Solove has noted that the US Supreme Court “fre-
quently accords deference to the judgments of numerous decisionmakers in the bureau-
cratic state: Congress, the Executive, state legislatures, agencies, military officials, pris-
on officials, professionals, prosecutors, employers, and practically any other 
decisionmaker in a position of authority or expertise.” Solove, 84 Iowa L Rev at 944 (cit-
ed in note 16). 
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agencies under deferential standards of review such as clear er-
ror (for district court fact-finding in civil cases18), plain error (for 
issues not raised below19), substantial evidence (for jury ver-
dicts20 and certain agency fact-finding21), and abuse of discretion 
(for many procedural and evidentiary determinations).22 Defer-
ence might also be granted due to legal presumptions coupled 
with standards of evidence or burdens of proof. For example, pa-
tents are presumed valid,23 which means that a court will hold a 
patent invalid only if there is clear and convincing evidence of 
invalidity (rather than a preponderance of the evidence).24 In es-
sence, this means that courts are granting some deference to the 
PTO’s prior determination of patent validity. And, as we de-
scribe in Part I.C, many other specific deference regimes are re-
quired by statute or have been developed by courts. 
Because we are interested in deference only as it affects doc-
trinal development, the issue on which deference is granted 
must matter in subsequent cases. Agencies frequently receive 
deference on legal determinations under Chevron, USA, Inc v 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc25 or other agency-
deference regimes,26 and it would be erroneous for another deci-
sionmaker to treat one of these deferential precedents as if it 
had been decided under de novo review. But outside the Chevron 
context, one might question whether courts in fact defer on is-
sues of future relevance. Questions of law are almost universally 
reviewed without deference;27 instead, deference is typically 
 
 18 See FRCP 52(a)(6). 
 19 See FRCrP 52(b). Errors that do “not affect substantial rights” are considered 
“harmless” and “must be disregarded.” FRCrP 52(a). While we do not focus on them here, 
the rules for harmless error are themselves complex. 
 20 See Hamling v United States, 418 US 87, 124 (1974). 
 21 Agency fact-finding is reviewed for substantial evidence when it results from 
formal adjudication and rulemaking; other agency actions are reviewed under an “arbi-
trary and capricious” standard. 5 USC § 706(2)(A). 
 22 See generally Steven Alan Childress and Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards of 
Review (LexisNexis 4th ed 2010) (summarizing the standards of review employed by fed-
eral courts). 
 23 See 35 USC § 282(a). 
 24 See Microsoft Corp v i4i LP, 131 S Ct 2238, 2243 (2011). 
 25 467 US 837 (1984). 
 26 See id at 842–44; William N. Eskridge Jr and Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 Georgetown L J 1083, 1098–1120 (2008). See also generally Melissa F. Was-
serman, Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93 Tex L 
Rev 625 (2015). 
 27 See Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 Geo Wash L Rev 308, 
312–16 (2009) (criticizing universal de novo review of legal issues). 
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granted on case-specific facts—known as “adjudicative facts”—
which (by definition) are supposed to be unimportant in subse-
quent cases.28 If this formal law/fact division were clear and pre-
cisely followed, so that any issue that might be relevant in a 
subsequent case were always reviewed de novo (functionally as 
well as formally), the deference mistakes at the heart of our 
model would never occur. 
The real world, however, is not so precisely divided. Some 
facts are relevant in many cases—these “legislative facts” might 
be found by courts or legislatures,29 and these facts are some-
times granted deference.30 Even adjudicative facts might be rel-
evant in subsequent cases if those facts infect legal decisionmak-
ing. For example, an appellate court that sees only particular 
factual postures might subconsciously shape the law to fit those 
facts.31 
There is also no clear divide between fact and law: the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged that the boundary is “slippery”32 
and “vexing,”33 and scholars have questioned the coherence of 
the distinction.34 Legally imbued issues that have been deemed 
questions of fact—and which are thus reviewed deferentially—
include whether there was discriminatory intent in an employ-
ment discrimination case,35 whether an exemption to the Fair 
Labor Standards Act36 applies in a particular case,37 and wheth-
er there was negligence and causation in tort cases (except in 
 
 28 See United States v Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F3d 802, 811 (1995), citing FRE 201, 
Advisory Committee’s Note to the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Adjudicative facts are 
simply the facts of the particular case.”). See also text accompanying notes 18–22. 
 29 See Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F3d at 811, citing FRE 201, Advisory Committee’s 
Note to the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Legislative facts . . . are those which have rele-
vance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a le-
gal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.”). 
 30 See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-record Fact-
Finding, 61 Duke L J 1, 49 (2011); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference 
to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 Ind L J 1, 6–13 (2009) (discussing the confusion in the 
courts as to how much deference should be given to legislative fact-finding). 
 31 See note 211 and accompanying text. 
 32 Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362, 385 (2000), quoting Thompson v Keohane, 516 
US 99, 110–11 (1995). 
 33 Pullman-Standard v Swint, 456 US 273, 288 (1982). 
 34 See, for example, Ronald J. Allen and Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-
Fact Distinction, 97 Nw U L Rev 1769, 1790 (2003); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 
Nw U L Rev 859, 863 (1992). 
 35 See Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 289. 
 36 52 Stat 1060 (1938), codified at 29 USC § 201 et seq. 
 37 See Icicle Seafoods, Inc v Worthington, 475 US 709, 713 (1986). 
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the Second Circuit).38 Some issues have been explicitly called 
“mixed questions of law and fact,” and the standard of review for 
these issues varies.39 Wright and Miller have compiled a long list 
of issues “that certainly seem to contain both legal and factual 
elements” but that have been reviewed for clear error; these in-
clude the scope of a fiduciary relationship, the existence of a con-
tract, the likelihood of consumer confusion about trademarks, 
and the existence of personal jurisdiction.40 In any of these cases, 
an appellate court might grant deference to a district court deci-
sion on an issue that will matter in future cases, such as a con-
clusion that an employer’s seniority system does not reflect dis-
criminatory intent41 or a decision about the extent of a speeding 
driver’s contributory negligence.42 
Appellate courts also apply deferential review to many deci-
sions that involve legal judgments of possible future relevance, 
including evidentiary rulings,43 injunctions,44 sentences,45 attor-
neys’ fees and sanctions,46 declaratory jurisdiction (in some cir-
cuits),47 and numerous other issues.48 This deference means that 
 
 38 See Childress and Davis, 1 Federal Standards of Review at § 2.28 at 2-195 (cited 
in note 22). 
 39 See Wright and Miller, 9C Federal Practice and Procedure at § 2589 at 484–86 
(cited in note 7). See also Lowry Development, LLC v Groves & Associates Insurance, Inc, 
690 F3d 382, 385 (5th Cir 2012) (applying different standards of review to the legal and 
factual aspects of a single issue). 
 40 Wright and Miller, 9C Federal Practice and Procedure at § 2589 at 486–92 (cited 
in note 7). 
 41 See Pullman-Standard, 456 US at 289–90. 
 42 See Pohl v County of Furnas, 682 F3d 745, 754 (8th Cir 2012). 
 43 See Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael, 526 US 137, 152 (1999) (affirming that deci-
sions whether to admit expert testimony are subject to abuse of discretion review); Gen-
eral Electric Co v Joiner, 522 US 136, 141 (1997) (“All evidentiary decisions are reviewed 
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”). 
 44 See eBay Inc v MercExchange, LLC, 547 US 388, 391 (2006) (reviewing the grant 
of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion); Ashcroft v American Civil Liberties 
Union, 542 US 656, 664 (2004) (reviewing the grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse 
of discretion). 
 45 See Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 41 (2007) (reviewing a criminal sentence for 
abuse of discretion). 
 46 See Cooter & Gell v Hartmarx Corp, 496 US 384, 405 (1990) (affirming that a 
district court’s imposition of sanctions under FRCP 11 is reviewed for abuse of discre-
tion); Pierce v Underwood, 487 US 552, 563 (1988) (holding that a determination wheth-
er the government’s litigation position was “substantially justified” for purposes of 
awarding attorneys’ fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion). 
 47 See Pacific Employers Insurance Co v M/V Capt W.D. Cargill, 474 US 909, 909–
10 (1985) (White dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting a circuit split on the appro-
priate standard of review for declaratory jurisdiction). 
 48 See, for example, Cooper Industries, Inc v Leatherman Tool Group, Inc, 532 US 
424, 433 (2001) (noting that a district court’s determination whether a punitive damages 
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a given case may have more than one acceptable conclusion.49 If 
an appellate court affirms one such outcome—for example, the 
exclusion of a certain type of expert testimony or the denial of an 
injunction under certain circumstances—district courts may 
thereafter rely on that precedent without realizing that admit-
ting the testimony or granting the injunction would also be with-
in their discretion. 
Finally, as we will discuss in much greater detail in Part II, 
courts sometimes evaluate issues more deferentially based on 
specific statutory requirements. As we mentioned earlier, courts 
must evaluate granted patents more deferentially than they 
would in the examination context due to the presumption of pa-
tent validity.50 Similarly, courts must evaluate convictions chal-
lenged via habeas petitions more deferentially than direct crim-
inal appeals due to the requirement that relief may be granted 
only when there was a violation of “clearly established Federal 
law.”51 When statutes require review of similar issues under dif-
ferent standards in different contexts, deference mistakes may 
be especially pernicious. 
In sum, decisionmakers often grant deference (broadly de-
fined) on issues that will matter in future cases. This brief review 
of deference regimes has focused on US federal law, but similar 
mechanisms may also operate at the international,52 state,53 and 
 
award is excessive is reviewed for abuse of discretion); Wilton v Seven Falls Co, 515 US 
277, 289–90 (1995) (holding that a district court’s decision to stay a declaratory judg-
ment action pending state litigation is reviewed for abuse of discretion); Immigration 
and Naturalization Service v Abudu, 485 US 94, 96 (1988) (holding that the decision 
whether to reopen deportation proceedings is reviewed for abuse of discretion). 
 49 See, for example, Wheat v United States, 486 US 153, 164 (1988) (“[W]e hold that 
the District Court’s [decision] . . . was within its discretion. . . . Other district courts 
might have reached differing or opposite conclusions with equal justification, but that 
does not mean that one conclusion was ‘right’ and the other ‘wrong.’”). 
 50 See notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 51 28 USC § 2254(d)(1). 
 52 See generally, for example, Steven P. Croley and John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute 
Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 Am J Intl L 
193 (1996) (examining the standard that the World Trade Organization uses to review 
national governments’ actions). See also Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a 
Globalizing Judicial System, 54 Duke L J 1143, 1178–97 (2005) (discussing issues relat-
ed to the amount of deference accorded to domestic court decisions under review by in-
ternational arbitration panels). 
 53 See generally, for example, William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, and Leo E. Strine 
Jr, Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation 
Law, 56 Bus Law 1287 (2001); W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 29 St 
Mary’s L J 351 (1998). 
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local levels.54 All that is needed is for one authoritative deci-
sionmaker to defer to another decisionmaker on an issue that 
will be relevant in the future. 
B. Does Deference Matter? 
The second key element required by our model is that legal-
deference regimes must actually affect outcomes. One reason to 
believe that standards of review, legal presumptions, and other 
deference regimes can matter is that judges say that they do. 
Judge Harry Edwards of the DC Circuit opens his book on 
standards of review by noting that they “are critically important 
in determining the parameters of appellate review.”55 Former 
Tenth Circuit chief judge Deanell Tacha said that the standard 
of review “is everything.”56 Former DC Circuit chief judge Patri-
cia Wald stated that the appellate standard of review “more of-
ten than not determines the outcome.”57 And Judge Harry 
Pregerson of the Ninth Circuit wrote that “[t]he standard of re-
view is the keystone of appellate decision making” because ap-
pellate courts do not “reweigh all the evidence and find the facts 
anew;” he criticized briefs that “overlook this critical  
issue.”58 
Federal courts require parties to state the applicable stand-
ard of review for each issue,59 and many opinions state that the 
standard of review was outcome determinative in that case60 or 
 
 54 See generally Christopher P. Terry, On the Frontiers of Knowledge: A Flexible 
Substantial Evidence Standard of Review for Zoning Board Tower Siting Decisions, 20 
Temple Envir L & Tech J 147 (2002) (discussing a circuit split over the deference due to 
local zoning-board decisions about where service providers may erect cell phone towers). 
 55 Harry T. Edwards and Linda A. Elliott, Federal Courts Standards of Review: Ap-
pellate Court Review of District Court Decisions and Agency Decisions v (Thomson  
West 2007). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U Chi L Rev 1371, 1391 (1995). 
 58 Harry Pregerson, The Seven Sins of Appellate Brief Writing and Other Trans-
gressions, 34 UCLA L Rev 431, 437 (1986). 
 59 See FRAP 28(a)(8)(B) (requiring briefs to contain, “for each issue, a concise 
statement of the applicable standard of review”). 
 60 See, for example, Brown v Payton, 544 US 133, 148 (2005) (Breyer concurring) 
(“[T]his is a case in which Congress’ instruction to defer to the reasonable conclusions of 
state-court judges makes a critical difference.”); Fantasyland Video, Inc v County of San 
Diego, 496 F3d 1040, 1041 (9th Cir 2007) (“Identification of the proper standard of re-
view under state law will likely determine the outcome of this appeal.”); Transamerica 
Premier Insurance Co v Ober, 107 F3d 925, 929 (1st Cir 1997) (“[T]he pertinent standard 
of review . . . is decisive in shaping the outcome of our assessment.”); In re Brana, 51 F3d 
1560, 1569 (Fed Cir 1995) (“[E]ven though in some cases [the standard of review] might 
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explicitly distinguish precedents based on differing standards of 
review.61 The Seventh Circuit has memorably stated that a deci-
sion will be overturned under the clearly erroneous standard on-
ly if it “strike[s] [the court] as wrong with the force of a five-
week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish,”62 a metaphor adopted by 
many other circuits to illustrate the burden of challenging facts 
on appeal.63 Commentators agree that standards of review mat-
ter and have devoted many pages to drawing subtle distinctions 
between various standards of review, which suggests that these 
distinctions are not entirely meaningless.64 
To be sure, legal realists who believe that judicial outcomes 
are determined primarily by the facts may be skeptical of the 
relevance of deference regimes—although realists do not claim 
 
not matter, in others it would, otherwise the lengthy debates about the meaning of these 
formulations and the circumstances in which they apply would be unnecessary.”); United 
States v Conley, 4 F3d 1200, 1204 (3d Cir 1993) (“[T]he standard of review can be out-
come determinative.”); Payne v Borg, 982 F2d 335, 338 (9th Cir 1992) (“The relevant 
standards of review are critical to the outcome of this case.”); United States v Vontsteen, 
950 F2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir 1992) (en banc) (“[T]he standard chosen often affects the 
outcome of the case.”); United Steelworkers of America v Schuylkill Metals Corp, 828 F2d 
314, 320 (5th Cir 1987) (“In this case, the standard of review determines the outcome.”); 
Fox v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 718 F2d 251, 253 (7th Cir 1983) (“The critical 
issue in this case is one not discussed by the parties: our standard of review.”). 
 61 See, for example, Collins v Alco Parking Corp, 448 F3d 652, 658 (3d Cir 2006); 
United States v Aguilera, 106 Fed Appx 892, 896 (5th Cir 2004); Marshall v United 
States, 436 F2d 155, 157 n 4 (DC Cir 1970); Highmark Federal Credit Union v Hunter, 
814 NW2d 413, 418 (SD 2012); State v Reed, 21 SW3d 44, 46 (Mo App 2000). But see 
United States v Shelton, 937 F2d 140, 143–44 (5th Cir 1991) (rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that precedent was “not controlling because it was decided under a different 
standard of review,” and choosing to treat the precedent as “controlling” regardless). 
 62 Parts and Electric Motors, Inc v Sterling Electric, Inc, 866 F2d 228, 233 (7th  
Cir 1988). 
 63 See, for example, McCormack v Hiedeman, 694 F3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir 2012); 
L.J. v Wilbon, 633 F3d 297, 311 (4th Cir 2011); United States v Lanham, 617 F3d 873, 
888 (6th Cir 2010). 
 64 See, for example, Childress and Davis, 1 Federal Standards of Review § 1.01 at  
1-2 (cited in note 22) (“[S]tandards of review—those yardstick phrases meant to guide 
the appellate court in approaching both the issues before it and the trial court’s earlier 
procedure or result—actually matter. They do affect subsequent courts, trial and appel-
late, in doing their job.”) (emphasis omitted); Edwards and Elliott, Federal Courts at v 
(cited in note 55); Eugene Volokh and Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Inde-
pendent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 Yale L J 2431, 2441 & nn 62–63 
(1998) (“Skeptics may suggest that, in practice, the standard of review matters little—
that judges will manipulate the standard to reach the results they want. We disagree. 
Doubtless such manipulation sometimes happens, but in our experience courts generally do 
take the standard of review seriously.”). See also generally Kevin Casey, Jade Camara, and 
Nancy Wright, Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance and Se-
mantics, 11 Fed Cir Bar J 279 (2002). As of May 27, 2015, there were over 670 articles in 
Westlaw’s database of journal articles with “standard” (or “standards”) and “review” in 
their titles. 
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that rules never matter.65 A treatise on federal standards of re-
view begins by emphasizing two points about the importance of 
legal practice over formalism: first, “[t]he formulations do not 
say much until the appeals court . . . gives them life”; and sec-
ond, “[e]ven when the slogans have no real internal meaning . . . 
the issue framing or assignment of power behind the words is 
the turning point of the decision.”66 Thus, for example, the 
phrase “abuse of discretion” reflects the sense that appellate 
courts should not review de novo every minor evidentiary or pro-
cedural determination of trial courts—but “the variety of mat-
ters committed to the discretion of district judges means that 
the standard is necessarily variable.”67 
Similarly, one might believe that the Federal Circuit uses a 
higher standard to invalidate issued patents not because of for-
mal evidentiary standards, but because of its reluctance to dis-
rupt settled expectations and reveal a split with a coordinate 
branch.68 The presumption of patent validity merely captures 
this legal practice. And the legal practice behind the words mat-
ters: former Federal Circuit chief judge Paul Michel once told 
practitioners that “standards of review influence dispositions in 
the Federal Circuit far more than many advocates realize.”69 
When the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, considered its re-
view of PTO fact-finding in In re Zurko,70 it noted that “the  
 
 65 See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurispru-
dence, 76 Tex L Rev 267, 275 & n 39 (1997) (stating that a fundamental tenet of legal 
realism is that “judges respond primarily to the stimulus of facts” but cautioning that 
“[p]roper emphasis must be put on the word ‘primarily’: no Realists (except perhaps Un-
derhill Moore) claimed that rules never mattered to the course of decision”); Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, Book Review, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal L Rev 465, 471 (1988) (“The most 
convincing legal realists argued that the reasoning demanded by judicial opinions sub-
stantially constrained judges.”). 
 66 Childress and Davis, 1 Federal Standards of Review § 1.01 at 1-2 (cited in note 
22) (emphasis omitted). See also Michael R. Bosse, Standards of Review: The Meaning of 
Words, 49 Me L Rev 367, 396–98 (1997) (arguing that “the reasoning behind the labeling 
is the important first step in the [standard of review] analysis” and the attempt to base 
standards of review on the law/fact distinction “is a misguided and impossible  
adventure”). 
 67 Edwards and Elliott, Federal Courts at 67 (cited in note 55). 
 68 See, for example, Dickinson v Zurko, 527 US 150, 161–62 (1999) (“[B]oth bench 
and bar have now become used to the [Federal] Circuit’s application of a ‘clearly errone-
ous’ standard that implies somewhat stricter court/court review.”). 
 69 Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 Ohio St L J 1415, 
1415 (1995). 
 70 142 F3d 1447 (Fed Cir 1998) (en banc), revd, Dickinson v Zurko, 527 US 150 
(1999). 
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outcome of this appeal turns on the standard of review.”71 This 
means that the court thought the PTO’s finding was clearly er-
roneous (and thus reversible under the clear error standard) 
even though the finding was supported by substantial evidence 
(and thus not reversible under the less searching standard of the 
Administrative Procedure Act72 (APA)).73 The Supreme Court re-
versed, stating that the Federal Circuit had not explained why 
PTO review “demands a stricter fact-related review standard 
than is applicable to other agencies.”74 The debate was not over 
the inherently slippery distinction between clear error and sub-
stantial evidence. Rather, it was over the meaning behind these 
words and the balance of power between the PTO and the Fed-
eral Circuit.75 An empirical study concluded that there was a 
statistically significant decrease in Federal Circuit reversals of 
the PTO in post-Zurko patent cases,76 suggesting that the deci-
sion did impact Federal Circuit review. 
Efforts to quantify the effect of standards of review are chal-
lenging due to selection effects. Simply counting reversals miss-
es those cases that are settled or not appealed. But one would 
expect these effects to decrease the observable impact of the 
standard of review.77 It is thus noteworthy that there was an ob-
servable effect post-Zurko, and that another empirical study of 
Illinois appellate cases found that “application of standards of 
review that grant less deference to the lower court’s decision 
regularly yield lower affirmance rates.”78 Another study of feder-
al appellate cases found both that “deferential standards of re-
view appear to considerably decrease the probability of outright 
reversal” and “no evidence that judges manipulate standards of 
 
 71 In re Zurko, 142 F3d at 1449. 
 72 60 Stat 237 (1946), 5 USC § 706(2)(E) (instructing that courts shall “hold unlaw-
ful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence”). 
 73 See In re Zurko, 142 F3d at 1449. 
 74 Dickinson, 527 US at 165. 
 75 See id at 160–61. 
 76 See Jeffrey M. Samuels and Linda B. Samuels, The Impact of Dickinson v. Zurko 
on Federal Circuit Review of USPTO Board Decisions: An Analytic and Empirical Analysis, 
20 Fed Cir Bar J 665, 675–80 (2011) (reviewing all relevant decisions of the Federal Cir-
cuit from 1990 to 2009, a period straddling the 1999 Zurko decision). 
 77 See George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litiga-
tion, 13 J Legal Stud 1, 17–20, 29 (1984) (arguing that selection effects will cause win 
rates to be independent of decision standards but dependent on the stakes of the parties 
and further noting that this model “applies indistinguishably to trial and appellate  
disputes”). 
 78 Timothy J. Storm, The Standard of Review Does Matter: Evidence of Judicial 
Self-Restraint in the Illinois Appellate Court, 34 SIU L J 73, 103 (2009). 
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review.”79 One study avoided the selection-effect problem by 
looking at the effect of changing standards of review on depar-
tures from federal sentencing guidelines (because all convicted 
offenders must be sentenced) and found that “[c]hanges to 
standards of review clearly have an impact on district judges’ 
sentencing behavior.”80 The authors of this study concluded that 
“[these] results also provide indirect evidence that review stand-
ards constrain circuit courts.”81 
To be sure, courts sometimes make mistakes in determining 
the correct standard of review,82 and similar deference regimes 
may be treated differently in different contexts.83 We are not 
claiming that all courts necessarily treat deference identically. 
Some courts might treat deference regimes literally, scrutinizing 
each appellate issue to determine whether it was actually clear 
error, an abuse of discretion, and so on. Other courts might ap-
ply a rough two-step process: give deferential cases only a curso-
ry look but then scrutinize them more carefully if something ap-
pears amiss. Still others might employ a different type of 
procedure. For our purposes, all that matters is that courts do in 
fact grant deference: the evidence presented in this Section 
demonstrates that, in some cases, courts place a thumb on the 
scales in favor of the judgment of another decisionmaker rather 
than simply making the decision independently. 
 
 79 Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An Empir-
ical Study, 2012 Utah L Rev 1, 5. The full effects of deferential review were “complex”; 
for example, “findings of fact [were] associated with more manifested ideological disa-
greement than discretionary rulings or conclusions of law.” Id. The overall rates of rever-
sal in the federal courts are quite low. In 2013, for instance, the federal courts of appeals 
reversed only 6.8 percent of the cases that they decided on the merits. Statistical Tables 
for the Federal Judiciary: December 31, 2013 table B-5 (Administrative Office of the US 
Courts, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/G772-FKRU. Reversal rates for private civil 
cases were slightly higher, at 11.8 percent. Id. 
 80 Joshua B. Fischman and Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? 
The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J Legal Stud 405, 431 (2011). 
 81 Id at 432. 
 82 See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 
13 Lewis & Clark L Rev 233, 252–75 (2009) (reporting that, “in nearly three percent of 
the factual sufficiency appeals in Texas, the appellate court was using a disfavored 
standard of review” and that a handful of California cases applied de novo review “under 
questionable circumstances”). 
 83 See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 Wm 
& Mary L Rev 679, 718–20 (2002) (quantifying affirmance rates in various administra-
tive appeals and finding that agency-specific practices can affect these rates). 
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C. Deference Mistakes Formally Defined 
We are now ready to describe the class of cases and situa-
tions with which this Article is centrally concerned. We are in-
terested in situations in which, at time t1, some legal deci-
sionmaker C1 decides a particular legal issue. At time t2, some 
other legal decisionmaker C2 is confronted with a similar legal 
issue in a different case, and C1’s opinion is either binding or 
persuasive precedent. Note that C2 could be a court, an agency, 
or any other legal actor—the only requirement is that C1’s opin-
ion have some influence on C2’s eventual decision. C2 makes a 
deference mistake when it misapplies C1’s opinion by failing to 
account for the deference regime under which the case was  
decided. 
We use “deference regime” to describe trans-substantive 
standards of review, burdens of proof, and standards of evi-
dence. “Clear and convincing evidence” is a deference regime, as 
are “abuse of discretion,” “clearly established federal law,” “pre-
ponderance of the evidence,” “Chevron deference,” and “de novo 
review.” We focus on these trans-substantive standards because 
their potential to generate judicial errors—particularly errors 
that propagate and thereby affect doctrine—has been over-
looked. And we treat them as a class because they share many of 
the same characteristics, including their propensity to be mis-
understood or addressed sloppily by the decisionmakers apply-
ing them. 
“Deference regime” may not seem like the most appropriate 
term, as many of these evidentiary standards do not self-
evidently involve deference to a lower body in the way that an 
abuse of discretion standard might. We employ the term largely 
because it is convenient and relatively descriptive. But we also 
believe that it captures much of what is driving the trans-
substantive standards in these situations. For instance, the fact 
that a federal court can invalidate an issued patent only if there 
is clear and convincing evidence results from the deference that 
the court affords to the PTO, which issued the patent.84 The fact 
 
 84 See Microsoft, 131 S Ct at 2243 (agreeing with the Federal Circuit that the stat-
utory presumption of patent validity codified the “common-law presumption based on 
‘the basic proposition that a government agency such as the [PTO] was presumed to do 
its job’”), quoting American Hoist & Derrick Co v Sowa & Sons, Inc, 725 F2d 1350, 1359 
(Fed Cir 1984); KSR International Co v Teleflex Inc, 550 US 398, 426 (2007) (noting that 
the “rationale underlying the presumption” of patent validity is “that the PTO, in its ex-
pertise, has approved the claim”). 
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that a federal court will overturn a state conviction only if it vio-
lated “clearly established [f]ederal law” is due to the deference 
that the federal courts owe to state courts under the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act85 (AEDPA).86 The same is 
true for cases of qualified immunity, in which police officers and 
other state actors may be held responsible under § 1983 only for 
violations of clearly established law in part because of the defer-
ence owed by courts to those whose responsibility it is to enforce 
the law.87 Although the precision of the term “deference regime” 
is not of great importance, we wish to emphasize the commonali-
ties between these trans-substantive standards, and thus the 
sense behind treating them collectively here. 
A deference mistake occurs when C2 relies on C1’s opinion 
without fully accounting for the deference regime under which 
C1 decided the prior case.88 C2 could mistakenly treat C1’s opin-
ion as if it involved more deference than it actually did (a 
“stronger” deference regime) or less; either type of error is a def-
erence mistake. The mistake could be explicit or implicit, and it 
might or might not be dispositive in a given case. Deference mis-
takes might also be more or less influential depending on the 
identity of C2. If C2—the erring decisionmaker—is an appellate 
court, its deference mistakes will likely have a substantial im-
pact on the law. A trial court will have more-modest influence; 
an administrative agency may exert less influence still. But 
even an administrative agency that issues nonbinding decisions 
 
 85 Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, codified at 28 USC § 2241 et seq. 
 86 See AEDPA § 104, 110 Stat at 1219, codified at 28 USC § 2254(d)(1). See also 
Renico v Lett, 559 US 766, 773 (2010) (“AEDPA thus imposes a highly deferential stand-
ard for evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that state-court decisions be given 
the benefit of the doubt.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Monique Anne  
Gaylor, Note, Postcards from the Bench: Federal Habeas Review of Unarticulated State 
Court Decisions, 31 Hofstra L Rev 1263, 1264 (2003) (“Although opinions differ on the 
practical magnitude of change in federal habeas review of state petitions wrought by the 
enactment of the AEDPA, the statute does mandate a level of federal deference to state 
court decisions on issues of federal law previously nonexistent.”). 
 87 See Charles T. Putnam and Charles T. Ferris, Defending a Maligned Defense: 
The Policy Bases of the Qualified Immunity Defense in Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
12 U Bridgeport L Rev 665, 708 (1992) (“As might be expected, the courts appear willing 
to grant wide deference to the judgment of correctional officials when those officials are 
confronted with situations in which the use of force is perceived as necessary.”); Hoitt v 
Vitek, 361 F Supp 1238, 1242 (D NH 1973) (“This deference to the judgment of prison 
officials in perceiving what they consider to be an emergency situation and unilaterally 
acting to quell or prevent it has been recognized by the federal judiciary and reflects a 
proper understanding of a prison’s need for discipline, safety, and security.”). 
 88 This definition includes the possibility that C2 treats C1’s decision as having been 
qualified by deference when the decision was really de novo. 
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can nonetheless influence the law through repeated deference 
mistakes. For instance, those mistakes may create reliance in-
terests that future decisionmakers are reluctant to upset.89 Past 
practice and facts on the ground can exert a powerful influence 
even when they have no binding legal effect. 
In sum, if C2’s decision exerts any precedential influence go-
ing forward, then C2’s deference mistakes will potentially influ-
ence the way that cases are decided and, in the long run, the 
shape of the law. 
D. Why Would Courts Make Deference Mistakes? 
Those who believe that deference regimes matter might still 
be skeptical of our thesis for another reason: the idea that a 
court might make a mistake about the relevant deference regime 
might seem bizarre. For example, it is well understood that a 
right must be clearly established to defeat a claim of qualified 
immunity, so the very fact that the defendant is a public offi-
cial—or that the defendant has made a claim of qualified im-
munity—should alert the judge reading the opinion to the fact 
that the issue is whether the right is clearly established, not 
whether the right exists. 
Yet it is easy to imagine how such a mistake might be made. 
A sloppy judge (or clerk) might not read an opinion in full or 
might not attend to all the details and circumstances surround-
ing a holding. A judge (or clerk) might take a single sentence or 
 
 89 For example, the PTO can affect the development of patent doctrine by repeated-
ly making the same deference mistake when granting patents. Granted patents are then 
entitled to a presumption of validity, making them more likely to be upheld in the in-
fringement context. The existence of many such patents may create reliance interests 
that courts are reluctant to upset, even if those courts do not believe that the patents 
should have been granted in the first instance. Indeed, this precise consideration ap-
pears to have been decisive when Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics, 
Inc, 133 S Ct 2107 (2013), the case involving the patenting of human genes, was heard 
by the Federal Circuit. See generally Association for Molecular Pathology v United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F3d 1303 (Fed Cir 2012). Judge Kimberly Moore, the 
deciding vote in that case, explicitly rested her decision on the desire not to disturb set-
tled reliance interests related to already-granted (and upheld) gene patents. See id at 
1343 (Moore concurring) (citation omitted), revd in part, Association for Molecular Pa-
thology v Myriad Genetics, Inc, 133 S Ct 2107 (2013): 
If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I might conclude that an isolat-
ed DNA sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not patentable subject 
matter. . . . [But] [t]here are now thousands of patents with claims to isolated 
DNA . . . . I believe we must be particularly wary of expanding the judicial ex-
ception to patentable subject matter where both settled expectations and ex-
tensive property rights are involved. 
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paragraph out of context. The availability of legal materials 
online, which allows individuals to search electronically for certain 
words or phrases and jump to certain portions of an opinion, might 
facilitate and exacerbate these types of errors.90 And indeed, courts 
do make these types of mistakes, and they do so across a variety of 
legal doctrines, as we show in Part II. Even though we cannot 
quantify the frequency of such mistakes, we think it uncontrover-
sial that courts sometimes cite cases inappropriately. 
Judges may sometimes have strategic reasons for citing 
precedents misleadingly. But such mistakes may also occur 
when judges lack the resources to carefully consider each of 
their citations. When judicial caseloads surge, judges have less 
time to devote to each case. This can affect substantive out-
comes.91 Deference mistakes are also likely to multiply as aver-
age opinion length increases, because judges will have less time 
to focus on each citation.92 The average number of cases cited in 
federal appellate opinions has increased from around fifteen in 
1957 to over thirty in 2007, in part due to the ease of citation 
production through electronic legal research.93 
Judges increasingly rely on law clerks (who are typically 
fresh out of law school) to perform legal research and draft opin-
ions (as indicated by textual analysis,94 statements by judges,95 
and even opinions themselves96). Nonprecedential cases may be 
written entirely by staff attorneys and law clerks, with little  
 
 90 One of us committed such an error while clerking, though the error was fortu-
nately caught by a co-clerk. 
 91 See generally Huang, 124 Harv L Rev 1109 (cited in note 6). 
 92 See generally Ryan C. Black and James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of 
the Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 Houston L Rev 621 (2008) (examining 
the increase in the length of Supreme Court opinions over time). 
 93 See Casey R. Fronk, The Cost of Judicial Citation: An Empirical Investigation of 
Citation Practices in the Federal Appellate Courts, 2010 U Ill J L Tech & Pol 51, 69–70. 
 94 See generally Jeffrey S. Rosenthal and Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: 
Authorship on the Supreme Court, 96 Cornell L Rev 1307 (2011). 
 95 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 148 (Chica-
go 1990) (“[M]ost judicial opinions are written by the judges’ law clerks rather than by 
the judges themselves.”); William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 261 (Knopf 2d ed 
2001) (“After this [post-conference] discussion, I ask the clerk to prepare a first draft of a 
Court opinion and to have it for me in ten days or two weeks.”); Wald, 62 U Chi L Rev at 
1383 (cited in note 57) (“It is an ill-kept secret that law clerks often do early drafts of 
opinions for their judges.”). 
 96 See Acceptance Insurance Co v Schafner, 651 F Supp 776, 778 n * (ND Ala 1986) 
(“This Memorandum of Opinion was prepared by William G. Somerville, III, Law Clerk, 
in which the Court fully concurs.”). 
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supervision.97 A law clerk might insert a quotation from some 
precedential opinion that supports his or her judge’s argument 
without reading the entire opinion or considering its context, 
and judges might not verify every citation in their opinions.98 
The persistence of deference mistakes is made somewhat 
more puzzling by the adversarial nature of litigation. We have 
described the process by which judges insert citations that they 
have themselves identified into their own opinions. At the same 
time, many citations in published opinions derive from the par-
ties’ briefs. It seems natural to expect that the parties and their 
attorneys would make deference mistakes only rarely, and that 
many of these deference mistakes would be identified by the ad-
verse party. And yet parties, like courts, may sometimes be re-
source-constrained or may even purposely attempt to introduce 
deference mistakes.99 Tracing the source of deference mistakes 
would be a useful avenue for further research. For now, we know 
for certain only that deference mistakes exist, often in important 
cases regarding significant issues. 
In sum, we believe that there are many reasons why courts 
make deference mistakes. In Part II, we bring some content to 
 
 97 See Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff 
Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 Ariz St L J 1, 42 (2007) (“[M]ost Ninth Circuit un-
published opinions are clerk and staff attorney work product, rather than the fruits of 
judicial labor.”); Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J App Prac & Process 153, 169 
(2012). 
 98 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” 
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L J 1898, 1933–34 (2011) (stating that, when federal 
courts “cite [state] cases that are outdated from a methodological perspective,” “[t]hese 
citation choices are likely due to errors by law clerks or lawyers or to the tendency of 
courts to rely on the same (sometimes outdated) set of boilerplate precedents from case 
to case”). 
 99 Indeed, there may be cases in which a court catches and eliminates a deference 
mistake introduced by a party. A version of this occurred during the October 2014 argu-
ment in al Bahlul v United States, 767 F3d 1 (DC Cir 2014). There the government ar-
gued that a prior case (involving the same petitioner) was binding, only to be admon-
ished by Judge David Tatel that the earlier case had been decided under a plain error 
standard, while at least Tatel believed that the instant case should be reviewed de novo. 
See Steve Vladeck, Evidence of Absence: A Brief Reply to Peter Margulies on the al Bahlul 
Argument (Lawfare, Oct 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/JXV5-VG85. We hesitate 
to deem this an outright deference mistake, because the standard of review in the in-
stant case was at issue, and the government had argued that a plain error standard 
should govern. See Brief for the United States, al Bahlul v United States, No 11-1324, 
*23–26 (DC Cir filed Sept 17, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 4647818). The 
government may have simply been operating under an ongoing belief that the standards 
of review in the two cases were identical, or it may have been trying to induce the court 
into making a deference mistake by treating the prior case as binding regardless of the 
standard that the court chose to adopt in the case before it. 
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this existence claim by documenting instances in which courts 
have made such errors. Part III will then explicate our model of 
deference mistakes and the way in which they can exert long-
term influence on legal doctrine. 
II.  DEFERENCE MISTAKES IN PRACTICE 
Part I showed that the three necessary elements for defer-
ence mistakes are present in the real-world legal system: (1) de-
cisionmakers sometimes grant deference on issues that will 
matter in future cases, (2) this deference does sometimes affect 
outcomes, and (3) various institutional factors might cause 
courts to rely on precedent without considering the deference re-
gime under which the precedent was decided. This Part demon-
strates that deference mistakes have actually occurred in prac-
tice, that they may have been dispositive and caused courts and 
agencies to err, and that they are a plausible source of some of 
the doctrinal movement that has occurred in the relevant areas 
of law. 
A. Federal Rights under Habeas and Qualified Immunity: Not 
Clearly Established or Clearly Not Established? 
Deference mistakes may be most pernicious when courts re-
view issues of law under different standards. If a defendant 
raises an issue of criminal procedure in the course of a criminal 
trial, the court will decide the issue according to whatever legal 
standard is intrinsic to the criminal procedure right itself. A 
court must decide whether a search was reasonable,100 whether a 
defendant’s waiver of her Fifth Amendment rights was volun-
tary,101 or whether a defendant was denied the right to confront 
an accuser.102 These are the baseline legal standards. As de-
scribed in the following sections, however, if one of these ques-
tions arises in the context of a habeas petition or a § 1983 suit 
for damages, the baseline standard is not the only one at issue. 
A court must also determine whether the right was clearly es-
tablished—that is, whether prior cases firmly establish the 
right, or whether it represents a step beyond existing law.103 
 
 100 See US Const Amend IV.  
 101 See Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 461 (1966).  
 102 See Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 43 (2004).  
 103 See notes 107–11 and accompanying text. We do not mean to imply that “clearly 
established” has the same meaning in both contexts. The precise meaning of the term is 
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This is a higher standard and represents a position of deference, 
either to the state court that originally tried the defendant  
(habeas) or to the state actor who is the defendant (§ 1983). 
If a court announces that a certain right was not clearly es-
tablished, and courts subsequently rely on that precedent in a 
direct criminal appeal to conclude that the right does not exist 
at all, this mistake would tend to shrink the scope of the right. 
In other words, if courts regularly mistake a right that is not 
clearly established for one that is clearly not established, the ef-
fect will be to contract the scope and power of that right.104 
1. Habeas relief for criminal defendants. 
The writ of habeas corpus allows a prisoner to challenge the 
legal authority for his detention. We focus here on 28 USC 
§ 2254, which allows the writ to be granted when a state prison-
er is held “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 
the United States.”105 Under AEDPA, such relief is available af-
ter a state court merits adjudication only if the decision “was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determi-
nation of the facts.”106 
A court considering a habeas petition is thus not determin-
ing de novo whether there was a violation of federal law; rather, 
the court may consider only whether there are on-point Supreme 
Court “holdings, as opposed to [ ] dicta,”107 on the legal issue and 
whether the state court decision was “diametrically different”108 
from this precedent or involved an “unreasonable” application of 
law on which it is not “possible [that] fairminded jurists could 
 
unimportant here; the important point is only that finding a right to be clearly estab-
lished requires a more searching inquiry than de novo review.  
 104 As we will explain in Part III.C, such mistakes could also run in the opposite di-
rection: just because some court has held that a right is established does not mean that 
the right is clearly established. We have not found any examples of such errors, and we 
think that these errors are less likely because the government tends to focus on the im-
portance of the “clearly established” requirement in cases in which it applies, but which 
kind of mistake dominates is ultimately an empirical question. 
 105 28 USC § 2254(a). 
 106 28 USC § 2254(d). See also generally Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable 
Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 Buff Crim L Rev 535 
(1999). 
 107 Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362, 412 (2000). 
 108 Id at 406. 
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disagree.”109 The Supreme Court has made clear that it is not 
enough for the state court to have gotten the law wrong: “an un-
reasonable application of federal law is different from an incor-
rect application of federal law.”110 In addition to this restricted 
legal review, a court considering a habeas petition must also 
give “remarkably deferential review . . . to state court factfind-
ings, actual or implied.”111 
Given this high degree of deference on both law and facts, 
one would expect federal courts at all levels to deny habeas re-
lief—finding no clearly established violation of federal law—in 
many cases in which they would have found a violation of the 
defendant’s rights on direct review. It would thus be a mistake 
to rely on these habeas precedents when evaluating the exist-
ence of these rights on direct review, and yet numerous courts 
have done exactly that. 
In Harris v Stovall,112 the Sixth Circuit considered a habeas 
petition filed by an indigent defendant who argued that due pro-
cess was violated when he was denied transcripts from the earlier 
trial of his codefendants.113 The defendant had hoped to use these 
transcripts to impeach the state’s witnesses.114 The Supreme 
Court had held, in Britt v North Carolina,115 that “the state must 
‘provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate 
defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to 
other prisoners.’”116 But the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Su-
preme Court had not specifically extended Britt’s principle to the 
situation in Harris: “Supreme Court precedent existing at the 
time of petitioner’s trial did not dictate or compel a rule that a 
defendant is entitled to a free copy of a transcript of his  
codefendants’ previous trial for impeachment of witnesses.”117 
Harris was then cited by a district court in an initial criminal 
trial to deny an indigent defendant’s motion for transcripts: 
In Harris v. Stovall . . . this Circuit reviewed the limits of 
the United States Supreme Court’s directive in Britt. . . . 
The Court concluded in Harris that U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 109 Harrington v Richter, 131 S Ct 770, 786 (2011). 
 110 Id at 785, quoting Williams, 529 US at 410. 
 111 Childress and Davis, 2 Federal Standards § 7.02 at 7-5 (cited in note 22). 
 112 212 F3d 940 (6th Cir 2000). 
 113 Id at 941–42. 
 114 Id at 942. 
 115 404 US 226 (1971). 
 116 Harris, 212 F3d at 944, quoting Britt, 404 US at 227. 
 117 Harris, 212 F3d at 945. 
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precedent did not establish that the defendant was entitled 
to a free copy of a transcript of his co-defendants’ previous 
trial for impeachment of witnesses.118 
But this is a mistake: Harris did not say that “Supreme Court 
precedent did not establish” a right to free transcripts of earlier 
proceedings—it said that Supreme Court precedent did not 
clearly establish such a right.119 The Supreme Court of Ohio also 
made a deference mistake involving Harris: in rejecting a capital 
defendant’s request for daily transcripts of his trial, the court 
erroneously cited Harris as “rejecting defendant’s contention 
that Britt entitled him to transcripts from his accomplice’s tri-
al.”120 And a brief by the United States before the First Circuit 
similarly erred by citing Harris as holding that “an indigent de-
fendant is not entitled to free copies of transcripts from a co-
defendant’s trial.”121 
In Brown v Payton,122 the defendant sought habeas relief 
from a prior state court decision, in which the California Su-
preme Court had held that the prosecutor’s misstatements (that 
the jury should disregard the defendant’s religious conversion) 
did not mislead the jury about its ability to consider mitigating 
evidence.123 The US Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor 
was mistaken but held that habeas relief was unwarranted be-
cause the decision was not an objectively unreasonable applica-
tion of clearly established federal law.124 Two concurrences disa-
greed about whether they would have found an Eighth 
Amendment violation on direct review; Justice Stephen Breyer 
noted that “this is a case in which Congress’ instruction to defer 
to the reasonable conclusions of state-court judges makes a criti-
cal difference.”125 But Payton was later cited to reject challenges 
to similar prosecutorial statements in nonhabeas cases. The Ari-
zona Supreme Court stated in State v Roque126 that the US  
 
 118 Carrion v Wilkinson, 405 F Supp 2d 850, 851–52 (ND Ohio 2005), citing Harris, 
212 F3d at 944. 
 119 See Harris, 212 F3d at 945 (“[T]he Supreme Court precedent on the rule sought 
by petitioner was not clearly established.”). 
 120 State v Treesh, 739 NE2d 749, 770 (Ohio 2001). 
 121 Brief for Appellee, United States v Solano-Moreta, No 09-1067, *50 (1st Cir filed 
Sept 11, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 7196601). 
 122 544 US 133 (2005). 
 123 Id at 138–39. 
 124 Id at 144, 147. 
 125 Id at 148 (Breyer concurring). See also id at 147–48 (Scalia concurring). 
 126 141 P3d 368 (Ariz 2006). 
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Supreme Court had concluded in Payton that “the jury was ade-
quately instructed as to mitigation,” and that the prosecutor’s 
comments at issue in Roque were “[l]ikewise” allowable.127 Pay-
ton was also cited by the Second Circuit in support of the conclu-
sion that “it is extremely unlikely that the jury felt constrained 
in its consideration of [ ] mitigating evidence” in a case in which 
“the prosecutor erroneously argued that the jury could not con-
sider mitigating evidence that was unrelated to the crimes for 
which [the defendant] had been found guilty.”128 
In Poole v Goodno,129 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of 
a habeas petition because “[t]here is no clearly established Su-
preme Court law which holds that due process requires a jury trial 
in civil commitment proceedings or that incorporates the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury for such cases.”130 But in five subse-
quent cases, the Minnesota Court of Appeals mischaracterized 
Poole, repeatedly stating that “the Eighth Circuit held that federal 
due process does not require a jury trial before a person is commit-
ted as [a sexually dangerous person] under Minnesota law.”131 The 
First Circuit also cited Poole as a case in which “the claim to a jury 
trial right in civil commitments has been rejected.”132 
In the habeas appeal at issue in Sims v Rowland,133 the 
Ninth Circuit held that “the state court’s failure to hold an evi-
dentiary hearing sua sponte when presented with evidence of ju-
ror bias” was not contrary to clearly established federal law.134 
The court explained that “[t]he reason is simple: the Supreme 
Court has not yet decided whether due process requires a trial 
court to hold a hearing sua sponte whenever evidence of juror 
bias comes to light.”135 But in a later direct appeal involving ju-
ror bias, the Ninth Circuit itself erroneously cited Sims as “hold-
ing that due process does not require a trial court to hold an  
 
 127 Id at 398. 
 128 United States v Fell, 531 F3d 197, 221, 223 (2d Cir 2008). 
 129 335 F3d 705 (8th Cir 2003). 
 130 Id at 710–11. 
 131 In re Civil Commitment of Sargent, 2005 WL 406345, *2 (Minn App). See also In 
re Civil Commitment of Shell, 2009 WL 1182152, *8 (Minn App); In re Civil Commitment 
of Martin, 2005 WL 354088, *5 (Minn App); In re Commitment of McEiver, 2005 WL 
704298, *2 (Minn App), citing Poole, 335 F3d at 710–11 (“There is no established law re-
quiring a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment before a person is committed . . . un-
der Minnesota law.”); In re Civil Commitment of Hartleib, 2004 WL 2283558, *2  
(Minn App). 
 132 United States v Carta, 592 F3d 34, 43 (1st Cir 2010). 
 133 414 F3d 1148 (9th Cir 2005). 
 134 Id at 1153. 
 135 Id. 
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evidentiary hearing sua sponte when presented with evidence of 
juror bias.”136 
The habeas petition in Anderson v Mullin137 raised a double 
jeopardy challenge to the defendant’s prosecution for a lesser in-
cluded offense after his conviction for a greater offense had been 
reversed based on insufficient evidence.138 The Tenth Circuit de-
nied the petition based on the Supreme Court’s “express reser-
vation”139 of this question in Greene v Massey.140 But then the 
Kentucky Supreme Court stated that, “[a]lthough the United 
States Supreme Court has not ruled upon this precise issue, at 
least three federal appellate courts have determined that it is 
permissible for a defendant to be retried for a lesser included of-
fense” in these circumstances—citing Anderson and two other 
habeas cases.141 A federal district court similarly stated that  
Anderson had held that “double jeopardy [is] no bar to prosecu-
tion for [a] lesser included offense” in these circumstances.142 
These citations ignore the deferential context of Anderson: the 
habeas petition was necessarily rejected because of the Supreme 
Court’s express reservation in Greene, but that does not mean 
that the Tenth Circuit panel that decided Anderson would not 
have found a violation on direct review. 
Finally, in Newton v Kemna,143 the defendant had sought to 
disqualify a witness as incompetent based on drug use, and his 
habeas petition asserted that the trial court’s refusal to grant 
access to the witness’s psychiatric records violated the Confron-
tation Clause.144 The Eighth Circuit noted that “the Supreme 
Court has recognized in other circumstances that constitutional 
rights can trump evidentiary privileges” but concluded that, 
“[g]iven the restrictive nature of habeas review,” it was not the 
Eighth Circuit’s “province to speculate as to whether the Su-
preme Court, if faced with the issue, would find that Missouri’s 
 
 136 United States v Mitchell, 568 F3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir 2009). 
 137 327 F3d 1148 (10th Cir 2003). 
 138 Id at 1150–52. 
 139 Id at 1155. 
 140 437 US 19 (1978). 
 141 Cohron v Commonwealth, 306 SW3d 489, 498 n 26 (Ky 2010), citing Anderson, 
327 F3d at 1154–58, Shute v Texas, 117 F3d 233 (5th Cir 1997), Beverly v Jones, 854 F2d 
412 (11th Cir 1988). 
 142 Hargrove v Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 2010 WL 518176, 
*12 (SD Ohio). 
 143 354 F3d 776 (8th Cir 2004). 
 144 Id at 779. See also US Const Amend VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witness against him.”). 
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physician-patient privilege must give way to a defendant’s de-
sire to use psychiatric records in cross-examination.”145 A district 
court later relied primarily on Newton in rejecting a party’s re-
quest for a witness’s medical records, erroneously stating that 
Newton “held that the trial court’s denial of the criminal defend-
ant’s access to the witness’s medical records did not violate the 
confrontation clause under the Sixth Amendment.”146 Another 
district court stated that a criminal defendant’s request for 
mental-health records “appears to be foreclosed by the Eighth 
Circuit’s recent decision in Newton v. Kemna.”147 And a treatise 
cites Newton as support for the proposition that “privilege 
claims by testifying witnesses should generally be sustained.”148 
In sum, these examples illustrate that numerous courts 
have made deference mistakes by relying on habeas precedents 
in cases that arose on direct review. In the absence of other fac-
tors, the cumulative effect of such mistakes would be a system-
atic shrinking of federal rights. One would thus expect a declin-
ing success rate for both habeas petitions and direct criminal 
appeals. 
There is some evidence that criminal procedure rights have 
constricted over time.149 There are of course many possible expla-
nations for this—including changes in judicial philosophies150 and 
the composition of the courts151—and many of these explanations 
 
 145 Newton, 354 F3d at 781–82. 
 146 Jackson v Wiersema Charter Service, Inc, 2009 WL 1531815, *1 (ED Mo). 
 147 United States v Stone, 2005 WL 1845153, *3 (D SD). 
 148 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 2 Federal Evidence § 5:43 at 
792–93 & n 75 (Thomson Reuters 4th ed 2013). 
 149 See generally, for example, Louis Michael Seidman, Book Review, Akhil Amar 
and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 Yale L J 2281 
(1998); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 Georgetown L J 151 (1980). See also Carol 
S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two 
Answers, 94 Mich L Rev 2466, 2515 (1996) (arguing that courts have narrowed particu-
lar types of rights); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process rather than the 
Result, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev 85, 102 (2012) (examining all 115 Supreme Court habeas 
decisions from 1996 to 2011 and finding that the success rate declined from 50 percent in 
the late 1990s to just over 20 percent in the 2000s to under 15 percent during 2010 and 
2011); Nancy J. King and Joseph L. Hoffmann, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century: Uses, 
Abuses, and the Future of the Great Writ 79 (Chicago 2011) (“[T]he percentage of peti-
tioners who obtain relief has decreased over time.”). 
 150 See, for example, Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Proce-
dure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 Georgetown L J 185, 247 
(1983).  
 151 See, for example, Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the Rehnquist Court: 
Has the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 Ind L J 273, 275 (1987).  
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may be complementary. We simply add one more possible expla-
nation: deference mistakes—in which courts mistake rights that 
are not clearly established for those that are clearly not estab-
lished—may be contributing to a systematic doctrinal creep by 
limiting the range of substantive rights that are enforced. 
2. Qualified immunity in § 1983 and Bivens suits. 
A similar deference regime exists in the qualified immunity 
context. Plaintiffs may seek redress for constitutional violations 
by government officials under § 1983152 (for state actors) or 
Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics153 (for federal officials),154 but the doctrine of qualified im-
munity limits government liability for damages.155 The Supreme 
Court has held that “government officials performing discretion-
ary functions[ ] generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”156 Thus, as in the habeas context, 
courts might evaluate whether federal rights exist (applying a 
less deferential standard), or whether the rights are clearly es-
tablished (the more deferential standard of § 1983 and Bivens 
cases).157 
One might expect a similar problem as in the habeas con-
text: even if a court thinks that there was a constitutional viola-
tion, the government will win on qualified immunity if the viola-
tion was not clearly established. And if similar situations arise 
outside the qualified immunity context—for example, when a 
lawsuit seeks an injunction or the suppression of evidence or in-
volves municipal policy158—and courts mistakenly rely on these 
 
 152 42 USC § 1983. 
 153 403 US 388 (1971).  
 154 Id at 396–97. 
 155 For a general overview of these topics, see Richard H. Fallon Jr, et al, Hart and 
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 733–42, 955–72, 994–1006 
(Thomson Reuters 6th ed 2009) (describing Bivens, § 1983, and qualified immunity).  
 156 Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982). See also Hope v Pelzer, 536 US 730, 
741 (2002) (holding that earlier cases with “materially similar” facts are not necessary to 
show that a clearly established right was violated); United States v Lanier, 520 US 259, 
268–69 (1997) (determining that a right may be established by consistent circuit court 
precedent); Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635, 640 (1987) (stating that a right must be 
established in a “particularized,” rather than general, sense). 
 157 The “clearly established” language was, however, judicially rather than statutorily 
created. 
 158 See Camreta v Greene, 131 S Ct 2020, 2031 n 5 (2011). 
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qualified immunity precedents to conclude that there was no vi-
olation, the result would be a systematic shrinking of constitu-
tional rights. Once again, courts might mistake rights that are 
not clearly established for ones that are clearly not established. 
But there is an important difference between qualified im-
munity and habeas that makes these deference mistakes less 
likely. In the 2001 decision Saucier v Katz,159 the Supreme Court 
mandated a particular sequencing for qualified immunity cases, 
holding that courts must first consider whether the alleged con-
duct violated a constitutional right before considering whether 
that right is clearly established.160 Many criticized Saucier for 
mandating dicta about important constitutional questions,161 but 
others argued that the benefits of constitutional articulation 
outweighed these concerns.162 In 2009, the Supreme Court abro-
gated mandatory Saucier sequencing in Pearson v Callahan,163 
but the Court has since emphasized that sequencing “is some-
times beneficial to clarify the legal standards governing public 
officials.”164 And post-Pearson studies have found that, when 
courts concluded that qualified immunity applied, in only 
around 25 to 30 percent of circuit cases and fewer than 5 percent 
of district cases did those courts exercise their discretion to 
avoid the underlying constitutional issue.165 
 
 159 533 US 194 (2001). 
 160 Id at 201. The Supreme Court had followed this approach in earlier cases. See, 
for example, Wilson v Layne, 526 US 603, 614 (1999) (“Since the police action in this case 
violated petitioners’ Fourth Amendment right, we now must decide whether this right 
was clearly established at the time of the search.”); Mitchell v Forsyth, 472 US 511, 535 
(1985) (“Mitchell is immune from suit for his authorization of the Davidon wiretap not-
withstanding that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 161 See, for example, Brosseau v Haugen, 543 US 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer concur-
ring); Pierre N. Leval, Judging under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 NYU L Rev 
1249, 1275–81 (2006). 
 162 See generally, for example, Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-
Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation of Constitutional Rights, 80 U Colo L Rev 401 
(2009); Michael L. Wells, The “Order-of-Battle” in Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L 
Rev 1539 (2007). But see generally John C. Jeffries Jr, Reversing the Order of Battle in 
Constitutional Torts, 2009 S Ct Rev 115 (arguing that the rule from Pearson v Callahan, 
555 US 223 (2009), the case that overturned Saucier, is defensible in certain contexts). 
 163 555 US 223 (2009). 
 164 Camreta, 131 S Ct at 2032. 
 165 See, for example, Ted Sampsell-Jones and Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson in 
the Circuits, 80 Fordham L Rev 623, 628–29 (2011) (examining 190 circuit cases from 
2009 to 2010 and finding that 31.4 percent of denied claims avoided the constitutional 
question); Colin Rolfs, Comment, Qualified Immunity after Pearson v. Callahan, 59 
UCLA L Rev 468, 489, 496–97 (2011) (examining 100 district cases and 100 circuit cases 
from 2009 and finding that, of denied claims, 24.6 percent of circuit court decisions and 
2.7 percent of district court decisions avoided the constitutional question). 
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A formal deference mistake (as we have defined it) in this 
setting requires precedent that finds immunity without reaching 
the constitutional question, and given the small universe of such 
cases, it is unsurprising that we found fewer examples of such 
mistakes than in the habeas context. But that is not to say that 
no such examples exist. 
For example, in DiMeglio v Haines,166 a zoning inspector al-
leged that the zoning commissioner violated his First Amend-
ment rights by reassigning him in retaliation for his speech at a 
public meeting.167 The Fourth Circuit held that the zoning com-
missioner was protected by qualified immunity: it was not clear-
ly established that the inspector’s speech was protected, because 
he was speaking as an employee.168 The court noted that, shortly 
before the events at issue, “the Fifth Circuit [in Terrell v Univer-
sity of Texas System Police169] actually had held that whether 
speech is protected . . . depends upon whether the employee is 
speaking as an employee or as an interested citizen,” and that it 
was thus “at least questionable” whether the speech was pro-
tected.170 A district court within the Fourth Circuit then cited 
DiMeglio in support of its rejection of a First Amendment claim, 
stating that “the critical determination is ‘whether the speech at 
issue . . . was made primarily in the plaintiff’s role as citizen or 
primarily in [her] role as employee.’”171 But the language quoted 
is from Terrell, the Fifth Circuit case cited to show that the right 
was not clearly established—DiMeglio was not adopting Terrell’s 
holding.172 
Given the smaller number of deference mistakes in the 
qualified immunity context as compared to the habeas context, 
one might conclude that courts reviewing habeas petitions 
should similarly be encouraged to determine whether a right is 
established before deciding whether it is clearly established. One 
scholar has even argued that mandatory Saucier-type sequenc-
ing should be required in habeas cases as a benefit to future 
 
 166 45 F3d 790 (4th Cir 1995). 
 167 Id at 794. 
 168 Id at 805. 
 169 792 F2d 1360 (5th Cir 1986). 
 170 DiMeglio, 45 F3d at 805, citing Terrell, 792 F2d at 1362. 
 171 Jackson v Alleghany County, 2008 WL 3992351, *10 (WD Va), quoting DiMeglio, 
45 F3d at 805. 
 172 See DiMeglio, 45 F3d at 805, quoting Terrell, 792 F2d at 1362. 
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criminal defendants.173 There is, however, a vigorous empirical 
debate over whether Saucier actually led to an expansion of con-
stitutional rights, with some evidence demonstrating that, when 
courts were forced to reach constitutional issues, they almost 
always decided these issues against the defendant.174 Professor 
Nancy Leong, who conducted one of these studies, argues that 
“[t]he act of recognizing a right, yet precluding a remedy, could 
create cognitive dissonance for many judges,” and, “[r]ather than 
tolerate this cognitive dissonance, judges may be subconsciously 
inclined to deny that a constitutional violation occurred at all.”175 
The empirical debate over Saucier illustrates that, while re-
quiring courts to be explicit about how they would have decided 
an issue without deference may reduce the risk of formal legal 
error, it could also worsen the underlying deference problem. If 
decisionmakers engage in motivated reasoning to align their 
nondeferential conclusions with their deferential ones, then 
these (erroneous) nondeferential conclusions will become for-
mally enshrined in the case law. 
 
 173 See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for 
Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 Seattle U L Rev 595 (2009). But see Berghuis 
v Thompkins, 560 US 370, 391–92 (2010) (Sotomayor dissenting) (criticizing the majority 
for announcing rules that are unnecessary to resolve the case, “which is governed by the 
deferential standard of review set forth in [AEDPA]”). 
 174 Compare, for example, Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experi-
ment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 Pepperdine L Rev 667, 690 (2009) (finding “virtually no 
change in the percentage of cases where courts held that a constitutional violation had 
taken place and a striking increase in the percentage of cases where courts held that no 
constitutional violation had taken place”); Rolfs, Comment, 59 UCLA L Rev at 486 n 130 
(cited in note 165) (noting “a lopsided increase in the frequency with which courts find 
that no right was violated”); Sampsell-Jones and Yauch, 80 Fordham L Rev at 639 (cited 
in note 165) (confirming Professor Nancy Leong’s findings on Saucier’s effects), with 
Hughes, 80 U Colo L Rev at 422–23 (cited in note 162) (reporting a post-Saucier increase 
in cases announcing constitutional rights); Greg Sobolski and Matt Steinberg, Note, An 
Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of 
Pearson v. Callahan, 62 Stan L Rev 523, 547–49 (2010) (reporting a statistically insignif-
icant increase in rights-restricting holdings post-Saucier and a statistically significant 
increase in rights-affirming holdings). Leong has argued that the differences between 
her study, the Hughes study, and the Sobolski-Steinberg study stem from her inclusion 
of nonprecedential cases and multiple claims, as well as the different time periods con-
sidered. See Nancy Leong, Rethinking the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts: A Re-
ply to John Jeffries, 105 Nw U L Rev 969, 972 n 32 (2011). 
 175 Leong, 36 Pepperdine L Rev at 704 (cited in note 174). But see Jeffries, 2009 S Ct 
Rev at 125 (cited in note 162) (arguing that cognitive dissonance does not apply in this 
context because judges are not making unconstrained choices). 
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B. Criminal Law and Procedure: De Novo, Abuse of Discretion, 
or Plain Error? 
Mistakes between the different contexts of direct criminal 
appeals, habeas petitions, and qualified immunity cases are par-
ticularly striking, but mistakes can also occur wholly within the 
context of direct appeals. Many issues in criminal cases are re-
viewed under deferential standards, and later courts (both dis-
trict and appellate) sometimes fail to account for the deference 
regime under which a precedent was decided. 
When a party to a criminal case appeals an issue that was 
raised at trial, the appellate court typically considers that issue 
under one of several deferential standards. Criminal procedure 
questions—including evidentiary determinations, challenges for 
cause, jury instructions, and motions for new trials—are re-
viewed under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.176 Other 
issues are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, includ-
ing questions of the defendant’s competency and the voluntari-
ness of waivers.177 Appeals of guilty verdicts based on insuffi-
cient evidence are reviewed according to “whether, after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements be-
yond a reasonable doubt.”178 However, when the appealing party 
has failed to raise and preserve the issue at trial, all these types 
of questions are reviewed only for plain error, an even more def-
erential standard.179 
Unlike the habeas and qualified immunity deference re-
gimes, in which the deference formally favors the state, deferen-
tial standards of review such as plain error could favor either 
party in a criminal appeal. But in practice, the deference usually 
favors the state—defendants appeal convictions but prosecutors 
generally cannot appeal when the defendant prevails,180 and  
 
 176 See Wayne R. LaFave, et al, 7 Criminal Procedure § 27.5(e) at 96–97 (Thomson 
West 3d ed 2007). 
 177 See id at § 27.5(e) at 97. 
 178 Id, quoting Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979).  
 179 See LaFave, 7 Criminal Procedure at § 27.5(d) at 87–88 (cited in note 176). 
 180 See US Const Amend V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”); Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784, 795–97 
(1969). A judgment for the defendant entered on legal grounds—rather than based on a 
jury verdict or on the insufficiency of the evidence—may be appealed when a reversal 
would not require a second trial. See United States v Scott, 437 US 82, 91 n 7 (1978); 
United States v Wilson, 420 US 332, 345 (1975). Federal prosecutors may also appeal 
pretrial suppressions of evidence. See 18 USC § 3731. 
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defendants appeal sentences much more frequently than prose-
cutors do.181 Appellate criminal case law thus appears more gov-
ernment friendly than appellate courts may have intended. This 
one-sided appeal problem compounds the deference mistakes in 
the habeas and qualified immunity contexts discussed above.182 
In addition to mistaking the “clearly established” standard, sub-
sequent courts may not fully account for an appellate court’s 
deferential standard of review, which most commonly favors the 
government.183 
Below we provide examples of two kinds of deference mis-
takes that occur in criminal cases: (1) relying on precedent hold-
ing that an error did not rise to the level of plain error in order 
to reject claims of error when this high level of deference is in-
appropriate, and (2) relying on precedent holding that an evi-
dentiary ruling was not an abuse of discretion when the same 
issue later arises in a nondeferential posture. We conclude this 
Section by examining the role of deference mistakes in the over-
all doctrinal development of criminal law and procedure. 
1. Plain error mistakes. 
Even those who accept that deference regimes sometimes 
matter might be skeptical that courts would ever distinguish be-
tween different deference regimes rather than lumping different 
standards such as abuse of discretion and plain error under one 
mental category of deference.184 We agree that the labels for 
 
 181 For example, the federal courts of appeals decided 5,844 sentencing appeals from 
federal criminal defendants in 2011, compared with 53 sentencing appeals from the gov-
ernment. 2011 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tables 56–56A (US Sentenc-
ing Commission, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/YQJ5-Z8HS and http://perma.cc/ 
VQK4-9B7R. 
 182 See Part II.A. 
 183 In habeas appeals, the government will necessarily have won below. And the 
same may be true in qualified immunity appeals for two reasons. First, a denial of quali-
fied immunity may be appealed only when it involves a question of law (whereas grants 
of qualified immunity may always be appealed). See Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662, 671–
74 (2009); Mitchell, 472 US at 530 (“[W]e hold that a district court’s denial of a claim of 
qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final 
decision.’”). Second, the government—as a repeat player in qualified immunity cases—
may also be more likely to settle cases that will probably result in unfavorable appellate 
precedent. See Galanter, 9 L & Society Rev at 102 (cited in note 6) (“[W]e would expect 
the body of ‘precedent’ cases—that is, cases capable of influencing the outcome of future 
cases—to be relatively skewed toward those favorable to [repeat players].”). 
 184 See Koon v United States, 518 US 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court . . . abuses its 
discretion when it makes an error of law.”). But a district court will be reversed under 
plain error review only if “the legal error [is] clear or obvious, rather than subject to rea-
sonable dispute,” if it “affected the appellant’s substantial rights,” and if “the error  
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these deference regimes have little intrinsic meaning, but we 
think that these labels reflect the way that judges generally 
treat the different situations in which the labels apply. When a 
criminal defendant fails to object at trial, such that a district 
court judge has no warning of a potential problem, appellate 
judges may be exceedingly reluctant to undo their colleague’s 
hard work. This hesitance may well surpass whatever caution 
an appellate judge would exercise before overturning a lower 
court decision reviewed for abuse of discretion. Problems can 
arise, however, if in one case the defendant does not object at 
trial and the court of appeals affirms on plain error review, and 
then in subsequent cases—in which defendants do object at tri-
al—that precedent is used mistakenly by district or appellate 
courts to find against the defendants. 
For example, in United States v Ristine,185 the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that it was not plain error to prohibit the defendant 
from “possessing any pornographic materials” or entering “any 
establishment where pornography or erotica can be obtained” as 
a condition of supervised release from imprisonment, despite 
precedent from another circuit suggesting that such a condition 
raises First Amendment concerns.186 The court explicitly high-
lighted the extremely deferential standard of review: 
Were we reviewing this special condition for an abuse of 
discretion, we might be forced to select the line of reasoning 
we find more compelling, but the standard here is plain er-
ror. . . . [W]e cannot conclude that the District Court com-
mitted an error that is clear under current law because . . . 
the current law concerning this issue is unsettled. Because 
the imposition of the condition was not plain error, we are 
bound to uphold it.187 
It would be a deference mistake to rely on Ristine in a later case 
to find that similar conditions on supervised release are not an 
abuse of discretion without recognizing the different postures of 
the two cases. Yet a later Eighth Circuit panel did exactly that. 
The court found that a ban on entering any location where por-
nography could be obtained was not an abuse of discretion  
 
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 
Puckett v United States, 556 US 129, 135 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). 
 185 335 F3d 692 (8th Cir 2003). 
 186 Id at 694–95 (quotation marks omitted). 
 187 Id at 695. 
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because the restriction was “virtually identical to wording previ-
ously upheld” in Ristine.188 Similarly, Ristine held that condi-
tions prohibiting the defendant from owning a camera and re-
stricting his computer usage did not constitute plain error,189 
and subsequent Eighth Circuit cases explicitly relied on Ristine 
to affirm similar restrictions even when the defendant did pre-
serve his objection below.190 
As another example, deference mistakes have also resulted 
from the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v Hernan-
dez,191 which rejected a defendant’s procedural challenge to his 
sentence based on the district court’s failure to provide an ade-
quate individualized assessment.192 The Hernandez court noted 
that, while “the district court in this case might have said more,” 
the defendant had “lodged no objection to the adequacy of the 
district court’s explanation” and “has simply not demonstrated 
that the district court’s explanation constituted plain error.”193 It 
thus would be a mistake to rely on Hernandez when reviewing a 
sentence under a more stringent standard. The Fourth Circuit 
itself recognized as much in a later nonprecedential case, reject-
ing the government’s reliance on Hernandez—even though “the 
district court’s reasoning in Hernandez was essentially identical 
to the district court’s reasoning in this case”—because the re-
view was not for plain error.194 
Yet numerous other Fourth Circuit cases have erroneously 
relied on Hernandez to affirm sentences under the less deferen-
tial abuse of discretion standard. One case cited Hernandez as 
“finding no procedural error” under similar circumstances and 
affirmed a sentence even though “it would have been preferable 
for the district court to have specifically mentioned” certain sen-
tence-related factors.195 Another panel wrote, “[T]he district 
court’s explanation was more than sufficient. See Hernandez,” 
 
 188 United States v Mefford, 711 F3d 923, 928 (8th Cir 2013), citing Ristine, 335 F3d 
at 694–95. 
 189 Ristine, 335 F3d at 695–96. 
 190 See, for example, United States v Koch, 625 F3d 470, 481 (8th Cir 2010), citing 
Ristine, 335 F3d at 696 (“We have previously upheld the imposition of [conditions that 
include a ban on owning a camera and a restriction on Internet access].”); United States 
v Boston, 494 F3d 660, 668 (8th Cir 2007), citing Ristine, 335 F3d at 696 (“A restriction 
on computer usage does not constitute an abuse of discretion.”). 
 191 603 F3d 267 (4th Cir 2010). 
 192 Id at 270, 273. 
 193 Id at 272–73. 
 194 United States v Jackson, 397 Fed Appx 924, 926 (4th Cir 2010) (per curiam). 
 195 United States v Bennett, 439 Fed Appx 278, 280 (4th Cir 2011) (per curiam). 
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with no mention of the differing standard of review.196 Numerous 
other abuse of discretion cases evince the same mistake.197 Her-
nandez also has little applicability for district courts imposing 
sentences in the first instance, but a district court relied on 
Hernandez as having found “the district court’s ‘sparse explana-
tion’ legally sufficient,”198 with no mention of the highly deferen-
tial standard of review or Hernandez’s hint that “the district 
court . . . might have said more.”199 
2. Pro-prosecutor evidentiary determinations. 
Deference mistakes in criminal cases do not necessarily re-
quire confusion between two different standards of review, such 
as plain error and abuse of discretion. They can also arise in 
cases that are reviewed under a single standard when district 
courts mistake deferential appellate precedents for binding 
guidance. For example, as we have noted, just because an evi-
dentiary holding is not an abuse of discretion does not mean 
that the contrary holding would not also be allowed.200 If liti-
gants are more likely to appeal rulings admitting a certain type 
of evidence than rulings excluding it, appellate case law would 
be skewed toward deferential review of decisions to admit (ra-
ther than exclude) evidence. Subsequent courts might then be 
biased toward admitting similar evidence in future cases.201 And 
while a shift toward admitting more evidence might not system-
atically favor either criminal defendants or prosecutors—after 
all, each side often has evidence to present—certain kinds of ev-
idence might be more likely to be offered by one side or the other. 
 
 196 United States v Hood, 487 Fed Appx 69, 70 (4th Cir 2012) (per curiam), citing 
Hernandez, 603 F3d at 271. 
 197 See, for example, United States v Messer, 546 Fed Appx 192, 193 (4th Cir 2013) 
(per curiam), citing Hernandez, 603 F3d at 270–73 (“[T]he district court’s explanation, 
while brief, was legally adequate.”); United States v Buczkowski, 505 Fed Appx 236, 238–
39 (4th Cir 2013) (per curiam), citing Hernandez, 603 F3d at 271 (“The court’s explana-
tion of the within-Guideline sentence may not have been lengthy, but it was sufficient.”); 
United States v Garner, 489 Fed Appx 721, 722 (4th Cir 2012) (per curiam), citing Her-
nandez, 603 F3d at 271 (“[T]he district court provided an adequate explanation.”); Unit-
ed States v Clemons, 412 Fed Appx 646, 649 (4th Cir 2011), citing Hernandez, 603 F3d at 
272 (referring to Hernandez as holding that the “sentence [was] not procedurally  
unreasonable”).  
 198 Pierce v United States, 2011 WL 3881019, *6 (ED Wis), quoting Hernandez, 603 
F3d at 272. 
 199 Hernandez, 603 F3d at 272. 
 200 See note 49 and accompanying text. 
 201 See Part III. 
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For example, in a sample of twenty-five appellate cases dis-
cussing the admission or exclusion of latent fingerprint evi-
dence, twenty-four were cases in which the defendant had ap-
pealed and the appellate court affirmed the admission of 
fingerprint evidence against the defendant.202 In every case, the 
appellate court reviewed the lower court’s decision only for 
abuse of discretion.203 There are significant questions about the 
scientific reliability of fingerprint evidence, as summarized by 
the 2009 forensic-science report from the National Academy of 
Sciences.204 But a district court faced with this one-sided body of 
appellate fingerprint precedent might erroneously conclude that 
it has no discretion to exclude such evidence. 
For example, in United States v Cerna,205 the district court 
stated that a method of latent fingerprint identification “specifi-
cally has undergone Daubert analysis by a number of courts and 
has been repeatedly upheld as sufficiently reliable.”206 But the 
three cases cited for this proposition had held only that admit-
ting such evidence was not an abuse of discretion. The first spe-
cifically acknowledged shortcomings in the method but conclud-
ed that “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion.”207 The 
second explicitly held that abuse of discretion review was appro-
priate even when the district court made no findings of fact.208 
And the third was very clear about the deferential standard of 
 
 202 On February 5, 2013, we ran the following search on Westlaw: [latent /s finger-
print /s (admi! exclu!)]. This located twenty-five precedential federal appellate cases dis-
cussing the admissibility of latent fingerprint evidence (in addition to other cases that 
happened to have these search terms), and in twenty-four out of twenty-five, the crimi-
nal defendant had appealed and the appellate court affirmed the admission of finger-
print evidence against the defendant. See, for example, United States v Mitchell, 365 F3d 
215, 246 (3d Cir 2004) (“[T]he District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding the 
government’s [latent fingerprint] evidence admissible.”). In the remaining case, the gov-
ernment sought a writ of mandamus directing the district court to admit fingerprint evi-
dence, which the court of appeals granted. See In re United States, 614 F3d 661, 662 (7th 
Cir 2010). The district court had excluded the evidence because of concerns about gov-
ernment tampering, not concerns about reliability, and the court of appeals reassigned 
the case because of the district judge’s “unreasonable fury toward the prosecutors.” Id  
at 664–66. 
 203 See, for example, Mitchell, 365 F3d at 234. 
 204 National Research Council of the National Academies, Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States: A Path Forward 8 & n 7, 139–45 (2009). See also generally 
Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” Is Re-
vealed, 75 S Cal L Rev 605 (2002). 
 205 2010 WL 3448528 (ND Cal). 
 206 Id at *6. 
 207 United States v Pena, 586 F3d 105, 110–11 (1st Cir 2009). 
 208 Mitchell, 365 F3d at 233–34. 
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review: “Our task is not to determine the admissibility or inad-
missibility of fingerprint analysis for all cases but merely to de-
cide whether, on this record, the district judge in this case made 
a permissible choice in exercising her discretion to admit the ex-
pert testimony.”209 It is a mistake to conclude from these defer-
ential precedents that fingerprint evidence clearly should be 
admitted, but the Cerna court seemed to do exactly that. 
Similarly, Professor Michael Risinger found ten post–
Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael210 criminal appellate cases on the 
admissibility of handwriting-identification evidence, all of which 
held that admission of the evidence was not an abuse of discre-
tion.211 And he recognized the inherent probability of deference 
mistakes: 
[T]he overwhelming problem [with] these appellate deci-
sions . . . is their inevitable skew. . . . The skew problem 
arises because appeals by the government challenging ex-
clusion or limitation of prosecution-proffered expert testi-
mony (including handwriting testimony) are virtually non-
existent. . . . So the only cases appellate courts see involve 
situations where the testimony was admitted and the de-
fendant was convicted. What appellate courts would have to 
say about exclusion or limitation [of handwriting-
identification evidence] under an abuse of discretion stand-
ard is unknown, but it seems likely that, given an appropri-
ate hearing and findings, that result would [ ] most likely be 
affirmed also.212 
Deference mistakes can also arise from deferential affir-
mances of decisions to exclude evidence. In United States v Fra-
zier,213 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision 
to exclude a forensic investigator’s testimony on behalf of the de-
fendant.214 The Eleventh Circuit did not state that allowing the 
expert to testify would have been an abuse of discretion; to the 
contrary, it stressed “the basic principle that an appellate court 
 
 209 United States v Baines, 573 F3d 979, 989 (10th Cir 2009). 
 210 526 US 137 (1999). Kumho held that a district court’s determination of whether 
to admit any type of expert testimony must be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id at 152. 
 211 See D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or a Fool’s Errand, by One of the 
Fools: How I Stopped Worrying about Court Responses to Handwriting Identification 
(and “Forensic Science” in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho 
Tire v. Carmichael, 43 Tulsa L Rev 447, 467–68 (2007). 
 212 Id at 468–69. 
 213 387 F3d 1244 (11th Cir 2004) (en banc). 
 214 Id at 1283. 
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must afford the district court’s gatekeeping determinations ‘the 
deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion review.’”215 
When discussing “the central issue” whether the testimony’s re-
liability had been established, the Eleventh Circuit “reiterate[d] 
that the district court has the same broad discretion in deciding 
how to assess the reliability of expert testimony that it has in its 
ultimate reliability determination.”216 
Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s clear explanation of the role 
of deference in its decision, a subsequent district court managed 
to misread Frazier. In a case decided two years later, this court 
wrote, “The Eleventh Circuit held that, although the witness 
was qualified as an expert in forensic investigations, he had not 
offered a reliable foundation.”217 And another district court re-
jected a defense expert’s testimony, which it found to be “similar 
to the expert testimony that the Eleventh Circuit decided was 
properly excluded in United States v. Frazier.”218 
3. Deference mistakes and doctrinal development in 
criminal law. 
We have given some examples of actual deference mistakes 
in the area of criminal law and procedure, but determining the 
net effect of such mistakes on doctrine is far more complicated 
and ripe for empirical study.219 One issue is that the effect of def-
erence mistakes on doctrinal development may be overwhelmed 
by other systematic factors. For example, a number of commenta-
tors have suggested that the asymmetry in criminal appeals will 
cause trial judges to favor defendants in order to avoid reversal.220 
This effect might be outweighed by a competing desire to “preserve 
 
 215 Id at 1248, quoting General Electric Co v Joiner, 522 US 136, 143 (1997). 
 216 Frazier, 387 F3d at 1264. 
 217 Landrin v MGA Entertainment, Inc, 2006 WL 5249735, *4 (SD Fla), citing Fra-
zier, 387 F3d at 1265. See also R.K. v Kanaskie, 2007 WL 2026388, *4 (SD Fla). 
 218 United States v Certantes-Perez, 2012 WL 6155914, *6 (WD Tex). 
 219 Designing such studies is difficult, in large part because of the difficulty in iden-
tifying deference mistakes, which is discussed in the following Section on employment 
discrimination. We think that the best approach may be to begin with an area of doctrine 
that may plausibly have shifted due to deference mistakes and then to have someone 
with substantive expertise in the area trace out the development of that doctrine to see 
whether any of the significant cases seem attributable to deference mistakes. 
 220 See, for example, Justin Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 Yale 
L J 486, 511 (1927); Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Conse-
quences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U Chi L Rev 1, 38 (1990) (arguing 
that, because of the rule against government appeals, judges who wish to avoid reversal 
are incentivized to rule in favor of the defendant). 
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reviewability,”221 although Professor Kate Stith has argued that 
this pro-prosecution bias is generally implausible and has pre-
sented a number of other mechanisms by which the asymmetry 
in appeals may systematically push doctrine in a prodefendant 
direction.222 
Stith briefly notes, however, that a contrary pro-prosecution 
effect could result from appellate deference through a mecha-
nism similar to the one we describe. As she explains, “deference 
toward the legal evaluations of the trial court” could result in “a 
tendency to affirm” convictions, and “[i]f observers (including the 
trial court) do not recognize and adjust for any such tendency, 
they will infer from appellate decisions a constitutional standard 
below the original standard.”223 Such mistakes could then propa-
gate: “If the appellate court defers in each successive round of 
appeals, the apparent precedential standard of law could con-
tinually shift in a pro-government direction, absent countervail-
ing bias or correction.”224 Other commentators have similarly ar-
gued that the asymmetry in appeals results in a one-sided body 
of precedent, causing a progovernment doctrinal shift.225 
This pro-prosecution deference effect is independent from 
the other sources of bias that Stith describes,226 and all these ef-
fects could be concurrently pushing doctrine in different direc-
tions. Although Stith finds the sources of prodefendant bias 
more plausible, we see no a priori reason to conclude that one of 
these effects dominates the development of criminal law—
indeed, all these effects might be swamped by the shifting  
 
 221 Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Crimi-
nal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U Pa L Rev 506, 520 n 22 (1973). See also Re-
port to the Attorney General on Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of Acquittals 
64 (Office of Legal Policy 1987) (arguing that allowing government appeals “of jury in-
structions might at times work in the defendant’s favor” by eliminating the incentive to 
“not frame questionable jury instructions that would favor the defendant, since judges 
know that the government cannot appeal instructions on the ground of legal error after 
an acquittal”). 
 222 See Stith, 57 U Chi L Rev at 15–42 (cited in note 220). 
 223 Id at 27–28 (citations omitted). 
 224 Id at 28. 
 225 See, for example, Adam Harris Kurland, Court’s in Session: A Law Professor Re-
turns to the Majestic Chaos of a Criminal Jury Trial, 52 Howard L J 357, 369–70 (2009); 
Anne Bowen Poulin, Government Appeals in Criminal Cases: The Myth of Asymmetry, 77 
U Cin L Rev 1, 8 n 15 (2008). 
 226 See Stith, 57 U Chi L Rev at 18–28, 36–49 (cited in note 220) (examining selec-
tion effects in criminal appeals as well as incentives for trial court error). 
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political views of the judiciary.227 As Stith acknowledges, “we 
need further empirical research on the extent of pro-defendant—
or pro-government—bias resulting from the present asymmetry 
in criminal appeal rights.”228 Our ultimate point is this: even if 
the effects of deference mistakes are mitigated or overwhelmed 
by other trends within the law, that does not mean that defer-
ence mistakes are unimportant. They will exert influence, even 
if that influence is not the sole or primary driver of doctrinal  
development. 
C. Employment Discrimination 
The opposite asymmetry in appeals may be responsible for a 
prodefendant shift in employment discrimination law, including 
cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.229 
Unlike in criminal law, there is no legal barrier to appeals from 
either side. However, empirical work has shown that, in prac-
tice, plaintiffs file the vast majority of federal employment dis-
crimination appeals.230 This asymmetry exists because few em-
ployment discrimination cases go to trial,231 and most dispositive 
pretrial motions are made by defendants.232 Plaintiffs, who have 
the burden of establishing factually intensive issues such as  
 
 227 See Vincent Martin Bonventre and Amanda Hiller, Public Law at the New York 
Court of Appeals: An Update on Developments, 2000, 64 Albany L Rev 1355, 1382–84 
(2001) (noting that prodefendant outcomes at New York’s highest court fluctuated with 
political changes); Cornell W. Clayton and J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal 
Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Ju-
risprudence, 94 Georgetown L J 1385, 1423 (2006) (“[T]he aggregate voting patterns [of 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts] demonstrate a clear and unmistakable shift from a 
liberal, pro-defendant position prior to 1968 to a conservative, pro-state position after 
1968.”). 
 228 Stith, 57 U Chi L Rev at 55 (cited in note 220). 
 229 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq. 
 230 See, for example, Kevin M. Clermont and Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Dis-
crimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 Harv L & Pol Rev 103, 
108–09 & n 18 (2009) (reporting that, from 1988 to 2004, “plaintiffs’ appeals [ ] are ten 
times more frequent in absolute numbers than defendants’ appeals”). 
 231 See Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary at table C-4 (cited in note 79) 
(showing that, of 745 federal employment discrimination cases terminated in 2013, only 
3.8 percent reached trial). 
 232 See Memorandum from Joe Cecil and George Cort, Federal Judicial Center, to 
Judge Michael Baylson, US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 4 
(Federal Judiciary Center, Nov 2, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/EFB6-87JV (report-
ing that plaintiffs file only 8 to 9 percent of summary judgment motions in employment 
discrimination cases). 
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intent, rarely succeed on summary judgment.233 If the defend-
ant’s motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion is denied, 
the defendant cannot immediately appeal,234 and the case often 
settles before trial.235 Thus, most employment discrimination 
appeals are brought by plaintiffs after the district court has 
ruled for the defendant on summary judgment or on a motion to  
dismiss.236  
In a recent essay, Judge Nancy Gertner argues that this 
asymmetry has led to shifts in substantive employment discrim-
ination law.237 She notes that, even though the standard of re-
view for summary judgment orders is formally de novo, appel-
late courts generally defer to district court judgments in 
employment discrimination cases because “[i]t takes substantial 
work, not to mention a motivated decisionmaker, to dig into the 
voluminous summary judgment record and find a contested is-
sue of fact,” and “few appellate court judges are so motivated in 
this area.”238 
Indeed, only about 10 percent of district court judgments for 
defendants in employment discrimination cases are reversed on 
appeal.239 As “[t]he body of precedent detailing plaintiffs’ losses 
grows,” future “[a]dvocates seeking authority for their positions 
will necessarily find many more published opinions in which 
courts granted summary judgment for the employer than for the 
employee.”240 This dynamic, Gertner argues, has caused judges 
 
 233 See Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 Yale L J Online 109, 113 (2012) (citations 
omitted) (“Plaintiffs rarely move for summary judgment. They bear the burden of prov-
ing all elements of the claim, particularly intent, and must do so based on undisputed 
facts. Defendants need only show contested facts in their favor on one element of a plain-
tiff's claim.”). 
 234 See Ortiz v Jordan, 562 US 180, 188 (2011) (“Ordinarily, orders denying sum-
mary judgment do not qualify as ‘final decisions’ subject to appeal.”); Jackson v City of 
Atlanta, 73 F3d 60, 62 (5th Cir 1996) (“Denials of motions to dismiss and motions for 
summary judgment in the Title VII context are non-final pretrial orders.”). 
 235 See Kevin M. Clermont and Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J Empirical Legal Stud 429, 440 (2004) (“[A]lmost 70 
percent of employment discrimination and other cases are terminated by settlement.”). 
 236 See Clermont & Schwab, 3 Harv L & Pol Rev at 109–10 (cited in note 230). 
 237 Gertner, 122 Yale L J Online at 116 (cited in note 233). 
 238 Id at 114. 
 239 See Clermont and Schwab, 3 Harv L & Pol Rev at 110 (cited in note 230). More 
precisely, appellate courts reversed in 8.7 percent of cases in which defendants won at 
trial and 10.7 percent of cases in which defendants won on a pretrial motion. Id. These 
rates are lower than the 11.8 percent reversal rate for all private civil cases, even though 
review of pretrial decisions is formally de novo and review of many other civil issues in-
volves deference to the trial court’s decision. See note 79. 
 240 Gertner, 122 Yale L J Online at 115 (cited in note 233). 
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to develop “rules that have effectively gutted Title VII.”241 Other 
commentators have noticed a similar prodefendant trend in em-
ployment discrimination doctrine.242 
Gertner’s argument is distinct from ours, but our model of 
deference mistakes nonetheless offers another complementary 
channel by which asymmetric employment discrimination prec-
edent can lead to substantive doctrinal shifts. If appellate courts 
generally defer to prodefendant district court judgments in em-
ployment discrimination appeals, future litigants and courts 
might rely on these precedents without appreciating the under-
lying implicit deference regime. This type of error is not quite 
the same as the typical deference mistake described above. 
Here, it is unstated deference by the first court—not an error in 
reading the precedent by a subsequent court—that is causing 
the problem. 
Nonetheless, we think this type of situation fits our model 
in a general sense because, as with a typical deference mistake, 
the second decisionmaker is using precedent without fully ac-
counting for the deference regime under which the precedent 
was decided. It is important to note, however, that the relevant 
deference regime is informal: Gertner argues that the problem 
arises from appellate courts’ tendency to defer to district courts 
that find for employers on summary judgment, even though the 
formal standard of review is de novo.243 This example illustrates 
that eliminating formal legal errors will not necessarily solve 
the deference-mistake problem if judges continue to defer sub si-
lentio. It may thus serve as a cautionary tale for those who 
would eliminate formal deference regimes, such as the presump-
tion of patent validity, which is discussed in the following  
Section. 
D. Patent and Trademark Inflation 
When the PTO grants a patent or registers a trademark, 
those intellectual property rights are entitled to presumptions of 
 
 241 Id at 123. 
 242 See, for example, Lee Reeves, Pragmatism over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower 
Court Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 Mo L Rev 481, 482 & n 1 (2008) 
(citing scholars who have addressed “the judiciary’s decreasing receptivity to employ-
ment discrimination claims”); Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 56 SLU L J 111, 168 (2011) (identifying a “movement of the judiciary toward 
foreclosing employment discrimination plaintiffs’ cases”). 
 243 See Gertner, 122 Yale L J Online at 114 & n 20 (cited in note 233). 
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validity.244 A granted patent may be invalidated only if a chal-
lenger meets the higher evidentiary burden of clear and convinc-
ing evidence (rather than a preponderance of the evidence).245 
Similarly, a registered trademark is entitled to a presumption 
that it is protectable—that it is either inherently distinctive 
(such that consumers are unlikely to view it as merely descrip-
tive) or that it has secondary meaning (such that consumers in 
fact view it primarily as designating a particular source of goods 
or services).246 Judicial evaluations of granted patents and 
trademarks thus involve some deference to the PTO’s validity 
determinations, and this deference might cause a court to hold 
patents valid or trademarks protectable even though the court 
would have refused to recognize an intellectual property right 
without these evidentiary presumptions. 
It would thus be a mistake for the PTO or courts considering 
new applications for patents or trademarks (or reevaluating pa-
tents during reexamination) to rely on precedents from the in-
fringement context in which granted patents and trademarks 
were held valid.247 Just because there is not clear and convincing 
evidence that a patent is invalid does not mean that a similar 
patent application should not be denied under the lower prepon-
derance standard that applies in the examination context.248 As 
we will explain in more detail in Part III, the cumulative effect 
of these mistakes would be an expansion of the boundaries of 
patentability and of the kinds of marks that are inherently dis-
tinctive.249 Indeed, commentators have observed this expansion 
 
 244 See 35 USC § 282(a); 15 USC § 1115(a). 
 245 See Microsoft Corp v i4i LP, 131 S Ct 2238, 2243 (2011). 
 246 See 15 USC § 1115(a) (stating that registration “shall be prima facie evidence of 
the validity of the registered mark”); J. Thomas McCarthy, 2 McCarthy on Trademarks 
and Unfair Competition § 11:43 at 11-127 to -131 (Thomson Reuters 4th ed 2014). Note 
that, while US patent rights exist only when the PTO has granted a patent application, 
US trademark rights stem from use of the mark—registration merely results in some 
legal advantages, such as the presumption of validity. See J. Thomas McCarthy, 3 
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§ 19:1.25, 19:9 at 19-14 to -16, 19-34 
to -36 (Thomson Reuters 4th ed 2014). 
 247 See Ouellette, 121 Yale L J Online at 368–71 (cited in note 6). 
 248 See In re Oetiker, 977 F2d 1443, 1445 (Fed Cir 1992) (“[P]atentability is deter-
mined on the totality of the record, by a preponderance of evidence.”); In re Caveney, 761 
F2d 671, 674 (Fed Cir 1985) (“Because it is the only standard of proof lower than clear 
and convincing, preponderance of the evidence is the standard that must be met by the 
PTO in making rejections.”). 
 249 See notes 301–03 and accompanying text. 
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in both the patent250 and the trademark251 contexts, though they 
have not recognized the possibility that the expansion might be 
driven by deference mistakes. 
These mistakes could also occur in the opposite direction: it 
would be a mistake to rely on precedents rejecting applications 
for new patents or trademarks in order to invalidate granted pa-
tents or trademarks. Such errors would tend to contract the 
boundaries of patentability and of inherent distinctiveness.  
Although these “reverse mistakes” are more plausible here than 
in the habeas context,252 we suspect that they are still relatively 
less frequent, both because there are more precedents involving 
granted patents and trademarks to be erroneously applied, and 
because the PTO has the chance to erroneously rely on these 
precedents when granting hundreds of thousands of patents and 
trademark registrations each year. Of course, both these effects 
might be swamped by other doctrinal pressures, including other 
kinds of deference mistakes.253 
Despite the error inherent in relying on cases out of context, 
courts254 and the PTO255 regularly cite cases from one context in 
 
 250 See, for example, Masur, 121 Yale L J at 473 & n 6 (cited in note 6) (citing 
sources that discuss the loosening of Federal Circuit rules for patentability and the re-
sulting expansion of patentability). 
 251 See, for example, Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark Law: Greenlighting 
a Red Tide of Anti Competition Blues, 97 Ky L J 263, 264 (2009) (“The decision to recog-
nize colors alone as protectable, defensible trademarks is an iconic example of reflexive 
expansion of trademark rights by members of the judiciary.”); Andrew Beckerman-
Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property Rights: Subject Matter Expansion, 13 
Yale J L & Tech 35, 69 (2010) (“The scope of what can be a trademark today has [been] 
expanded [by courts] beyond the typical word, phrase, or unique design that comprises 
most trademarks.”); Joseph Cockman, Note, Running from the Runway: Trade Dress 
Protection in an Age of Lifestyle Marketing, 89 Iowa L Rev 671, 691 (2004) (describing 
“the judicial expansion of trade dress protection”). 
 252 See note 104. 
 253 For example, patent law is similar to the employment discrimination context dis-
cussed above in that defendants are likely to settle if they do not win on summary judg-
ment, making patent plaintiffs more likely to appeal. See Jay P. Kesan and Gwendolyn 
G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication 
and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 Wash U L Rev 237, 258–59 (2006) (finding that 
roughly 80 percent of all patent cases filed in 1995, 1997, and 2000 settled, and that 8 
percent were decided on summary judgment). This may push the law in a prodefendant 
direction. 
 254 See, for example, In re Vaidyanathan, 381 Fed Appx 985, 994 (Fed Cir 2010), cit-
ing Perfect Web Technologies, Inc v InfoUSA, Inc, 587 F3d 1324, 1329 (Fed Cir 2009) (re-
lying in part on Perfect Web Technologies in vacating an obviousness rejection by the 
PTO); In re Bond, 910 F2d 831, 835 (Fed Cir 1990) (per curiam), citing Uniroyal, Inc v 
Rudkin-Wiley Corp, 837 F2d 1044, 1050–51 (Fed Cir 1988). 
 255 See, for example, Ex parte Kim, 2010 WL 3827134, *2–4 (BPAI), citing In re 
Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 536 F3d 1361, 1379–81 (Fed Cir 2008) (reversing an  
02 MASUR_ART_PSA (CKB) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2015 10:15 AM 
692  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:643 
   
the other without considering whether this is appropriate in 
light of the different evidentiary standards. For example, in 
Mintz v Dietz & Watson, Inc,256 the Federal Circuit concluded 
that the evidence did not meet the clear and convincing hurdle 
for invalidity—despite a “simple” meat-encasing invention that 
appeared obvious under the district court’s “common sense” 
view—when the patentee presented evidence such as initial 
skepticism by experts followed by commercial success.257 Mintz 
arguably made it more difficult to invalidate patents for obvi-
ousness in the context of an infringement suit,258 but the meat-
encasing invention at issue may well have been obvious under 
the preponderance standard of a PTO proceeding, so Mintz 
should have limited precedential value in that context. Yet the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) within the PTO has re-
peatedly cited Mintz when reversing examiner rejections of pa-
tents for obviousness.259 
Deference mistakes also may be responsible for an expan-
sion in the kinds of claims that pass the “definiteness” require-
ment for patentability,260 under which claims must “particularly 
point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ]” the invention.261 In 2001, the 
Federal Circuit held that whether a claim is invalid for indefi-
niteness is a pure question of law but stated that to “accord re-
spect to the statutory presumption of patent validity,” it would 
find granted claims indefinite “only if reasonable efforts at claim 
construction prove futile” and the claim is “insolubly ambigu-
ous.”262 (In 2014, the Supreme Court abrogated this standard in 
 
obviousness rejection, relying in part on the Federal Circuit’s affirmance of the district 
court’s nonobviousness finding in Omeprazole); Ex parte Albritton, 2009 WL 671577, *16 
(BPAI), citing Arkie Lures, Inc v Gene Larew Tackle, Inc, 119 F3d 953, 957 (Fed Cir 
1997) (reversing an obviousness rejection in a “close case” based on Arkie Lures). 
 256 679 F3d 1372 (Fed Cir 2012). 
 257 Id at 1377–80. 
 258 See Jason Rantanen, Mintz v. Dietz & Watson: Hindsight and Common Sense 
(PatentlyO, May 30, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/GZ9L-VMRZ. 
 259 See, for example, Switech Medical AG v Sanuwave, Inc, 2013 WL 4636443, *6 
(PTAB); Ex parte Werner Montabaur, 2013 WL 5273983, *3 (PTAB); Ex parte Kueppers, 
2012 WL 6772030, *4 (PTAB). 
 260 See Christa J. Laser, A Definite Claim on Claim Indefiniteness: An Empirical 
Study of Definiteness Cases of the Past Decade with a Focus on the Federal Circuit and 
the Insolubly Ambiguous Standard, 10 Chi Kent J Intell Prop 25, 32 (2010) (finding that 
the rate at which the Federal Circuit holds claims not to be indefinite has increased). 
 261 35 USC § 112(b). 
 262 Exxon Research and Engineering Co v United States, 265 F3d 1371, 1375–76 
(Fed Cir 2001) (“A decision holding a patent invalid for indefiniteness presents a ques-
tion of law, which we review de novo.”). 
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Nautilus, Inc v Biosig Instruments, Inc.263) But this high barrier 
to invalidating a patent for indefiniteness was at times improp-
erly imported into the examination context, as illustrated by de-
cisions of the reviewing board within the PTO.264 Even after the 
PTO explicitly clarified that examiners should use “a lower 
threshold of ambiguity,” such that claims are indefinite if “ame-
nable to two or more plausible constructions,”265 other PTO deci-
sions continued to improperly apply the higher standard.266 And 
once these unclear patent applications are granted, they receive 
the presumption of validity, making them even less likely to be 
struck down as indefinite. These granted patents then create re-
liance interests, which future decisionmakers—including 
courts—may be reluctant to disturb.267 
A review of all 324 Federal Circuit patentability decisions 
issued over 5 years found only 1 that distinguished precedent 
based on the different standards.268 Indeed, there is even some 
dissent within the Federal Circuit over whether the contexts are 
really different: when affirming a nonobviousness judgment in 
Fresenius USA, Inc v Baxter International, Inc,269 Judge Timothy 
Dyk noted that “[i]t is entirely possible that the [PTO] will” in-
validate the claims on reexamination,270 while Judge Pauline 
Newman disputed that “a PTO decision on reexamination 
[could] override a judicial decision.”271 The PTO did find the 
 
 263 134 S Ct 2120 (2014). In this case, the Court replaced the “insolubly ambiguous” 
standard with a clearer standard for determining indefiniteness. See id at 2130–31 & n 9. 
 264 See, for example, Ex parte Crenshaw, 2008 WL 6678100, *8 (BPAI), quoting  
Exxon, 265 F3d at 1375 (“Claims are indefinite ‘if reasonable efforts at claim construc-
tion prove futile,’ that is, if a claim ‘is insolubly ambiguous, and no narrowing construc-
tion can properly be adopted.’”); Ex parte Spina, 2008 WL 4768094, *2–3 (BPAI) (revers-
ing an examiner’s rejection for indefiniteness because the claims were not “insolubly 
ambiguous”); Ex parte Saaski, 2008 WL 4752052, *4–5 (BPAI) (same); Ex parte Machida, 
2008 WL 4449324, *2, 5 (BPAI) (same). 
 265 Ex parte Miyazaki, 2008 WL 5105055, *5 (BPAI). 
 266 See, for example, Ex parte Golle, 2012 WL 5937546, *4–5 (PTAB) (reversing an 
examiner’s rejection for indefiniteness because the claims were not “insolubly ambigu-
ous”); Ex parte Kessel, 2012 WL 4165616, *3 (BPAI) (same); Ex parte Coble, 2012 WL 
4483292, *2 (BPAI) (same); Ex parte Dionne, 2012 WL 3613695, *4 (BPAI) (same). 
 267 We discussed this mechanism at greater length in Part II.C. See note 89 and  
accompanying text. 
 268 See Ouellette, 121 Yale L J Online at 369 & n 119 (cited in note 6). See also In 
re Swanson, 540 F3d 1368, 1379 (Fed Cir 2008) (“[T]he court’s final judgment and the 
examiner’s rejection are not duplicative—they are differing proceedings with different 
evidentiary standards for validity.”). 
 269 582 F3d 1288 (Fed Cir 2009). 
 270 Id at 1306 (Dyk concurring). 
 271 Id at 1305 n 1 (Newman concurring). 
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claims obvious on reexamination, and the Federal Circuit af-
firmed, noting the different evidentiary standards.272 Newman 
dissented from the panel decision and from the denial of rehear-
ing en banc, describing the PTO’s decision as “administrative 
nullification of a final judicial decision.”273 The three-judge con-
currence in the rehearing denial explained the different standards: 
In a court proceeding, a patent is not found “valid.” A judg-
ment in favor of a patent holder in the face of an invalidity 
defense or counterclaim merely means that the patent chal-
lenger has failed to carry its burden of establishing invalidi-
ty by clear and convincing evidence in that particular case—
premised on the evidence presented there.274 
But the opinion was still criticized as an example of the PTO 
overruling the Federal Circuit, as if there were no difference be-
tween validity decisions in the two contexts.275 As long as some 
patent decisionmakers treat infringement and examination 
precedents equivalently, the potential for patent-related defer-
ence mistakes will persist. 
Trademarks might raise the same sorts of issues. A trade-
mark is valid only if it is distinctive, and if a mark does not have 
“inherent” distinctiveness—that is, if it is merely descriptive of 
the product that it signifies—it must have “acquired” distinc-
tiveness (known as “secondary meaning”) such that buyers view 
the mark as uniquely distinctive of a particular source of 
goods.276 The PTO’s refusal to register a mark—based on either 
lack of inherent distinctiveness or lack of secondary meaning—is 
reviewed for substantial evidence.277 Registration creates a  
 
 272 In re Baxter International, Inc, 678 F3d 1357, 1364, 1366 (Fed Cir 2012). 
 273 Id at 1366 (Newman dissenting). See also In re Baxter International, Inc, 698 
F3d 1349, 1351–55 (Fed Cir 2012) (Newman dissenting from denial of rehearing  
en banc). 
 274 Baxter, 698 F3d at 1351 (O’Malley concurring). The parties subsequently disput-
ed the effect of a PTO reexamination proceeding on a pending infringement action. See 
generally Fresenius USA, Inc v Baxter International, Inc, 721 F3d 1330 (Fed Cir 2013), 
rehearing en banc denied, 733 F3d 1369 (Fed Cir 2013). 
 275 See, for example, Kevin E. Noonan, In re Baxter International, Inc. (Fed Cir 
2012) (Patent Docs, May 17, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/4KZT-JYEP; Matthew R. 
Osenga, PTO Overrules Federal Circuit (Inventive Step, May 18, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/S3DX-4AHD. 
 276 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 Cal L 
Rev 351, 352–53 (2014) (summarizing the requirements for a trademark to be protectable). 
 277 See In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F3d 960, 964 (Fed Cir 2007) (“The deter-
mination that a mark is merely descriptive is a factual finding, and this court reviews 
the [Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s] fact finding for substantial evidence.”); In re 
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rebuttable presumption that a mark is distinctive.278 And when a 
court of appeals considers a challenge to trademark validity in 
infringement litigation, it must consider both this evidentiary 
presumption and the deferential standard of review, as distinc-
tiveness is a factual determination that can be reversed only if 
clearly erroneous.279 
For example, in Nautilus Group, Inc v ICON Health and 
Fitness, Inc,280 the Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of a pre-
liminary injunction in a trademark-infringement suit, including 
the finding that “Bowflex” is a strong mark (that is, it is inher-
ently distinctive).281 The Federal Circuit said that it “cannot say 
that . . . the court clearly erred in preliminarily finding Bowflex 
to be a suggestive mark,” and that it “[did] not think the court 
clearly erred in finding that [the mark owner] has strengthened 
a presumptively weak suggestive mark through its advertis-
ing.”282 Nautilus was then cited by the PTO as support for the 
conclusion that the unregistered mark “BEST REST” was not 
merely descriptive.283 
If the presumptions of validity for granted patents and 
trademarks are indeed contributing to doctrinal inflation in 
these contexts, one solution might be to change the formal legal 
rules. For instance, courts might eliminate the presumption of 
validity—a route that the Supreme Court recently rejected in 
the patent context in Microsoft Corp v i4i LP,284 contrary to the 
urgings of patent-law academics.285 But the nebulous impact of 
mandatory sequencing in the qualified immunity context illus-
trates that simply changing the formal rules might not help,  
 
Pacer Technology, 338 F3d 1348, 1349 (Fed Cir 2003) (“Whether an asserted mark is in-
herently distinctive is a factual determination made by the [Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board].”). 
 278 See McCarthy, 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition at § 11.43 at 
11-127 to -128 (cited in note 246). 
 279 See id at § 11:3 at 11-10 to -11. Distinctiveness cannot be challenged for regis-
tered marks that have become “incontestable” through five years of use, so it is also pos-
sible that a court evaluating a contestable mark might mistakenly rely on a decision on 
the strength of an incontestable mark. Id at § 11:44 at 11-134. 
 280 372 F3d 1330 (Fed Cir 2004). 
 281 Id at 1339–43. 
 282 Id at 1343. 
 283 Dreamwell, Ltd v Kittrich Corp, 2011 WL 1495462, *7 (TTAB). 
 284 131 S Ct 2238 (2011). The Court’s holding in Microsoft affirmed a heightened ev-
identiary standard for establishing invalidity of a granted patent. Id at 2242, 2246. 
 285 See id at 2251–52. For the amicus brief itself, see generally Brief Amici Curiae of 
37 Law, Business, and Economics Professors in Support of Petitioner, Microsoft Corp v 
i4i LP, No 10-290 (US filed Feb 2, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 380832).  
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depending on the source of deference.286 In the patent context, 
even without a formal presumption of validity, courts might 
simply be more reluctant to invalidate issued patents and dis-
rupt settled expectations than to reject a new patent application. 
For example, we have argued that the Supreme Court’s state-
ment in Nautilus that the presumption of validity does not affect 
the legal standard for indefiniteness287 might have the perverse 
effect of undermining the PTO’s recent efforts to demand greater 
clarity in the examination context.288 We discuss the option of 
eliminating formal deference variations further in Part IV. 
* * * 
This Part has shown that deference mistakes are far from 
theoretical. Habeas precedents holding that a federal right was 
not clearly established have been relied on in standard criminal 
cases to conclude that the right does not exist. Criminal appeals 
holding that an error did not rise to the level of plain error have 
been used to justify affirmances when the standard of review 
should have been more searching. Opinions holding that eviden-
tiary rulings were not abuses of discretion have been read as de 
novo decisions that no court should admit the evidence even as a 
matter of first impression. And decisions upholding patents in 
the infringement context have been used to justify granting new 
patents that are not entitled to the same presumption of validi-
ty. In short: courts make deference mistakes. Such mistakes are 
likely not limited to the few doctrinal areas we have surveyed, 
nor to judicial or agency decisionmakers.289 Indeed, Professor 
 
 286 See notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 287 See Nautilus, 134 S Ct at 2130 n 10 (stating that the “presumption of validity 
does not alter the degree of clarity that § 112, ¶ 2 demands from patent applicants”). 
Shortly before Nautilus was decided, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s use of a dif-
ferent indefiniteness standard in the examination context, but this conclusion appears 
incompatible with the Supreme Court’s statement in Nautilus. See In re Packard, 751 
F3d 1307, 1312 (Fed Cir 2014). 
 288 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette and Jonathan Masur, How Will Nautilus Affect Indefi-
niteness at the PTO? (PatentlyO, June 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/RH4B-3AJW. 
 289 Some readers might be wondering why we have not discussed Chevron deference, 
which is perhaps the best known and most thoroughly analyzed form of judicial defer-
ence. The Supreme Court is often inconsistent in its application of Chevron and other 
related deference regimes, which is some evidence that courts do not always recognize 
the appropriate deference regime when dealing with agency interpretations of statutes. 
See generally Eskridge and Baer, 96 Georgetown L J 1083 (cited in note 26). But we be-
lieve that explicit deference mistakes are rare in the Chevron context. For a court to 
make a clear Chevron deference mistake, the court would have to be faced with a legal 
question that another court had previously decided under Chevron, but which will now 
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Trevor Morrison has argued that a similar effect may influence 
decisionmaking at the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in a proex-
ecutive direction.290 
Of course, deference mistakes are important (and problem-
atic) even if they never exert a lasting influence on doctrine. Any 
deference mistake has the potential to cause an erroneous result 
in the case in which it occurs. But deference mistakes are even 
more pernicious when they lead to long-term shifts in legal doc-
trine. In the following Part, we develop a model of judging and 
error that demonstrates how cumulative deference mistakes can 
lead to systematic doctrinal shifts. 
III.  A MODEL OF DEFERENCE MISTAKES AND THEIR INFLUENCE 
A single deference mistake, by itself, may be a significant 
matter. A judge may decide a case incorrectly, or litigants may 
settle a case for more or less than it is worth (or incorrectly de-
cide to pursue or not pursue the case in the first place), because 
of such a misinterpretation. Misinterpretations might also prop-
agate if a court incorrectly cites a prior opinion and subsequent 
courts rely on the mistaken citation without noticing the mis-
take.291 But courts and parties make errors of many types on a 
regular basis.292 There is no obvious reason to believe that  
 
be decided without deference, or else an issue that another court had previously decided 
without deference, but which will now be decided with Chevron deference. We think it 
very unlikely that such situations would arise without the court being alerted to the 
Chevron issue, and we were unable to find any such mistakes. Searching for subtler def-
erence mistakes in the agency statutory-interpretation context could be a valuable area 
for future study. 
 290 See Trevor W. Morrison, Book Review, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv L Rev 
1688, 1719–20 (2011) (noting that the OLC produces written opinions about only those 
policies that it deems lawful, so “new OLC lawyers might overread certain written opin-
ions to support the legality of policies or actions OLC had earlier deemed unlawful in 
oral advice,” which could result in “a jurisprudence that is more one-sided than OLC it-
self has intended”). 
 291 See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Service Temps 
Inc, 679 F3d 323, 332 (5th Cir 2012) (“[I]n neither case does the chain of citations and au-
thorities lead to any substantive support for the proposition that those courts apply.”). See 
also Adam D. Chandler, Comment, Puerto Rico’s Eleventh Amendment Status Anxiety, 120 
Yale L J 2183, 2191 (2011) (“[T]he First Circuit’s now-settled holding on Puerto Rico’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity is ultimately based on a judicial game of  
‘telephone.’”). 
 292 See, for example, Iracheta v Holder, 730 F3d 419, 423–24 (5th Cir 2013) (noting 
that the government had “conceded that Article 314 of the Constitution of Mexico,” 
which it had relied on in numerous prior cases, “does not exist and never did”). See also 
Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and the 
Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 NYU L Rev 1600, 1619–45 (2013); Linda 
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deference mistakes are more common or more severe than any 
other type of legal error. 
Yet, as we have suggested, the effect of these errors will not 
necessarily be confined to the cases in which they occur. Over 
time, across large numbers of cases, deference mistakes can sys-
tematically skew legal doctrine. Any type of judicial error could, 
of course, affect legal doctrine. But errors will exert a systematic 
skew on doctrine only if they are biased in one direction or an-
other. Most types of judicial errors will be randomly distribut-
ed.293 But that is not the case for deference mistakes, which 
could point systematically in one direction depending on how 
courts and doctrine are structured. In the sections that follow, 
we set forth a model of deference mistakes and describe the 
mechanisms that could generate systematic evolution of the law. 
A. Deference Regimes: A Typology 
As explained above, we are interested in situations in 
which, at time t1, decisionmaker C1 decides a particular legal  
issue. At time t2, decisionmaker C2 is confronted with a similar 
legal issue in a different case, and C1’s opinion is either binding 
or persuasive precedent.294 Recall that a deference mistake oc-
curs when C2 relies on C1’s opinion without fully accounting for 
the deference regime under which C1 decided the prior case. 
The cases that interest us can arise in multiple ways. There 
are cases in which the deference regime is a deferential burden 
of proof or standard of evidence, such as clear and convincing ev-
idence or clearly established federal law. In these cases, C1 ap-
plies the particular burden of proof, which may include defer-
ence to a prior decisionmaker, C0. C2 later misunderstands the 
standard applied by C1. Alternatively, there are cases in which 
the deference regime arises from a standard of review. That is, 
 
Greenhouse, In Court Ruling on Executions, a Factual Flaw, NY Times A1 (July 2, 
2008). See also generally Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Pre-
liminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time across Cases in the Federal Courts of Ap-
peals, 81 Geo Wash L Rev 401 (2013) (arguing that judicial attention is a scarce resource 
and that error correction will never be perfectly achieved). 
 293 It is of course possible that random errors will not be evenly distributed, particu-
larly if the overall number of errors is low. But, in expectation, they will be evenly  
distributed. 
 294 As noted previously, C1 and C2 could be any combination of decisionmakers: ap-
pellate courts, trial courts, administrative bodies, or other legal institutions. All that is 
necessary is that C2 would consider C1’s opinion to be at least persuasive on the issue. 
See note 88 and accompanying text. 
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there is a lower court C0 that produces a judgment at t0. This 
judgment is then reviewed—under some standard of deference—
by C1 at t1. C2 later misunderstands the deference regime ap-
plied by C1. The interaction between C0 and C1 is very important 
to the mechanisms we describe, but fundamentally it is the rela-
tionship between C1’s precedent and C2’s interpretation of that 
precedent that can drive long-term evolution in the law. We do 
not differentiate between deferential burdens of proof and 
standards of review in our model because they are analytically 
similar.295 
Courts can generate deference mistakes in three distinct 
circumstances. First, some areas of law are governed by what we 
call “asymmetric” deference regimes, in the sense that legal is-
sues sometimes reach appellate courts under a more deferential 
standard that always favors one type of party. For example, Part 
II.A described the legal regimes for habeas and § 1983, which 
are biased toward the government (as compared with direct 
criminal appeals), and Part II.D described the legal regimes for 
granted patents and trademarks, which are biased toward the 
IP holder (as compared with cases involving IP rights that the 
PTO has not yet approved). We describe these areas of law as 
being governed by asymmetric deference regimes because only 
the government, and only holders of IP rights, respectively, will 
ever be the beneficiaries of the more deferential standard of  
review. 
Second, some legal issues arise under what we call “sym-
metric” deference regimes. Consider, for example, evidentiary 
questions, which can arrive at the courts of appeals under either 
of two deference regimes: abuse of discretion or plain error.296 A 
court mistaking a precedent governed by one regime for a prece-
dent governed by the other would be making a deference mis-
take. Importantly, however, either deference regime can attach 
to either side of an evidentiary question: evidentiary admissions 
 
 295 Consider, for instance, arbitrary-and-capricious review of agency rulemaking by 
federal courts. See 5 USC § 706(2)(A). This could be thought of as a unitary burden of 
proof: a party challenging a rulemaking must always prove that the agency’s decision 
was arbitrary and capricious. Or it could be thought of as a standard of review: the fed-
eral court (C1) is reviewing the agency’s decision (C0) with deference and will overturn 
the latter’s decision only if it was arbitrary and capricious. The two ideas can be modeled 
identically, so we do not differentiate between them here. 
 296 See Peter Nicholas, De Novo Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System, 
54 Syracuse L Rev 531, 537–40 (2004) (explaining the circumstances under which courts 
of appeals review district court rulings for abuse of discretion or plain error). 
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and exclusions can both be reviewed for either abuse of discre-
tion or plain error.297 Accordingly, as a conceptual matter, both 
sides could benefit equally from the various deferential stand-
ards of review; though, as we will see, the situation may be quite 
different in practice. 
Third and finally, courts can generate deference mistakes 
even if there is only one applicable deference regime. For in-
stance, when a party loses a motion for change of venue or forum 
non conveniens and appeals, review is for abuse of discretion.298 
Even if appellate courts were only ever confronted with change-
of-venue appeals governed by an abuse of discretion regime, def-
erence mistakes might nonetheless result, as we will explain in 
Part III.C. We hesitate to claim that the laws of venue and fo-
rum non conveniens (or any other legal issue) are “governed” by 
this sort of unitary deference regime, because it is always possi-
ble that a case might reach an appellate court under a plain er-
ror standard if one party failed to object below.299 Rather, our 
claim is that courts may generate deference mistakes even if 
they only ever review cases under a single standard of review. 
In the sections that follow, we present a model of judicial 
decisionmaking that explains how systematic asymmetries in 
the law might allow deference mistakes to propagate and even-
tually influence the long-term evolution of the law. We begin 
with areas governed by asymmetric deference regimes in Part 
III.B. Rather than proceed to symmetric deference regimes, we 
then detour to consider a model of unitary deference regimes in 
Part III.C. We do so because unitary regimes are actually a spe-
cial case of symmetric deference regimes, and our model of 
symmetric deference regimes will draw from and build on our 
model of unitary deference regimes. Finally, in Part III.D, we 
address symmetric deference regimes. 
 
 297 While plain error review of evidentiary exclusions might seem unusual, there are 
many cases in which the courts of appeals have found that the party offering the evi-
dence failed to preserve the proper argument. See, for example, Perkins v Silver Moun-
tain Sports Club and Spa, LLC, 557 F3d 1141, 1147 (10th Cir 2009); United States v  
Roti, 484 F3d 934, 935–36 (7th Cir 2007); Watson v O’Neill, 365 F3d 609, 615 (8th Cir 
2004); United States v Thompson, 279 F3d 1043, 1048 (DC Cir 2002). 
 298 See Windt v Qwest Communications International, Inc, 529 F3d 183, 189 (3d Cir 
2008) (“This Court reviews a district court’s dismissal of a complaint on forum non con-
veniens grounds for abuse of discretion.”); United States v Lipscomb, 299 F3d 303, 338 
(5th Cir 2002) (“We review all questions concerning venue under the abuse of discretion 
standard.”). 
 299 See, for example, United States v McCorkle, 688 F3d 518, 522 (8th Cir 2012) (re-
viewing a venue challenge for plain error). 
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One last note is in order. It is perhaps evident that C0, C1, 
and C2—the various actors in our models—all might be multi-
member bodies. C0 might be a district court composed of multi-
ple district judges or an agency with many decisionmakers. C1 is 
often an appellate court composed of multiple judges who sit in 
panels. And C2 may well be the same (or a similarly situated) 
appellate court, or the same district court or agency as C0. For 
ease of explication, we will generally refer to C0, C1, and C2 as 
unitary actors, but our analysis generalizes fully to the case of 
multimember actors. That is, when we discuss how C1 or C2 
would decide a case, we are really describing how the median 
member of that court (or agency) would vote. When we describe 
the possibility that C0 or C1 might make random errors, we also 
mean to include the possibility that one judge (or a three-judge 
panel) on those courts would have a different view of the law 
than the court itself holds. Our use of unitary-actor shorthand is 
not meant to obscure any substantive consideration. We now 
turn to our model of deference regimes and deference mistakes. 
B. Asymmetric Deference Regimes 
As described above, some legal questions can arise under a 
deferential burden of proof or legal standard that systematically 
favors a particular class of litigants. Here, we use patent law as 
the paradigm for illustrating our model of asymmetric deference 
mistakes. Recall that, when a patent has already been granted, 
a party challenging that patent must prove invalidity by clear 
and convincing evidence.300 But, when a patent has not yet been 
granted and is being considered by the PTO, the standard for 
determining validity is preponderance of the evidence. 
For ease of explication, we employ a linear model of judicial 
decisionmaking, in which all cases can be arrayed along a single 
dimension. In our patent example, the cases range from strong-
est (for the patent-holder) to weakest—that is, from the least 
likely to be invalidated to the most likely. Following attitudinal 
models of judging,301 we assign the Federal Circuit two “ideal 
 
 300 See notes 244–50 and accompanying text. 
 301 See Masur, 121 Yale L J at 483 (cited in note 6) (employing such a model); Glen-
don Schubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justic-
es 1946–1963 208–20 (Northwestern 1965) (employing a social-psychological approach to 
study how and why judicial decisions are made). See also generally Jeffrey A. Segal and 
Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 Am 
Polit Sci Rev 557 (1989) (quantifying justices’ ideological preferences and examining the 
correlation between ideological values and votes in civil liberties cases). 
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points” or “cutpoints”: one for cases governed by a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard, and one for cases governed by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard. (That is, along any given 
dimension of patentability, each judge—were she left to her own 
devices—would draw a line at a given point and grant patents 
up to that point and no further.302) The further to the right, the 
more permissive the standard. 
FIGURE 1.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S PATENT CUTPOINTS 
 
Each time a federal court or the PTO (C2) reviews a patent’s 
validity (or a patent application’s patentability), it will inevita-
bly turn to some precedents, primarily from the Federal Circuit 
(C1). Suppose that C2 misreads a clear and convincing evidence 
case (either invalidating or upholding a patent) as having been 
decided instead under a preponderance standard. It will have 
misunderstood that precedent as more favorable to the patent 
than it actually was. The misunderstood precedent may then af-
fect C2’s decision, causing the court to err in a patent-favoring 
direction. Or suppose instead that C2 misreads a case decided 
under a preponderance standard as a clear and convincing evi-
dence case. It will have misunderstood that precedent as less fa-
vorable to the patent than it actually was. The misunderstood 
precedent may then cause C2 to err in an antipatent direction if 
the precedent influences its eventual decision. 
Crucially, that new C2 precedent will then influence subse-
quent decisions even if future courts never make the same defer-
ence mistake that C2 made. By integrating its deference mistake 
into an opinion, C2 has effectively enshrined the mistake while 
 
 302 See Masur, 121 Yale L J at 483 (cited in note 6); Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei 
Shleifer, Judicial Fact Discretion, 37 J Legal Stud 1, 18–20 (2008) (employing an ideal-
point–based model); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States 
Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U Pa L Rev 1319, 1347 
(2009) (employing an ideal-point model of judging); Alexander Volokh, Choosing Inter-
pretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 NYU L Rev 769, 780–
82 (2008) (explaining the use of ideal points in decision models). 
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simultaneously sanitizing it, making it much more difficult for a 
subsequent court to recognize and correct the mistake.303 
Thus, each deference mistake can alter the overall shape of 
the law. The C2 precedent, which includes the deference mis-
take, will influence the law in one direction or another—in a pa-
tent-favoring direction in our example. This means that all 
courts that would treat C2’s decision as precedential or even in-
fluential will adjust their cutpoints in light of it. In theory, if C2 
made repeated mistakes of a single type—either pro-patent or 
antipatent—these mistakes could push the law further and fur-
ther in one direction. This would be a highly significant devel-
opment. Individual mistakes in particular cases are naturally 
also important, but they occur frequently and for a wide variety 
of reasons. But an overall, long-term trend in the law, which will 
naturally influence hundreds or thousands of subsequent cases, 
is a much more serious matter. 
We wish to stress that C2’s deference mistakes can exert a 
gravitational influence on the law even if C2 is not an appellate 
court or other body with the power to create binding precedent. 
So long as C2’s decisions will be influential or persuasive to fu-
ture legal decisionmakers, repeated deference mistakes will 
have a lasting impact on the evolution of doctrine. That impact 
will surely be greater if C2 is an appellate court, but it will exist 
even if C2 is a district court or an administrative agency. For in-
stance, as we noted above, repeated deference mistakes by the 
PTO can lead to large numbers of granted patents that will be 
presumed valid and likely upheld on appeal. These patents in 
turn create reliance interests that courts may be reluctant to 
disturb. In this fashion, even the PTO’s deference mistakes can 
become enshrined in doctrine.304 
Nonetheless, and irrespective of whether the deference mis-
takes are being made by appellate courts or agencies, this long-
term effect on legal doctrine will materialize only if courts produce 
more of one type of error than another—more pro-plaintiff mis-
takes than prodefendant ones, or the reverse. Suppose, however, 
 
 303 C2’s decisions can enshrine deference mistakes even if the decisionmaker lacks 
formal precedential authority. For example, if C2 is the PTO, and it repeatedly makes 
deference mistakes in favor of granting patents, those granted patents will then be enti-
tled to the presumption of validity and will be more likely to survive challenges in the 
infringement context. See notes 244–50 and accompanying text. 
 304 We discussed this mechanism in greater detail in Part I.C. See also note 89 and 
accompanying text. As we noted there, reliance interests may have been decisive when 
Myriad was heard by the Federal Circuit. 
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that equal numbers of cases reach the appellate court (C1) under 
each standard. That court will create equally many opportuni-
ties for C2 to err in an expansionary or a restrictive direction. 
Over long periods of time, we would expect no net effect on over-
all legal doctrine. Courts may make occasional mistakes, but 
those mistakes will be random, not biased. Thus, we can say 
that deference mistakes related to differing legal standards will 
generate no net legal change so long as two conditions hold: 
1. C1 reviews the same number of cases under the deferen-
tial standard as under the nondeferential standard. 
2. C2 is equally likely to misread a case’s deference regime 
whether it was decided with or without deference. 
In the sections that follow, we propose a variety of reasons 
why these conditions may not hold and describe the ramifica-
tions for long-term evolution in the law.305 
1. Unequal numbers of precedents. 
There are a number of straightforward reasons why defer-
ential and nondeferential cases might arise in different num-
bers. First, one type of case might simply be more common than 
another due to structural factors endogenous to the case types. 
For instance, criminal prosecutions—in which constitutional 
rights are evaluated with zero deference—are far more common 
than § 1983 suits for damages, in which the plaintiff must prove 
that the right violated was clearly established.306 Similarly, 
many more patent infringement lawsuits than direct PTO ap-
peals reach the Federal Circuit each year.307 
 
 305 In the discussion that follows, we assume that deference mistakes are being 
made unintentionally. Accordingly, we treat deference mistakes as probabilistic out-
comes and model their likelihood as a dependent combination of different factors. The 
likelihood of an intentional (strategic) deference mistake will be determined by different 
considerations, including a decisionmaker’s desire to alter the law, its beliefs about the 
efficacy of deference mistakes as a mode of accomplishing legal change, and the extent to 
which the decisionmaker is willing to behave disingenuously. 
 306 In 2013, federal district courts saw 68,080 new criminal cases, as compared with 
17,722 prisoner civil rights suits. Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary at tables  
C-2, D (cited in note 79). 
 307 A review of Federal Circuit cases on patent validity found that 73 percent of all 
written opinions (237 out of 324), and 80 percent of precedential opinions (181 out of 
226), arose in the context of infringement actions. Ouellette, 121 Yale L J Online at 358, 
358–59 (cited in note 6). The reason for this is somewhat unclear, as there are hundreds of 
thousands of patent applications filed every year and “only” thousands of infringement 
suits. See Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary at table C-2 (cited in note 79) (report-
ing that 6,401 patent cases were commenced in 2013); Performance and Accountability  
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In other instances, one type of case may be a subset of the 
other type, ensuring that asymmetric numbers of cases reach 
the courts. For example, within the criminal justice system,  
every petition for habeas corpus must be preceded by a criminal 
prosecution. An individual cannot petition for habeas unless she 
has first been convicted and imprisoned. Moreover, prisoners are 
required to exhaust their direct appeals before a court will en-
tertain a habeas petition.308 Thus, habeas petitions almost al-
ways arise only after there has been a full trial on the merits 
and a full complement of appeals.309 
In sum, in the criminal procedure context, far more cases 
reach the courts under a nondeferential standard than under 
a deferential one, creating more opportunities for prorights 
(antistate) deference errors. In the patent context, on the other 
hand, far more cases reach the courts under a deferential stand-
ard than under a nondeferential standard, creating more oppor-
tunities for pro-patent errors. More generally, under any area of 
law that involves asymmetric deference regimes, it would be 
surprising (and quite coincidental) if there happened to be equal 
numbers of cases decided with and without deference. Accord-
ingly, we believe that there will always be unequal numbers of 
cases and asymmetric opportunities for C2 to generate false posi-
tives and false negatives. 
 
Report: Fiscal Year 2013 *189 (US Patent and Trademark Office, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FAG2-F2X3 (showing that, since 2010, the PTO has received over 
500,000 patent applications each year). One explanation is that, if the patent applicant 
eventually prevails before the PTO, there is no opposing party to appeal, whereas in pa-
tent litigation, one side or the other will always be aggrieved. In addition, the cost of 
pursuing a Federal Circuit appeal might exceed the expected value of the median indi-
vidual patent that has not yet been granted. If patents amount to lottery tickets—with 
potentially great or small value—the value of a typical lottery ticket may be well below 
the known fixed cost of an appeal. On the other hand, once litigation has begun, the ex-
pected value of taking an appeal may far outstrip the cost of turning to the Federal Circuit. 
 308 See 28 USC § 2254(b)(1). See also Picard v Connor, 404 US 270, 275 (1971). 
 309 The exception to this rule is when the habeas petition involves a claim that the 
defendant has been deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme 
Court has indicated that such claims are better heard in the context of habeas petitions 
than direct appeals because of the difficulty involved in bringing an ineffective-
assistance claim while represented by the same attorney alleged to have been ineffective. 
See Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 US 365, 378 (1986) (determining that prohibiting crim-
inal defendants from raising ineffective-assistance claims in habeas petitions would 
amount to “deny[ing] most defendants whose trial attorneys performed incompetently 
. . . the opportunity to vindicate their right to effective trial counsel”). Accordingly, the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the lone type of constitutional criminal proce-
dure claim that might arise more frequently in habeas petitions than in direct nondefer-
ential appeals. 
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2. Asymmetric errors by a subsequent court. 
The second assumption needed to generate unbiased (which 
is to say, zero net) legal change is that a subsequent deci-
sionmaker (C2) is equally likely to mistake a given case decided 
with deference for one decided without deference as it is to do 
the reverse. As with the prior assumption of equal numbers of 
cases, we believe that this assumption is entirely unrealistic. We 
relax it here. 
We first note that it seems unlikely that C2 would make a 
deference mistake involving a precedent created under the same 
deference regime applied by C2. Such a mistake would require 
C2 to distinguish a precedent by explicitly misstating its defer-
ence regime, such as by writing, “In the present clear and con-
vincing evidence case, this precedent decided by C1 is inapplica-
ble because it was decided under a preponderance standard,” 
when it was in fact decided under the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard. Mistakes seem far more likely to occur when C2 
simply ignores a precedent’s deference regime. But is C2 more 
likely to err by relying on a clear and convincing evidence prece-
dent in a preponderance case, or vice versa? 
Although it is impossible to know for certain, we suspect 
that two distinct effects influence the likelihood of C2 making a 
deference error. The first is the majority effect: C2 is more likely 
to err when confronted with a case that employs a less common 
deference regime. This effect should seem intuitive. If C2 is ha-
bituated to relying on precedents that use a clear and convincing 
evidence standard or some other deferential rule, it may come to 
treat that standard as a default. C2 will reflexively expect that 
any case it seizes upon must have employed such a standard. 
The second effect is the nondeferential effect: C2 will default 
to believing that every case was decided by C1 under the non-
deferential legal standard. This effect draws on several related 
phenomena. First, it seems likely that, when a court examines a 
precedent, it looks first for the legal rule and holding, and only 
secondarily (if at all) for the operative deference regime. In the 
absence of any information regarding the deference standard, 
the court will likely default to the neutral position, which is to 
assume zero deference. Second, C2 may believe, correctly or in-
correctly, that deference standards are irrelevant to judicial de-
cisionmaking and that C1 decided its case without deference,  
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regardless of what C1 wrote in its opinion.310 Third and finally, 
evaluating a precedent decided under a deference standard will 
be more cognitively taxing for a court than evaluating a prece-
dent decided nondeferentially. The legal result and the defer-
ence standard employed may sometimes conflict, as when C1 de-
cides for the party deserving deference but appears to indicate 
that it does not believe that party had the stronger case. There 
is ample psychological evidence demonstrating that individuals 
shy away from cognitively difficult tasks.311 Accordingly, C2 may 
attempt, consciously or unconsciously, to shirk the difficult job of 
navigating these two ideas. All told, courts will tend to default to 
viewing prior precedents through nondeferential prisms. 
In some contexts, the majority effect and the nondeferential 
effect will point in the same direction. For instance, criminal tri-
als are much more common than habeas and § 1983 proceedings, 
so questions of federal criminal procedure arise much more 
commonly in a nondeferential posture than a deferential one.312 
Accordingly, both the majority and nondeferential effects sug-
gest that courts are more likely to err when confronted with def-
erential (clearly established) precedents, treating them as non-
deferential precedents and biasing the courts in an antirights 
direction. In other contexts, however, these effects pull in oppo-
site directions. As we have previously noted, the vast majority of 
patent cases that reach the Federal Circuit are appeals in in-
fringement lawsuits.313 In these cases, a defendant must advance 
clear and convincing evidence to prove a patent invalid. Accord-
ingly, when the Federal Circuit (or the PTO) looks for prece-
dents, it is more likely to find cases decided according to a defer-
ential standard. 
When these two effects conflict, which will dominate? This is 
a difficult empirical question, and one to which there will likely 
be different answers in different contexts. 
3. Effects in combination. 
In combination, the breaking of both symmetries—the num-
ber of deferential and nondeferential precedents and the likeli-
hood of a deference mistake given a particular precedent—might 
 
 310 If C2 is correct, then it has effectively avoided a mistake. See note 302. 
 311 See, for example, Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 35–70 (Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux 2011). 
 312 See note 306 and accompanying text. 
 313 See note 307 and accompanying text. 
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produce counterintuitive results. Asymmetries in case numbers 
and in types of deference mistakes will not necessarily be mutu-
ally reinforcing. Rather, in some cases they may mitigate one 
another. 
The example of federal criminal procedure questions arising 
in the context of habeas and § 1983 illustrates this point. As we 
noted above, many more criminal procedure cases reach the 
courts under a low deference regime than a high one. According-
ly, there are many more opportunities for C2 to generate 
prorights deference mistakes. However, both the majority effect 
and the nondeferential effect would seem to make it much more 
likely that C2 would err when faced with a deferential precedent 
than when faced with a nondeferential one. A deferential prece-
dent from C1 is much more likely to lead to an antirights defer-
ence mistake than a nondeferential precedent is to lead to a 
prorights deference mistake. On the side of prorights errors, 
then, there is a low probability of error coupled with a large 
number of opportunities to err; on the side of antirights errors, 
there is a higher probability of error coupled with a smaller 
number of opportunities to err. 
Which of these effects will dominate is ultimately another 
empirical question, and it is one that we are not yet prepared to 
answer. Based on the discussion above and the examples pre-
sented in Part II.A, it seems likely that there will be more an-
tirights deference mistakes than prorights deference mistakes.314 
 
 314 It is worth noting that a false positive will not drive the law in the direction that 
one might expect. In criminal procedure cases, deference (if appropriate) is awarded to 
state actors—police and state courts, for the most part—that are opposing the right in 
question in a § 1983 lawsuit or a habeas petition. Consequently, a predominance of false 
positives will lead to a contraction in the underlying criminal procedure right. 
 This gives rise to an interesting set of hypotheses regarding the expansion and con-
traction of criminal procedure rights in the United States. During the 1960s, the Warren 
Court engaged in a well-documented expansion of substantive criminal procedure rights. 
See, for example, Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy 
of the Warren Court, 75 Mich L Rev 1319, 1341–44 (1977). This expansion was accompa-
nied by a concomitant growth in individuals’ rights to bring habeas and § 1983 lawsuits. 
See Jeff Bleich, Actual Innocence: How Supreme Court Reforms Have Changed States’ 
Conception of Justice, 64 Or St Bar Bull 13, 14 (2004) (“Beginning with the Warren 
Court’s reform of criminal procedure in the 1950s, the number of habeas corpus petitions 
soon grew substantially.”); Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional 
Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 Georgetown L J 1493, 1537 (1989) (noting that 
the Warren Court “essentially converted § 1983 into an all-purpose constitutional litiga-
tion statute” in Lynch v Household Finance Corp, 405 US 538 (1972)). These procedural 
mechanisms often served as the vehicles for bringing substantive constitutional claims 
into federal court, particularly in the face of hostile state actors. Since the end of the 
Warren Court era, criminal procedure rights have gradually contracted along nearly  
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But the more general observation is that it would be quite a re-
markable happenstance if these factors canceled each other out 
and resulted in zero net legal movement. It is almost certain 
that, for any such regime involving biased, deferential legal 
standards, deference mistakes will drive the law in one direction 
or another. 
C. Unitary Deference Regimes 
We now turn to the possibility that deference mistakes 
might occur even if every single case on a given legal question is 
governed by the same deference regime. Again, it may be that no 
legal issue is ever limited to a single deference regime. There is 
always the possibility that a party will fail to preserve its objec-
tion at trial, leading to review for plain error. Our point is simp-
ly that courts can generate deference mistakes even if they see 
only cases governed by a single deference regime. In addition, 
the model that we present here will serve as the foundation for 
our model of symmetric deference regimes in Part III.D. 
Consider a legal issue that is decided in the first instance by 
a district court (C0) and then reviewed by an appellate court 
(C1). Our paradigm is a motion for change of venue or dismissal 
for forum non conveniens, though the possibilities are legion. C1 
will have its own idea of what the law should be—its own view 
as to when the plaintiff should prevail and when the defendant 
should prevail. That is, it will have in mind some legal cutpoint 
that divides the two sets of cases. We use the words “case,” 
“plaintiff,” and “defendant” for ease of explication, but more gen-
erally, the appellate court will have a view regarding which issues 
(rather than cases) should be decided in favor of the moving party 
 
every dimension. Scholars have attributed this contraction to the work of more ideologi-
cally conservative subsequent Courts, which disagreed with the Warren Court and 
sought to undo much of its work. See, for example, Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution 
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich L Rev 
2466, 2467, 2470 (1996) (summarizing the scholarly debate over the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts’ contraction of criminal procedure rights and arguing that these 
Courts engaged in a “counter-revolutionary war against the Warren Court’s constitu-
tional ‘remedies’ of evidentiary exclusion and its federal review and reversal of convic-
tions”). This is very possible, but it is also possible that the trend was helped along by 
the types of deference mistakes that we describe here. The growth of § 1983 and habeas 
cases could have introduced into the case law ever-increasing numbers of deferential 
precedents. Those precedents could then have given rise to false positives. Those defer-
ence mistakes would then have led, over time, to contraction in the underlying substan-
tive criminal rights.  
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(rather than the plaintiff), and which issues should be decided in 
favor of the nonmoving party (rather than the defendant). 
FIGURE 2.  THE APPELLATE COURT’S CUTPOINT 
 
 
If C0 has a different cutpoint—or simply if there are random 
errors or assignments to different district judges—C0 may not 
decide every case in the same way that C1 would. C0 may decide 
in favor of the plaintiff in a few cases in which C1 would decide 
in favor of the defendant, and vice versa. 
FIGURE 3.  C0’S ADJUDICATION OF CASES 
 
Part III.B focused on deferential legal standards, under 
which C1 effectively has two cutpoints. Deference mistakes can 
also arise out of C1’s deference to the initial decisionmaker, C0. 
Even if C0 does not decide every case as C1 would, C1 may have 
some range of outcomes within which it will defer to C0’s deci-
sion and affirm its outcome, even if C1 would have reached a dif-
ferent decision were it writing on a clean slate. 
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FIGURE 4.  C1’S ZONE OF DEFERENCE 
 
If C1 affirms a decision by C0 despite the fact that C1 would 
have decided the case differently in the absence of deference, we 
label that decision a “deference affirmance.” This type of case is 
represented in Figures 4 and 5 by the black circles to the right of 
C1’s cutpoint and the white circles to the left of C1’s cutpoint that 
fall within C1’s range of deference. White circles to the left of the 
cutpoint and black circles to the right of the cutpoint that fall 
outside C1’s range of deference will be reversed. These rever-
sals—which occur despite the deference afforded C0’s decision by 
C1—are “deference reversals.” 
FIGURE 5.  DEFERENCE AFFIRMANCES AND REVERSALS 
 
Each time C1 affirms a case that it would have decided dif-
ferently under a de novo standard, it should write an opinion 
explaining that its decision is based at least in part on the fact 
that it was obliged to defer to the lower court, C0. And each time 
C1 reverses a case despite the fact that it is affording deference 
to C0, it should write an opinion explaining that it has reversed 
despite that deference. A subsequent court (C2) that reads the 
opinion carefully should have a good sense of where C1 stood on 
02 MASUR_ART_PSA (CKB) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2015 10:15 AM 
712  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:643 
   
the underlying issue. However, deference affirmances and rever-
sals also represent opportunities for C2 to err. If C2 reads a C1 
deference affirmance and mistakenly believes it to be an unqual-
ified affirmance—the outcome that C1 would have reached if de-
ciding the case de novo—C2 has misunderstood the underlying 
law. Likewise for a deference reversal: if C2 believes that the re-
versal is an unqualified statement of C1’s own view of the law, 
rather than the much-stronger statement that the case must be 
reversed despite C1’s deference to C0, it has misunderstood the 
import of C1’s precedent. 
Suppose that C1 affirms a dubious ruling in favor of a plain-
tiff. If C2 believes that this reflects C1’s unqualified view of the 
law, it will have misinterpreted the law as more plaintiff-
friendly than C1 meant it to be. The same is true if C1 reverses a 
ruling in favor of a plaintiff and C2 misunderstands this as C1’s 
de novo view, rather than the very strong prodefendant state-
ment that it is—that too means that C2 will have interpreted the 
law as more plaintiff-friendly than C1 meant it to be. In very 
concrete terms, C2 might think to itself: “I see that C1 affirmed a 
ruling in favor of the plaintiff in an analogous case. C1 must 
have believed that the plaintiff deserved to win given the opera-
tive law and facts.” Or, in the case of a deference reversal: “I see 
that C1 reversed a ruling in favor of the plaintiff in an analogous 
case. But here the operative law and facts are slightly more pro-
plaintiff, so C1 might believe that the plaintiff deserves to win on 
this issue.” Similarly, in cases in which C0’s ruling favored the 
defendant, C2 might misunderstand C1’s deference affirmance or 
deference reversal as more defendant friendly than C1 meant it 
to be. 
It may seem peculiar or counterintuitive to imagine a plain-
tiff losing on appeal, and that precedent then giving rise to a 
mistaken interpretation that favors the plaintiff. But such a re-
sult is entirely possible. The question is how a precedent is per-
ceived relative to what the court actually decided. If C1 reverses 
a decision favoring a plaintiff—despite the deference due to that 
decision—it has made a very strong statement about the wrong-
ness of the earlier decision and how far it diverges from govern-
ing law. If C2 then mistakenly believes that C1 was applying 
something like a de novo standard, it will miss the full import of 
this statement—that is, C1’s judgment as to how incorrect C0’s 
decision really was. It is the difference between a case falling 
outside C1’s deference range (what has actually occurred) and, 
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on the other hand, believing only that a case falls to one side of 
C1’s cutpoint (what C2 might think).315 
The deference mistakes described above can give rise to er-
roneous outcomes in individual cases. Suppose that C0 decides 
an issue for the plaintiff, C1 upholds that judgment under a def-
erence standard, and C2 then commits a deference mistake by 
interpreting C1’s affirmance as that court’s unqualified view (ab-
sent any deference). Believing that C1’s precedent is very plain-
tiff friendly on account of this error, C2 might then decide its 
case in favor of the plaintiff. This creates a new precedent, one 
that would not have existed (at least in that form) but for C2’s 
deference mistake. Again, that new C2 precedent will then influ-
ence subsequent decisions even if future courts never make the 
same deference mistake that C2 made. C2 has integrated its mis-
take into existing doctrine while stripping it of any outward in-
dications of error. 
As we have already described, these mistakes can systemat-
ically shift doctrine over time. Each case in which C2 makes a 
deference mistake stands as a precedent for future courts, 
whether or not those courts make their own deference mistakes. 
This means that all courts that would treat C2’s decision as 
precedential or influential will adjust their cutpoints in light of 
it. In theory, if C2 were to make repeated mistakes of a single 
type—either pro-plaintiff or prodefendant—these mistakes could 
push the law further and further in one direction. 
This long-term effect on legal doctrine will materialize only 
if courts produce more errors of one type than another along any 
given legal dimension. For instance, courts could generate long-
term evolution in the law if they made more pro-plaintiff mis-
takes than prodefendant ones (or the reverse) with respect to 
some aspect of the law of forum non conveniens—the importance 
 
 315 Courts could conceivably make equal and opposite mistakes if it is C1, rather 
than C2, that employs the incorrect standard of review. Suppose that C1 decided (con-
sciously or unconsciously) to review a decision by C0 without deference, instead of afford-
ing C0 the deference that it was due. Suppose C2 then looked to C1’s decision as prece-
dent, paying close attention to the standard of review that C1 employed. This would be 
an error, because C2 would have misinterpreted the holding of C1’s precedent. However, 
we would not exactly consider it a deference mistake, because the error would have aris-
en not from a failure to understand the precedent’s deference regime, but rather from 
C1’s failure (or refusal) to apply the law correctly. Nonetheless, it is useful to bear in 
mind that, just as C2 can generate errors in one direction by misunderstanding C1’s prec-
edent, C1 can generate errors in the opposite direction by misrepresenting exactly what 
it has decided. 
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of litigating in a plaintiff’s chosen forum, for instance.316 Indeed, 
one would expect there to be approximately equivalent numbers 
of mistakes in each direction—and thus no long-term bias in the 
law—so long as four assumptions hold true: 
1. C0’s errors or deviations from C1’s cutpoint—what C1 be-
lieves the law should be—are distributed evenly around C1’s 
cutpoint. 
2. Plaintiffs and defendants appeal similarly situated cases 
at equivalent rates. 
3. C1’s zone of deference is symmetric around its cutpoint. 
4. C2 is equally likely to make mistakes with respect to cas-
es appealed by plaintiffs as by defendants. 
If the first three assumptions hold, there will be approxi-
mately equivalent numbers of deference affirmances for plain-
tiffs and defendants, and similarly equivalent numbers of defer-
ence reversals. And because each deference affirmance or 
reversal presents an opportunity for C2 to misinterpret the law, 
there will be equivalent numbers of opportunities for C2 to mis-
interpret the law in a pro-plaintiff direction as in a prodefendant 
direction. The net overall effect on the law should be neutral. 
In the sections that follow, we relax these assumptions. In 
addition, we introduce a number of other potential complications 
that can give rise to asymmetries and create long-term move-
ment in the law. 
1. Biased lower decisionmaker. 
We begin by relaxing the first assumption. If C0 is a faithful 
agent of C1, then C0’s deviations from C1’s cutpoint should all be 
random errors. That is, these errors should be randomly distrib-
uted around C1’s cutpoint. But what if C0 is not a faithful agent 
and is instead biased in one direction? C0’s bias might be the re-
sult of ideological predilection317 or a nonideological normative 
 
 316 See Koster v (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co, 330 US 518, 524 
(1947) (noting that cases with only two parties should generally be tried in a plaintiff’s 
home forum because “[i]n any balancing of conveniences, a real showing of convenience 
by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will normally outweigh the inconvenience 
the defendant may have shown”).  
 317 A geographically or politically diverse jurisdiction might have multiple subjuris-
dictions with widely divergent ideological or judicial philosophies. For instance, the 
Ninth Circuit includes both the Northern District of California and the District of Idaho. 
The two district courts (C0) might have very different cutpoints, as well as cutpoints that 
differ from that of the Ninth Circuit (C1). If, for instance, the District of Idaho deviates 
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view of what the law should be.318 This bias could also reflect 
C0’s systematic misinterpretation of C1’s view of the law. C1 may 
not have clearly specified the legal standard, or C0 may simply 
have misunderstood C1’s holding. If C0 is biased, its errors will 
be skewed in one direction. Suppose, for instance, that C0 is 
more prodefendant than C1. 
FIGURE 6.  BIASED LOWER COURT DECISIONMAKER 
 
Because C0 is prodefendant in comparison to C1, it will tend 
to decide most close cases in the defendant’s favor, creating far 
more opportunities for C1 to issue prodefendant deference affir-
mances and reversals. (In Figure 6, the three black dots to the 
right of the cutpoint but within the zone of deference are defer-
ence affirmances, while the rightmost black dot is a deference 
reversal.) This skew will exist whether plaintiffs and defendants 
appeal all cases or only those that are relatively close to the 
ends of C1’s range of deference, as long as C0’s prodefendant bias 
is sufficiently strong that plaintiffs regularly decide that it is 
worthwhile to appeal cases falling to the right of C1’s cutpoint.319 
Crucially, deference mistakes resulting from both deference 
affirmances and deference reversals of cases appealed by plain-
tiffs will operate as prodefendant errors. Regardless of how C1 
 
from the Ninth Circuit’s cutpoints while the remaining districts adhere to it, then C0 as a 
whole will have deviated from C1’s view of the law. The same could be true within a large 
state. The Supreme Court of Texas (C1) might have a cutpoint that differs significantly 
from those of local courts in Austin (C0) or Dallas (C0).  
 318 See Chandler v Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 US 74, 137 (1970) 
(Douglas dissenting) (“Judges are not fungible; they cover the constitutional spectrum; 
and a particular judge’s emphasis may make a world of difference when it comes to rul-
ings on evidence, the temper of the courtroom, the tolerance for a proffered defense, and 
the like.”). 
 319 We are currently holding to the second assumption that plaintiffs and defend-
ants appeal similarly situated cases at equal rates. 
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decides an issue that a plaintiff has appealed, its result will ap-
pear more prodefendant than it actually was if C2 forgets that C1 
was deferring to C0’s original judgment in favor of the defend-
ant. If C1 affirms C0’s prodefendant ruling, C2 may mistakenly 
think that C1 actually believes the defendant had the stronger 
case. If C1 reverses C0’s ruling, C2 may fail to appreciate what a 
strong statement C1 is making by reversing a case to which it 
owed deference. 
Thus, if C0 is biased in a prodefendant direction, this bias 
can generate long-term prodefendant doctrinal evolution. The 
equal and opposite effect would of course occur if C0 were biased 
in a pro-plaintiff direction: long-term, pro-plaintiff evolution in 
the law. What is striking about this result is that our model 
generates biased legal evolution based entirely on a bias in a 
lower court (C0), even in the presence of a neutral appellate 
court (C1).320 
2. Differential rates of appeal. 
Similar long-term effects will result if parties are differen-
tially likely to appeal decisions handed down by C0. Consider 
again Figure 3, which displays approximately equal numbers of 
cases that C0 decided in favor of plaintiffs and in favor of de-
fendants that are near the outer boundaries of C1’s deference 
range. These are the black dots (prodefendant cases) near the 
rightmost dashed line and the white dots (pro-plaintiff cases) 
near the leftmost dashed line. This is to be expected if C0 is an 
unbiased (but potentially error-prone) decisionmaker. 
Consider now the possibility that plaintiffs and defendants 
will appeal different proportions of similarly situated cases. 
Scholars have suggested numerous reasons why one side might 
be more likely to appeal in certain types of cases. For instance, 
in tort lawsuits, defendants might be better capitalized than 
plaintiffs and thus better able to bear the costs of appeal.321  
 
 320 Note, however, that this mechanism relies on quite a strong bias on the part of 
C0. In order to present a meaningfully greater number of opportunities for plaintiffs to 
appeal, C0 must be deciding cases in favor of the defendant that fall at or near the 
rightmost boundary of C1’s deference range. These are cases in which the plaintiff would 
have a significant advantage under typical circumstances. Accordingly, a relatively weak 
bias in one direction may not be enough to generate significant, long-term, biased evolu-
tion in the law. 
 321 See Howard M. Erichson, The End of the Defendant Advantage in Tobacco Liti-
gation, 26 Wm & Mary Envir L & Pol Rev 123, 125 (2001); Leslie Bender, Feminist 
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Defense attorneys typically work on an hourly fee basis, while 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are often paid on contingency; this dynamic 
might alter the incentives of the attorneys and the parties to 
continue litigating past the initial stages.322 More defendants 
might also be repeat players, giving them incentives to appeal 
that extend beyond the case at hand.323 Alternatively, any num-
ber of these factors could lead to higher rates of appeal by plain-
tiffs. The point is that there is no reason why these rates need 
be the same. 
Each appeal presents an opportunity for a deference affir-
mance or reversal by C1, which in turn presents an opportunity 
for a deference mistake by C2. Accordingly, if defendants appeal 
more cases, there will be more deference mistakes involving de-
fendant appeals. And, as we have explained, appeals by defend-
ants will be from C0’s decisions in favor of plaintiffs and will 
thus lead to pro-plaintiff deference mistakes. If C1 issues a def-
erence affirmance or reversal, and C2 then makes a deference 
mistake, C2 will have mistakenly understood C1’s precedent as 
more plaintiff friendly than it actually was. Thus, by appealing 
with greater frequency, defendants may actually end up nudg-
ing the law in a more plaintiff-friendly direction. Plaintiffs 
would create the opposite effect if they were to appeal more  
frequently. 
Of course, that effect would have to be balanced against any 
overall movement in the law that plaintiffs or defendants could 
generate by appealing with greater frequency in the first place. 
That is, if parties on one side of an issue appealed more regular-
ly and selected appeals carefully in order to generate favorable 
precedents, that side might be capable, over time, of shifting the 
law in a direction favorable to its interests. Deference mistakes 
might generate some contrary movement in the law, but possibly 
 
(Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 
Duke L J 848, 881. 
 322 See Robert E. Litan and Steven C. Salop, Reforming the Lawyer-Client Relation-
ship through Alternative Billing Methods, 77 Judicature 191, 192 (1994). 
 323 See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural 
Problem, 99 Georgetown L J 65, 75 (2010); Joel B. Grossman, Herbert M. Kritzer, and 
Stewart Macaulay, Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 L & Society Rev 803, 804 
(1999); Susan Brodie Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist, and Roger Hartley, Attorney Exper-
tise, Litigant Success, and Judicial Decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 33 L & 
Society Rev 667, 668 (1999); Brian Ostrom, Roger Hanson, and Henry Daley, So the Ver-
dict Is In—What Happens Next? The Continuing Story of Tort Awards in the State 
Courts, 16 Just Sys J 97, 103 (1993). See also generally William H. Simon, The Prudent 
Jurist, 4 Legal Affairs 17 (Mar–Apr 2005). 
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not enough to counteract the secular trend created by parties’ 
efforts to directly affect the law.324 
3. Asymmetric zone of deference. 
Now consider the possibility that C1 might not defer equally 
to decisions by C0 in favor of the plaintiff and defendant. Sup-
pose that C1 is very deferential when C0 decides a case in favor of 
the plaintiff and much less deferential when C0 decides a case in 
favor of the defendant. This might be modeled as C1 having a 
smaller deference range on the plaintiff’s side of its cutpoint and a 
larger deference range on the defendant’s side of its cutpoint.325 
FIGURE 7.  C1’S ASYMMETRIC ZONE OF DEFERENCE 
 
This asymmetry could arise for a variety of reasons. Per-
haps most straightforwardly, it might reflect C1’s ideological 
preferences. Or C1 might believe that C0 is biased and mistrust 
its decisions with respect to one side. C1 might also believe that 
one side generally has a more difficult time proving its cases for 
evidentiary reasons. Accordingly, it might be more strongly in-
clined to defer when parties on that side do succeed. 
This asymmetry will produce results very similar to those 
that would occur if one party were to appeal more than the oth-
er.326 If C1 is less deferential to decisions favoring defendants, 
then plaintiffs will appeal more cases. A party will be most in-
clined to appeal cases that fall outside (or near) C1’s deference 
range, because those are the appeals that the party has the 
 
 324 See generally Gertner, 122 Yale L J Online 109 (cited in note 233) (describing 
this phenomenon in the context of discrimination cases). 
 325 This is functionally equivalent to symmetric deference around a cutpoint that 
has been shifted, but we describe it as asymmetric deference in order to better capture 
the reasons why C1 might adopt such a posture. 
 326 See notes 321–23 and accompanying text. 
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greatest chance of winning. If C1’s deference range is smaller 
with respect to cases decided in favor of the defendant, then 
there will be more promising appeals for plaintiffs to bring. As 
in the above analysis, this will result in more defendant-friendly 
deference mistakes and thus a long-term skew in the law that 
favors defendants. And if C1 is more deferential to defendants 
than to plaintiffs, the same principle will apply, mutatis mutan-
dis, and we should expect long-term legal evolution in favor of 
defendants. Of course, as before, this long-term bias will act only 
as a counterweight to any other secular trend that might be cre-
ated by a greater number of appeals by one side. 
4. Asymmetric errors by a subsequent court. 
The foregoing sections have dealt with asymmetries in how 
C0, C1, and private parties make decisions. This section contem-
plates the possibility that C2 may make asymmetric errors when 
reading and relying on prior decisions by C1. That is, C2 may be 
more likely to make a deference mistake with respect to an af-
firmance of a prodefendant decision than with respect to an af-
firmance of a pro-plaintiff decision.327 The results dictated by 
such an asymmetry should be clear from the foregoing discus-
sion: a greater number of deference mistakes in prodefendant 
appeals will lead to biased evolution of the law in a direction fa-
voring defendants; a greater number of deference mistakes in 
pro-plaintiff appeals will lead to biased evolution in the law fa-
voring plaintiffs. 
Alternatively, it is possible that C2 is more likely to make a 
deference mistake when C1 issues a deference reversal than 
when it issues a deference affirmance. When an appellate court 
upholds a lower court decision under a deference standard, it is 
likely to emphasize the deference that it owes to the lower 
court.328 In contrast, when issuing a deference reversal, C1 is 
 
 327 It is difficult to specify why this might occur, but one can speculate. C2 might 
mistakenly believe that different standards exist to govern cases decided in favor of de-
fendants or plaintiffs. There might be something about the way that those cases are 
written that obscures the standard of review more frequently in one type of case. C2 
might believe that C1 is biased in favor of one side and might impute different meanings 
to decisions by C1 in favor of each of the two sides. Or C2 might be biased relative to C1 
and might be predisposed to make mistakes in the direction of its bias due to motivated 
reasoning; unconsciously or consciously, it might search for precedent to fit its preferences. 
 328 This is one mechanism by which the court can defend its opinion in the eyes of 
parties who might disagree with it while avoiding taking its own strong stand. In addi-
tion, “deference,” as a legal concept, generally has a positive valence. See, for example, 
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likely to deemphasize the deference that it owes to C0 precisely 
because it is reversing C0 despite that deference. As C1 obscures 
its deferential posture, C2 becomes more likely to miss that legal 
hook or misunderstand C2’s stance. The probability of a defer-
ence mistake rises. 
Of course, this might be entirely incorrect, and C2 might be 
more likely to err with respect to deference affirmances. Regard-
less, this particular asymmetry by itself will not suffice to gen-
erate long-term legal evolution. The reason is that both pro-
plaintiff and prodefendant errors can arise from either deference 
reversals or affirmances. However, if any other factor were to 
disturb the equilibrium between deference reversals favoring 
plaintiffs and those favoring defendants, that asymmetry—in 
combination with the greater propensity of reversals to generate 
mistakes—could lead to long-term, biased development in the 
law. For instance, suppose that C1 is more deferential to plain-
tiffs than defendants, as in Part III.C.3. Suppose further that C2 
is more likely to err with respect to deference reversals by C1. 
Many of the additional appeals that plaintiffs bring will result 
in reversals. The counterintuitive result is that this will accen-
tuate the long-term legal bias favoring defendants. 
5. Effects in combination. 
It is important to note that the mechanisms described in the 
previous four sections are all independent of one another and 
conceivably complementary. That is, consider an evidentiary ob-
jection related to hearsay, which is reviewed for abuse of discre-
tion.329 It is possible that (1) the trial courts (C0) that consider 
these objections in the first instance are biased in favor of non-
moving parties (non-objectors), (2) moving parties (objectors) ap-
peal more frequently, (3) the appellate court (C1) affords more 
deference to nonmoving parties, and (4) a subsequent court (C2) 
is more likely to make deference errors with respect to deference 
affirmances than reversals. These mechanisms would cumula-
tively bias doctrine in favor of nonmoving parties, with each 
mechanism reinforcing the others. 
 
Hernandez, 603 F3d at 272–73 (emphasizing the deference owed to the district court’s 
application of the Sentencing Guidelines). 
 329 See United States v Cash, 266 F3d 42, 44 (1st Cir 2001) (“The admission into evi-
dence of hearsay statements . . . is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”). 
02 MASUR_ART_PSA (CKB) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2015 10:15 AM 
2015] Deference Mistakes 721 
 
D. Symmetric Deference Regimes 
Finally, we turn to legal issues governed by symmetric def-
erence regimes: situations in which either side might receive 
greater or lesser amounts of deference. Our canonical example is 
an evidentiary objection. A trial court’s decision to admit or bar 
evidence is normally reviewed on appeal for abuse of discre-
tion,330 but the decision is reviewed only for plain error if the los-
ing party failed to properly preserve its objection below.331 This 
creates a situation in which either party might be the benefi-
ciary of lesser (abuse of discretion) or greater (plain error) de-
grees of deference on appeal. In some respects, this functions as 
a combination of the asymmetric and unitary regimes described 
above. Our analysis combines elements of those two discussions. 
The added complication is that the direction in which a def-
erence mistake shifts the law will depend on both the party that 
appeals and the degree of deference afforded. Suppose that a 
party fails to object to the introduction of evidence at trial (C0) 
and then later appeals C0’s decision to allow the evidence. C1’s 
review is for plain error. Suppose further that C2 later relies on 
C1’s opinion as precedent. Regardless of what C1 decided, if C2 
makes a deference mistake, that mistake will shift the law in a 
pro-evidence-admission direction. This is because failing to rec-
ognize the plain error standard will make it appear as though 
the objecting party’s argument was weaker than it really was, as 
C2 will believe that the objecting party lost (or won) on an abuse 
of discretion standard (rather than the more stringent plain er-
ror standard). 
The inverse is true as well. If, in this example, the party 
seeking to block the evidence does object at trial, loses, and ap-
peals, a later deference mistake will shift the law in an anti-
evidence-admission direction. This is because C2 will mistakenly 
believe that the standard was plain error (rather than abuse of 
discretion) and will thus judge the result reached by C1 as more 
favorable to the objecting party than it actually is. 
A parallel analysis applies when the party seeking to intro-
duce evidence loses at trial and appeals. If the party failed to 
preserve its argument and a plain error standard applies, a later 
deference mistake by C2 will shift the law in an anti-evidence-
admission direction. If the party introducing evidence preserved 
 
 330 See note 176 and accompanying text. 
 331 See note 297. 
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its argument and an abuse of discretion standard applies, a later 
deference mistake by C2 will shift the law in a pro-evidence-
admission direction. 
To state the intuition somewhat more succinctly: the higher 
the apparent deference standard, the stronger the apparent case 
for the party forced to overcome that standard. Whether that 
party wins or loses on appeal, the higher deference standard will 
make it appear as if that party faced long odds due to something 
other than the merits. Thus, a deference mistake will shift the 
law toward a given side of an issue if C2 mistakes a lower defer-
ence standard for a higher one. And a deference mistake will 
shift the law away from one side of an issue if C2 mistakes a 
higher deference standard for a lower one. 
In sum, then, the number of pro-evidence-admission defer-
ence mistakes will be: 
The number of cases in which an objecting party fails to 
object, loses, and appeals × the probability that C2 relies 
on a plain error case and makes a deference mistake 
+ 
The number of cases in which a party introducing evi-
dence loses and appeals × the probability that C2 relies 
on an abuse of discretion case and makes a deference 
mistake 
On the other hand, the number of anti-evidence-admission def-
erence mistakes will be: 
The number of cases in which a party introducing evi-
dence does not preserve an argument, loses, and ap-
peals × the probability that C2 relies on a plain error 
case and makes a deference mistake 
+ 
The number of cases in which an objecting party loses 
and appeals × the probability that C2 relies on an abuse 
of discretion case and makes a deference mistake 
Accordingly, there will be no net movement in the law so long as 
the following conditions hold: 
1. C0’s errors or deviations from C1’s cutpoint are distributed 
evenly around C1’s cutpoint. 
2. Both sides appeal cases at equivalent rates. 
3. C1’s zone of deference is symmetric around its cutpoint. 
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4. C2 is equally likely to make mistakes with respect to cas-
es appealed by each side. 
5. Each side fails to preserve issues at trial at the same 
rate. 
The first four of these conditions should be familiar from our 
discussion of unitary deference standards.332 The first condition 
affects how many opportunities there will be for one side or the 
other to appeal.333 The second and third determine the rate at 
which a given side will appeal when presented with an appeala-
ble case.334 The fourth condition is the likelihood that any given 
precedent will result in a deference mistake.335 We have already 
discussed these points in depth and will not repeat our analysis 
except to say that the points we made in Part III.C are equally 
applicable here. 
As to the fifth condition,336 there is every reason to believe 
that the two sides to a given issue will not preserve their argu-
ments at the same rate. The principal reason is structural. 
When a party seeks to introduce evidence, it is necessarily mak-
ing an argument as to why that evidence is admissible. The very 
fact of seeking to introduce the evidence preserves at least one 
argument as to admissibility. It is thus much easier for a party 
seeking to block evidence to forfeit a key argument than for the 
party introducing it to do so. A quick empirical check confirms 
this conclusion. We ran the following search on the Westlaw da-
tabase of federal courts of appeals opinions: [evidence /s exclu! /s 
“plain error”]. We looked for cases in which evidence had been 
excluded but the review was for plain error. This search re-
turned approximately five hundred results. When we replaced 
“exclu!” with “admi!” in order to find cases in which evidence 
was admitted and the standard of review was plain error, the 
number of results jumped to approximately three thousand. We 
take this as a structural asymmetry in the number of times that 
 
 332 See Part III.C. 
 333 See Part III.C.2. 
 334 See Parts III.C.2, III.C.3. 
 335 See Part III.C.4. 
 336 We note that it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for generating 
zero net movement in the law that C2 make deference mistakes with respect to plain er-
ror cases and abuse of discretion cases. Even if this were true, unequal numbers of cases 
of each type would still lead to long-term doctrinal evolution. And even if this is not true, 
there will still be no net doctrinal evolution if each side appeals equal numbers of plain 
error and abuse of discretion cases. Of course, as we will describe, it is unrealistic to be-
lieve that all these conditions hold.  
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a party will fail to preserve an objection and thus an indication 
that deference mistakes may induce a long-term trend toward 
greater permissiveness in the rules of evidence. 
* * * 
In isolation, deference mistakes are interesting and notable; 
in combination, they can influence the law in significant and 
perhaps pernicious ways. Our objective in this Part has been to 
demonstrate that deference mistakes can generate long-term 
evolution in the law if they fall unequally on one side of a legal 
issue. We cannot prove definitively that deference mistakes have 
had this effect, as it is difficult to separate the operation of def-
erence mistakes from other factors that affect the law over time. 
But in light of the theory presented above, we think that the ev-
idence offered in Part II is at least suggestive of the influence 
that deference mistakes might exert. In the Part that follows, we 
consider what might be done to blunt this influence. 
IV.  AVOIDING DEFERENCE MISTAKES 
If we are correct that courts have been making deference 
mistakes, and that these mistakes are influencing doctrine, 
what follows? In this Part, we offer some suggestions regarding 
the ramifications of deference mistakes, the ways in which they 
should alter our perceptions of certain legal doctrines, and po-
tential corrective mechanisms. 
As an initial matter, one might wonder whether a doctrine 
that has been influenced by deference mistakes is “wrong” in 
any normative sense, such that a “correction” should be made. 
We express no normative view regarding any of the doctrines 
that we discuss in this Article, so we do not mean to critique the 
development of any of those doctrines on substantive terms. Yet 
we nonetheless believe that the process of doctrinal evolution 
through deference mistakes is incorrect as a normative matter. 
Implicit in our model of deference mistakes is a model of judicial 
decisionmaking under which judges’ decisions are influenced, to 
at least some degree, by the legal precedent available to them.337 
Suppose, then, that there is some normatively correct outcome 
in each case, but that judges are imperfect—they will err and 
 
 337 See Masur, 121 Yale L J at 490 & n 85 (cited in note 6) (citing sources in support 
of such a model); Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 40–43 (Harvard 2008) (describ-
ing the various processes by which judges reach decisions). 
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arrive at less-than-ideal outcomes. Any given judicial decision 
will deviate from the correct outcome by some amount in some 
direction. 
Deference mistakes may represent a simple misunderstand-
ing of one of the inputs to a legal decision—a technical error, 
more or less.338 This technical error increases the inaccuracy of 
the judge’s decision above and beyond whatever errors the judge 
might make absent a deference mistake. On this understanding, 
deference mistakes would reduce (or at least not increase) the 
degree of error in judicial decisionmaking only if they were neg-
atively correlated with other errors the judge might be making. 
For instance, suppose that a Federal Circuit judge were ideolog-
ically antipatent, such that his decisions were biased against  
patent rights to a degree that was normatively harmful. Sup-
pose further that this judge was prone to making deference er-
rors, the vast majority of which were pro-patent because they 
involved infringement precedents decided under the clear and 
convincing evidence standard. In this case, the deference mis-
takes would mitigate the judge’s tendency to err in an antipa-
tent direction. 
Yet there is no reason to believe that deference mistakes 
will be negatively correlated with judicial error in general. Ra-
ther, there is likely no correlation between the two. Deference 
mistakes will thus exacerbate the errors inherent in judicial de-
cisionmaking and lead to even more suboptimal decisions. It is 
in this sense that we describe deference mistakes as normatively 
undesirable and search for potential correctives. 
More generally, when deference mistakes occur, the evolu-
tion of doctrine is being driven by something that most observ-
ers would agree has nothing to do with the normatively correct 
outcomes. Regardless of one’s normative view of an area of law, 
issues like which party appeals more frequently, whether a low-
er court is biased, or whether courts are more likely to make one 
type of error than another should play no role in that doctrine’s 
development. If these types of factors somehow push doctrine in 
a desirable direction, that would be pure, fortunate happen-
stance. This is not the way that a well-designed legal system 
should operate.  
So what can be done to reduce or eliminate deference  
mistakes? 
 
 338 As we have previously discussed, courts may also make deference mistakes for 
strategic reasons, a problem that lends itself to different solutions. See note 305. 
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The difficulty with legal solutions is that deference mistakes 
affect the evolution of doctrine through the natural, informal 
processes of the common law: judges read and rely on precedent 
when deciding cases. Eliminating deference mistakes would 
seem to require significant alterations to the common-law method. 
For instance, judges could simply do away with deferential 
standards of review and consider every case de novo. Yet this re-
sponse seems too extreme. It may be that trial courts do not de-
serve as much deference as they currently receive as a substan-
tive matter, but deference mistakes do not strike even us as so 
significant a problem that, on their own account, they would jus-
tify eliminating deferential standards of review. 
Alternatively, one could imagine collapsing all deference re-
gimes such that each legal question would be governed by a uni-
tary deference standard. For instance, patent validity might be 
judged by a preponderance of the evidence standard—rather 
than a clear and convincing evidence standard—even when a 
patent has already been granted and is being asserted in an in-
fringement suit. This would be operationally equivalent to elim-
inating the deference that the PTO receives for having examined 
the patent in the first instance—a result advocated by numerous 
legal academics.339 Again, it may be that the PTO should not re-
ceive such deference as a substantive matter, or that it should 
receive deference only under certain circumstances.340 But if def-
erence is otherwise appropriate, deference mistakes do not 
strike us as a sufficiently great reason to eliminate it. 
The same holds true for habeas and qualified immunity. 
Deference mistakes could be reduced or avoided if courts were to 
eliminate the requirement that a right be clearly established be-
fore it can serve as a basis for a habeas or § 1983 claim. Every 
case would then involve a straightforward consideration of 
whether the right in question exists, with no deference to state 
decisionmakers. Yet this would entail a tremendous alteration of 
 
 339 See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity versus Noninfringement, 99 Cornell L 
Rev 71, 118 (2013) (arguing for “eliminat[ing] the elevated burden of proof that applies to 
invalidity” and citing many “[s]cholars and others [who] have long argued” the same). 
 340 In Microsoft, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the presumption of 
validity should not apply when the PTO has not considered the prior art at issue, but the 
Court approved the use of a jury instruction stating that the PTO had not evaluated the 
evidence at issue. See Microsoft, 131 S Ct at 2244–45, 2251. It is difficult to know the 
consequences of using this type of nuanced instruction. See David L. Schwartz and 
Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment from Pa-
tent Law, 26 Harv J L & Tech 429, 460 (2013) (reporting the results of an empirical la-
boratory study on jury instructions in patent cases). 
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the two doctrines, one that might be warranted on substantive 
grounds but almost surely could not be justified merely as a 
means of eliminating deference mistakes. 
Even if we were to eliminate some deference regimes entire-
ly, this might not cure the problem. As we explained above, for-
mal deference regimes typically reflect underlying functional 
considerations. Even without the “clearly established” language, 
courts may be reluctant to require the government to pay money 
damages in a § 1983 case, or to contradict a state court by grant-
ing a habeas petition, unless there was clear notice of the unlaw-
fulness of the state’s conduct. Similarly, judges might nonethe-
less feel compelled to defer to patents that have already been 
granted or evidentiary rulings that were not contested at the 
time they were made. In other words, deference regimes typical-
ly exist for a substantive reason, and courts might reach similar 
outcomes for this reason irrespective of the formal deference re-
gime. This type of sub silentio deference could generate even 
more errors, and those errors would be even more difficult to de-
tect or correct. For instance, without the “clearly established” 
language to serve as a flag, future courts would be at even 
greater risk of making deference mistakes by applying habeas or 
§ 1983 precedents in direct appeals. In short, altering the formal 
legal rules in a fashion that judges are likely to disobey is not a 
viable option. 
Less drastic than wholesale reformulation of deference doc-
trine is the possibility that courts might instead use dicta to re-
duce deference mistakes. Courts that decide issues of qualified 
immunity are already encouraged, as a matter of law, to deter-
mine whether a right exists in addition to holding whether it is 
clearly established.341 This rule could be extended to the habeas 
context and to any number of other types of deference regimes. 
For instance, a court considering a patent’s validity in the course 
of an infringement lawsuit could rule on validity under the clear 
and convincing evidence standard and then announce separately 
what decision it would have reached had it considered the ques-
tion without deference. Appellate courts reviewing lower court 
decisions for abuse of discretion or clear error could issue their 
rulings and then add advisory statements explaining what they 
would have done were they considering the cases without defer-
ence. These measures would both reduce unintentional deference 
 
 341 See notes 159–65 and accompanying text. 
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mistakes and make intentional deference mistakes more diffi-
cult to disguise (and thus less valuable). Such statements by 
courts would be dicta, which could introduce other sorts of prob-
lems,342 but the statements would nonetheless constitute im-
portant information that future courts could use to make better 
decisions and avoid deference mistakes. 
The greater problem is that courts issuing such dicta might 
be tempted (consciously or unconsciously) to engage in motivat-
ed reasoning, as we mentioned above.343 A court that decides 
that a particular right was not clearly established might be re-
luctant to declare that the right exists, thus placing all the 
weight on its determination that it was not clearly established. 
A court that declares a patent valid might be loath to admit that 
it would have reached a different result under a preponderance 
standard, thereby acknowledging that the case was close and 
opening the door for an appellate court to disagree. Or, less con-
sciously, a court that decides a case one way might be more fo-
cused on evidence that confirms that view and thus more in-
clined to announce that the result would have been the same 
under any deference regime. 
Accordingly, a system in which courts regularly issue defer-
ence-related dicta seems inadvisable. If the number of errors 
due to motivated reasoning would exceed the current number of 
deference mistakes, courts might actually produce less accurate 
decisions if they were forced to speculate about outcomes under 
standards not before them. (This is, of course, one of the reasons 
behind the case-or-controversy requirement and the general dis-
taste for dicta.344) Accordingly, it is difficult to recommend even 
so limited an intervention as requiring that courts issue dicta 
when deciding cases under deferential standards. Some of the 
more limited measures that we described above—such as noting 
the deference standard in citations to a case—seem more likely 
to produce net gains. 
Another approach would be to discourage courts from citing 
cases decided under a different deference regime. This might 
 
 342 See generally David Klein and Neil Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory versus Prac-
tice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev 2021 (2013) (cataloguing the 
impact of dicta and suggesting that widespread reliance on dicta can subvert sound judi-
cial decisionmaking). 
 343 See note 327. 
 344 See Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441, 454–55 (1972) (“The broad language 
. . . relied upon by petitioners was unnecessary to the Court’s decision [in a previous 
case], and cannot be considered binding authority.”). 
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lead to some of the same problems discussed above, in that 
courts might be tempted to base their opinions on cases decided 
under other deference regimes without explicitly citing those 
cases. But we think there could be merit to such a soft interven-
tion in some areas; for example, the Supreme Court could an-
nounce that habeas and § 1983 cases have little relevance out-
side those contexts. 
Placing a greater burden on parties to prevent and correct 
deference mistakes might also be worthwhile. For example, 
rules of professional conduct requiring candor toward the tribu-
nal345 might be interpreted or amended to require litigants rely-
ing on a case decided under a less favorable deference regime to 
say so explicitly. 
An even more limited but potentially more effective inter-
vention would be to simply bring the issue to the attention of 
judges (and their clerks) in a more systematic fashion. If judges 
are aware of their potential to make deference mistakes, they 
will likely pay more attention to the deference regimes involved 
in the precedents they are citing and thereby become less likely 
to err in the first instance. If increased awareness alone is insuf-
ficient, one could imagine a set of informal procedural norms 
evolving to combat the problem. For instance, it might become 
standard practice, when citing a case, to note parenthetically the 
deference regime governing the legal question at issue.  
To illustrate: “A condition of supervised release that bars 
possession of any pornographic materials is not overbroad. United 
States v Ristine, 335 F3d 692, 694–95 (8th Cir 2003) (plain  
error).” 
Or: “A medical device patent is not obvious when the record 
contains no motivation to combine two similar prior art refer-
ences, and when the new device was widely copied after it was 
introduced. Kinetic Concepts, Inc v Smith & Nephew, Inc, 688 
F3d 1342, 1369 (Fed Cir 2012) (clear and convincing evidence).” 
Forcing judges to specify the deference regime will make the 
issue much more salient and force judges to consider whether 
they are using a case to support a legal proposition that it can-
not sustain, given the deference regime under which it was de-
cided. This should also limit courts’ opportunities for intention-
al, strategic deference mistakes by highlighting the operative 
standard. And it might help to prevent deference mistakes from 
 
 345 See, for example, Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 (ABA 1983). 
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propagating by making clear when a court is relying substan-
tially on deferential precedents. This norm could simply be an in-
formal practice among judges (and a requirement for the bench 
memos that law clerks write to help judges decide cases), or it 
could be instantiated in local judicial rules or even The Bluebook. 
Finally, it may simply be appropriate for courts, legisla-
tures, litigants, and scholars to view particular doctrines with 
greater skepticism because of the possibility that those doctrines 
have evolved in a biased fashion due to deference mistakes. This 
is especially true for doctrines governed by bifurcated deference 
regimes. Our model in Part III makes clear that deference mis-
takes can occur under both unitary and bifurcated deference re-
gimes. But we suspect that deference mistakes are much more 
common in bifurcated deference regimes, and our examples of 
errors are taken almost exclusively from those types of regimes. 
Thus, it is possible that the bifurcated deference regime govern-
ing patent validity has expanded the boundaries of patentability 
and made it easier to obtain a patent. And it is possible that def-
erence mistakes in habeas and § 1983 cases have led courts to 
unwittingly contract the scope of federal procedural rights. Poli-
cymakers, litigants, and scholars who examine these doctrines 
should not necessarily treat them exclusively as the product of 
years of common-law wisdom, enshrining truths that may not be 
visible to the human eye.346 Rather, in many cases, these doc-
trines may be the product of the most human of mistakes. 
We admit that it must be difficult to believe that any error 
that could be eliminated so easily—just pay closer attention to 
precedent!—really presents a significant problem. Perhaps it 
does not; we have no way of proving definitively to the contrary. 
But given the theory that predicts deference mistakes, as well as 
the numerous examples we have found, we believe it would be 
naïve to ignore the issue. Accordingly, some type of interven-
tion—even, or perhaps especially, a very mild one—may well be 
warranted. 
 
 346 We recognize that many participants in the legal system already view existing 
law with a jaundiced eye, but some parties are much more deferential to the law on the 
books and the reasoning that underlies it. 
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CONCLUSION 
The proposition that courts should understand the deference 
regimes at issue in the precedents they cite might seem banal, 
and the instances in which courts fail to do so might seem like 
minor errors. Yet we have shown that such deference mistakes 
are commonplace in areas ranging from criminal procedure to 
patent law, and that they can have pernicious effects on doctri-
nal development. The cumulative effect of deference mistakes 
may be partly responsible for doctrinal shifts such as the infla-
tion in the boundaries of patentability, the retrenchment in the 
law of criminal procedure rights, and the pro-employer shift in 
employment discrimination law. 
We have argued that requiring courts to be more explicit 
about deference might reduce the number of formal legal errors 
but also (counterintuitively) might exacerbate the underlying 
problem due to judges’ efforts to avoid cognitive dissonance. Un-
less judges become more comfortable admitting ambiguities, the 
best solution may be to increase awareness of the problem of 
deference mistakes among actors throughout the legal system, 
helping these actors to recognize deference mistakes when they 
occur. 
